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I. Introduction
Legal scholars have paid little attention to closing arguments. There
are few publications that touch on this phase of the trial process, most
focusing on the substance of prosecution arguments in criminal cases.'
As a result, too few of the legal principles and doctrines of closing
argument procedure are understood, especially in civil trials. The
purpose of this article is to set out a more comprehensive picture of
this body of law than has been done previously, and to define and
analyze its major doctrines.
For purposes of this article, a study was made of a one percent
random sample of appellate opinions concerning proper closing argu-
ment procedure. Approximately 700 cases comprised the sample. 2 All
the relevant statutes and codified rules were also studied. There were
1. The only sources that discuss closing argument procedure in civil as well as
criminal cases are: 5 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 408-549 (Encyc.
ed. 1963); L. SMITH, THE ART OF ADVOCACY-SUMMATION (1981); J. STEIN, CLOSING
ARGUMENT: THE ART & THE LAW (1969); J. TANFoRD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW,
TACTICS AND ETHICS, 139-47 (1983); 1 S. THOMPSON, LAW OF TRIALS 702-98 (1889).
See also Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REV. (in press, 1987).
The bulk of the scholarly work focuses on the state's closing arguments in criminal
cases: Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 629 (1972); Berger, The Prosecution's Rebuttal Argument: The Proper Limits
of the Doctrine of "Invited Response", 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1983); Crump, The
Functions and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L.J. 505 (1974); Singer,
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-and How it Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227
(1968). There are also a scattered number of other articles that examine only the
content of arguments or concentrate on the law of a single state: e.g., Bystrom,
Oklahoma Law on Closing Argument, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 445 (1984); Caldwell, Name
Calling at Trial, 8 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 385 (1985); Carlson, Argument to the Jury
and the Constitutional Right of Confrontation, 9 C Rd. L. BULL. 293 (1973); DeFoor,
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443 (1983); Livermore,
Absent Evidence, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 27 (1984); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey
of Limitations on a Prosecutor's Closing Arguments, 64 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
22 (1973).
2. Using ordinary legal research techniques, especially the West Digests, this author
generated a list of approximately 100,000 case citations dating back to the early
nineteenth century. A one percent sample, after accounting for duplicate and erroneous
citations, produced 692 appellate opinions from all fifty states and eight federal circuits.
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several reasons for using a large random sample of opinions. First,
all major doctrines of closing argument procedure had to be accounted
for, and it was not certain that even the combined existing publications
articulated all of them. The use of this size sample provided reasonable
assurances that all major legal doctrines would be found, even if not
previously identified.3 Second, the use of a representative sample made
it possible to distinguish between cases containing genuine issues arising
regularly in various jurisdictions, and sui generis cases. Therefore,
several issues intuitively appearing unlikely to be considered by the
courts were included, such as whether counsel's failure to request
argument constitutes a waiver, what happens if a juror is sleeping or
intoxicated during argument, and whether multiple parties on one side
of a case may be limited to a single argument. 4 The third advantage
of a random sample is that it allows making of more reliable and less
intuitive generalizations about what appellate courts do. Such gener-
alizations involve whether courts agree or disagree on how an issue
should be resolved, which are majority and minority solutions to
doctrinal puzzles, and how treatment of an issue has changed over
time. All three are important when exploring a relatively unknown
field.
This article will attempt to organize, describe, and analyze the basic
legal doctrines of closing argument procedure. It begins with the
fundamental procedural right to be heard, which is the right to give
a closing argument, and secondary rules facilitating or restricting that
right, including rules regulating the mechanical aspects of argument.
It then sets forth a tentative scheme of the doctrines regulating the
content of argument in order to examine the procedures for enforcing
those rules in the trial court5 and at the appellate level. Throughout
the article, the focus is on the scope of judicial discretion built into
the procedural rules of closing argument. 6
3. For example, several opinions discussed whether the trial judge must grant a
request for a recess in which to prepare for closing argument; an issue not mentioned
in any other source of which the author is aware. See text accompanying notes 113-
118.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 74-79, 138-39, and 166-68.
5. This study does not contain an empirical component examining the extent to
which real trial judges enforce or ignore the rules of argument. Obviously such a
study is necessary before the mechanisms by which closing arguments are regulated
can be fully understood. This seems intuitively true for any area of law. However,
before an effective study on how judges actually implement the rules of argument
procedure can be made, one must know ordinary legal rules.
6. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593
(1975).
1986]
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II. Closing Argument Procedure
A. The Right to Be Heard
Every party in a civil or criminal trial has the right to be heard in
argument on the merits of the case. The right to argue is derived from
various clauses of the federal constitution, 7 provisions in state consti-
tutions,8 statutes, 9 court rules,10 the nature of the adversary system,"
and even natural law. 2 Regardless of where the courts derive the right
to argue, they are uniform in defining it: every party in a civil or
criminal case has the right to argue the case to the jury, if there is
any issue for the jury to decide. 3
1. Scope of the Right to Argue
The extent of the right to argue is not well settled. The consensus
is that the right may be exercised by a party either personally or
7. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593
(1975); United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982) (sixth amendment right
to counsel-criminal cases); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp.
923 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (due process clause-civil and criminal cases); Turley v. Kotter,
263 Pa. Super. 523, 532, 398 A.2d 699, 704 (1979) (constitutional right to representation
by counsel in civil cases-due process); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 77, 213 S.W.2d
7, 11 (1948) (criminal defendant's constitutional right to be heard-no particular clause
specified); see also 5 F. BuscH, supra note 1, at 409 (part of right to trial by jury).
8. See Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946) (PA. CONST. art. I, §
9-right to counsel); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251 (1906) (probably WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22 (1889)-right to appear and defend in person and by counsel);
see also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right
to be heard by himself and counsel).
9. See Shelby v. State, 258 Ind. 439, 281 N.E.2d 885 (1972); Americus v. McGinnis,
128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924); see also HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 635-52 (1976) (parties
shall be entitled to sum up); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-21-1 (Burns 1973) (civil cases);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-2-2 (Burns 1985) (criminal cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
379 (1984) (right to argument is preserved).
10. See ME. R. CRwM. P. 30 (argument shall be permitted); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R.
4016 (argument permitted in civil cases).
11. See Herring, 422 U.S. at 858 (basic element of adversary factfinding process);
State v. Mann, 361 A.2d 897, 904 (Me. 1976), rev'd, State v. Gilman, 489 A.2d 1100,
1103 (Me. 1985) (basic element of adversary factfinding process).
12. See Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh.) 267, 271 (1830) (every person
has a natural right to be heard in his own cause, and no rule of practice can deprive
him of that right).
13. Cf. Buhring v. State, 453 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. 1983).-
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through counsel. 4 It includes the right to argue the facts in evidence,
to argue how the law is to be applied, and to utilize oratorical skills.
It extends to all civil and criminal cases surviving a motion for a
directed verdict 5 in jury and nonjury trials.' 6 It includes the right of
the party with the burden of proof to argue last.-7 The right is
waivable, 8 its denial is reversible error, 9 and it is subject to reasonable
limitations and regulations."0
No real controversy exists over whether the right to be heard may
be exercised by a party personally or through counsel. Some cases,
statutes, and court rules state the right to argue is given to the attorney
or is derived from a party's right to counsel. 21 However, the right to
counsel says more about the expectation that a "proper" trial is one
where the parties have lawyers rather than who has the right to argue.
The cases, statutes, and court rules give no indication that the right
would be denied to an unrepresented party.22 Additionally, a party
does not appear to have two rights to argue-one to argue personally
and one by counsel. 23
14. E.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562
(1975).
15. E.g., Cherry v. State, 305 Md. 631, 506 A.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1986).
16. E.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 863 n.15, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2556
n.15, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 601 n.15 (1975).
17. 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 412-20 (listing cases to support the proposition);
see also Silver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940).
18. E.g., Mo. R. CRm. P. 27.02(1).
19. Herring, 422 U.S. at 864-65.
20. Id. at 862.
21. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593
(1975) (right derives partly from right to counsel; counsel has right to closing
summation); United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991, 992 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument is
an integral part of right to counsel); Turley v. Kotter, 263Pa. Super. 523, 398, A.2d
699, 704 (1979) (argument is part of right to representation by an attorney in civil
cases); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-401(6) (1983) (counsel may argue); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-379 (1984) (counsel's right to argument is preserved); ClVnL DIST. CT. R. 14
(in all arguments, counsel shall be heard); ME. R. Crv. P. 51(a) (counsel for each
party shall be allowed one hour for argument); MICH. CT. R. 2.507(E) (attorney for
the party is entitled to make a closing argument); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.02 (the attorney
shall make an argument).
22. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562
(1975) (defendant has constitutional right to proceed without counsel); Americus v.
McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924) (civil plaintiff represented self; his right
to address jury held to be absolute).
23. Compare Poindexter v. State, 268 Ind. 167, -, 374 N.E.2d 509, 514 (1978)
(when defendant has been competently represented throughout trial, it is proper for
the court to determine whether argument is best made by counsel or by defendant)
with Americus v. McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924) (plaintiff had absolute
right to argue despite fact that associate counsel also argued; double argument issue
not discussed).
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The right to argue includes the privileges to argue the facts in
evidence,24 to argue how the law is to be applied, 25 and to employ
oratorical and rhetorical skills. 26 Most descriptions of the argument's
scope recognize that all three components may be properly included
in a closing argument.
[Airgument may properly include a full discussion of the issues in
the case, the credibility of the several witnesses . . ., the probative
value of the evidence as satisfying or failing to satisfy the required
burden of proof, [and] the application of the law to the evidence.
... It is the function of argument, and the inestimable privilege
of the advocate, to discuss the evidence and the law with the jury
so that it will understand the full significance of the former and
the applicability and justice of the latter . . . . Such an argument,
so long as it is supported by the facts and circumstances properly
in evidence, may be couched in vigorous and pungent phrases,
embellished with oratorical flourishes, and illuminated by pertinent
illustrations. 27
A few appellate cases state that closing arguments must be limited
to a review of the facts, and that arguments concerning the law are
not permitted. However, such statements cannot be taken literally.
They mean only that an attorney may not argue about what the law
is, as in an appellate court, but must accept the law as it is contained
in the judge's instructions. 28 A few courts have sporadically attempted
24. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, _, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (1974).
25. HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-52 (1976).
26. Wilhelm, 326 A.2d at 714.
27. 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 411-12, 431; see also Powell v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 598 S.W.2d 449 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (essence of argument is to offer counsel
the opportunity to focus attention on facts and law that support theory); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 635-52 (1976) (parties may sum up facts and argue law of the case).
28. A full discussion of the permissible extent of argument concerning the law is
beyond the scope of this article. It will be examined in detail in a forthcoming article.
In general, the limitations on arguing law can be stated as follows: it is improper to
argue against the court's instructions, to discuss legal issues not germane, to argue
novel theories of law, and to misstate the law or to state the law in a confusing
manner; but it is permissible to state the law consistent with the court's instructions
and to argue how the facts are to be applied to it. See Commonwealth v. Gwaltney,
479 Pa. 88, 387 A.2d 848 (1978); see also Goodrum v. State, 240 Ga. 678, 242 S.E.2d
158 (1978) (may read statute to jury); Martin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d
829, 416 N.E.2d 347 (1981) (counsel may state belief as to what court will instruct
based on pretrial conference, unless misleading); Morris v. State, 270 Ind. 245, 384
N.E.2d 1022 (1979) (proper to read one of court's instructions to jury); Bergel v.
Kassebaum, 577 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (a party has right to argue based
on instructions but not to differ from them); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212
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to prevent the use of oratorical tricks and rhetorical devices, but most
permit them. 29
Both civil and criminal litigants enjoy the right to argue. The right
exists in both jury and nonjury trials. It is strongest in criminal trials,
jury or nonjury, where constitutional status was given to a defendant's
right by the Supreme Court in Herring v. New York. 30 The right to
argue is also fairly strong in civil jury trials, where a party's right has
occasionally been elevated to constitutional stature. Additionally, it has
also been codified in many jurisdictions, and all modern cases deny
S.E.2d 125 (1975) (both sides can argue law but may not argue law not relevant to
case); cf. People v. Pineiro, 129 Cal. App. 3d 915, 179 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1982) (no
error even if a prosecutor misstates the law); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-14-18
(1984) (counsel may argue and comment upon law as given in instructions, but may
not argue that law governing the case is other than that given in instructions).
In the author's sample of 729 cases, only one contains broad language that seems
to prohibit legal argument altogether. Clemons v. State, 320 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1975)
(states that attorneys may not "instruct" on law, but case involved a prosecutor who
misstated law and then argued about it when the judge sustained an objection). Two
other cases in the sample hold it within the trial court's discretion to prevent argument
about law: State v. Stawicki, 93 Wis. 2d 63, 286 N.W.2d 612 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979),
which is probably bad law, since State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 247 N.W.2d
80 (Wis. 1976) states clearly that it is error to exclude all comments on the law;
People v. Boalbey, 90 Ill. App. 3d 738, 413 N.E.2d 553 (1980) (judge may deny party
the right to read law to jury), which conflicts with Martin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92
Ill. App. 3d 829, 416 N.E.2d 347 (1981). Thompson states that counsel "ought not
to be allowed to argue questions of law," 1 S. THOMPSON supra note 1, at 721, but
makes it clear in subsequent paragraphs that he is referring to arguments concerning
the validity of the judge's instructions, not to the general right of counsel to state
the law in accordance with the instructions and to argue about its application. Id. at
721-25. Busch cites three other cases as prohibiting argument concerning law, 5 F.
BUSCH, supra note 1, at 471 n.18, but the cases do not support such a broad
prohibition.
29. See also Thorsen v. City of Chicago, 74 I11. App. 3d 98, 104-05, 392 N.E.2d
716, 721 (1979) ("[T]he partisanship and heat of battle inherent in a lawsuit militate
in favor of granting a certain latitude to attorneys in representing their clients.").
Compare Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 351, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (1897) (tears have
always been considered legitimate arguments before a jury) with People v. Dukes, 12
I11. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14 (1957) (reversible error to shed tears during argument).
The majority position is stated in cases such as State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125 (Me.
1982) (prosecutor may employ wit, satire, invective and imagination); Wilhelm v. State,
272 Md. 404, 326 A.2d 707 (1974) (there are no well-defined bounds beyond which
the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar; he may indulge in oratorical conceit or
flourish and in metaphorical allusion); People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 430 N.E.2d
885, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1981) (broad bounds of rhetorical comment permitted in closing
argument); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977) (counsel must be indulged the privilege of flights of oratory).
30. 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975) (The Supreme Court
struck down on constitutional grounds a New York statute that gave trial judges the
power to dispense with summations in nonjury trials.).
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the judge power to prohibit argument.3 ' In civil bench trials, however,
the right to argue is not as universally recognized.12 A few courts have
held that argument in civil bench trials is only a privilege, not a right,
and that the judge has discretion to dispense with it." Finally, the
prosecution in a criminal trial undoubtedly has the right to make an
31. A few cases assert constitutional grounds. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (right to argue is a due
process right in civil and criminal cases); Neston v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469
(1946) (right to argue in civil case is part of constitutional right to representation by
counsel and due process). In the sample of 729 cases, none suggested that the judge
could dispense with arguments in a civil jury trial. Explicit statements that the right
exists can be found in civil cases going back 150 years. See, e.g., McCullough v.
Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 73 P.2d 649 (1937); Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4
J.J. Marsh) 267 (1830); Lyman v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 65 A.D. 27, 72 N.Y.S. 498
(1901). Busch cites twenty-six cases from the early 1900's for the proposition that
refusal to hear argument in civil cases is not always error but none supports the
point. 5 F. BuSCH, supra note 1, at 410. All involve directed verdicts, waivers of
argument, failure to preserve the issue for appeal, or limitations on the number of
attorneys who could argue.
Codifications of the right include: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 607 (West 1984); IowA
R. Cirv. P. 195; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-180 (1982), as interpreted in Lovett v.
Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 635-52
(1976); IND. CODE § 34-1-21-1 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1107(6) (1979); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-5-330 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (implicit); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
15-14-18 (1984) (implicit); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-379 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
805.10 (West 1977); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 46(g); Aim. R. CIrv. P. 51(c); Ky. R. CIv.
P. 43.02(e); ME. R. CIv. P. 51(a); MAss. R. Civ. P. 51(a); MICH. CT. R. 2.507(E);
OKLA. R. CIrv. P. § 577; R.I. CT. R. 51(a); TEX. R. CT. 269; UTAH R. CIv. P. 51.
32. E.g., Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Fetner, 269 Pa. Super. 455, 410
A.2d 344 (1979) (trial judge has discretion in permitting closing arguments).
33. In the sample, only three opinions held that arguments in civil bench trials
were discretionary. All are from intermediate appellate courts; none cited any prior
authority. Belmont Elec. Serv. v. Dohrn, 516 P.2d 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (one
sentence, no citations or discussion); Roberson v. Roberson, 40 N.C. App. 193, 252
S.E.2d 237 (1979) (court admits that no authority existed to support holding); Federal
.. and Bank of Baltimore v. Fetner, 269 Pa. Super. 455, 410 A.2d 344 (1979) (denial
of final argument approved in case where judge had encouraged discussion of issues
as trial progressed). Busch cites thirteen additional cases from the early 1900's in
support of the proposition that arguments are discretionary in civil nonjury trials, 5
F. BuscH, supra note 1, at 410, only two of which actually support the point: Warner
v. Close, 120 Mo. App. 211, 96 S.W. 491 (1906); and Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo.
89, 275 P. 101 (1929). The others either are not on point or are decided on harmless
error grounds. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254
N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 1977), while rejecting the proposition that arguments in bench
trials are discretionary, cited Annotation, Argument of Counsel-Denial-Prejudice,
38 A.L.R.2d 1396, 1419, 1431-39 (1954), in support of a statement that the courts in
other states are divided on the point. The cases cited in that annotation are essentially
the same as those cited by Busch.
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argument, although case law on the point is extremely rare and only
indirect statutory authority exists .
4
The right to argue a case's merits exists only if a genuine issue must
be resolved by the trier of fact, if it is a jury. Frequently, this limitation
is appended to general descriptions of the right, without further
explanation." This may mean the judge has discretion to send a case
to the jury without argument if he or she thinks the evidence and law
are all on one side, or it may mean that the right to argue extends
only to cases that go to the jury and are not decided by a directed
verdict. No case in the sample gave a detailed explanation, but several
cases in support of this limitation clarify how it operates.3 6 However,
the right of argument does not supersede the court's power to grant
a directed verdict. If the court is legally obligated to grant a directed
verdict (or judgment of acquittal) where the facts and law permit only
one result, it may do, even though the parties are deprived of the
opportunity to make closing arguments.37 However, cases concerning
the denial of the right to argue make it reasonably clear that trial
judges lack the power to dispense with arguments and still send cases
to the jury. 38
The party with the burden of proof usually has the right to argue
twice. He may make both the opening and the concluding arguments.
This principle is firmly rooted in the concept of formal adversary
34. The closest cases are Shelby v. State, 258 Ind. 439, 281 N.E.2d 885 (1972)
(right to argue forcefully is given to both sides), and Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254
N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977) (dictum). The absence of case law undoubtedly is because it
would be virtually impossible for the state to appeal a decision to dispense with
argument. The existence of the prosecution's right to argue is implicit in statutes and
rules of criminal procedure that set the order of argument or make an opening
argument mandatory. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-88 (West 1960); IIAHO CODE § 19-2101(5) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3414(4) (1979); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03(11)(h); Mo. R. CPm.. P. 29.1(a) (the state
shall have the right to open the argument).
35. 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 408; 1 S. THOMPsoN supra note 1, at 703.
36. See 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 412-20 (citing cases supporting limitation of
genuine issue).
37. See, e.g., Vieceli v. Cummings, 322 Ill. App. 559, 54 N.E.2d 717 (1944);
Douglass v. Hill, 29 Kan. 376 (1883).
38. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2553 45 L.
Ed. 2d 593, 598 (1975) (defense has right to argue no matter how strong the case
appears to the presiding judge); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977)
(reversing judge's denial of argument; judge had stated that argument was unnecessary
because evidence was clear); Word v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 743 (1831)
(jury trial; court convinced that evidence was all on one side and unimpeached,
resolution obvious, and argument useless; nevertheless error to prevent defendant from
arguing).
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argument and is found in appellate argument and in debating. The
side that must establish the affirmative proposition has the first
argument and also an opportunity for rebuttal.3 9 In a trial, historically
the principle has been known as the right to open and close. The
party with the burden of proof begins the voir dire, makes the first
opening statement, presents its evidence first, makes the first argument
(the right to open), and also makes the concluding or rebuttal argument
(the right to close). 40 Much has been written generally about the right
to open and close, analyzing which party should be given this position
of advantage.4 1 With the demise of complicated common-law pleading
and the growth of codification of trial procedures, 42 most of the
intricacies of the right to open and close have disappeared. These
events caused the order of arguments to become routinized. The plaintiff
normally has the first and last argument 43 except in three situations:
(1) in civil cases, when the defendant concedes a prima facie case and
proceeds solely on an affirmative defense;" (2) in four southeastern
states, when a criminal defendant presents no evidence; 45 and (3) in
six states that have a statute or rule that limits each party to a single
argument 46
39. E.g., Mo. R. CRIm. P. 27.02(1) (appellate rule); see also H. Summers, F.
Whan & T. Rousse, How to Debate: A Textbook for Beginners app. 5 at 344-45 (3d
ed. 1963) [hereinafter How to Debate] (high school debate rules).
40. E.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 51(c) (party with burden of persuasion has right to
open and close).
41. See, e.g., 5 F. BuscH, supra note 1, at 412-20; 1 S. THOMPSON supra note 1,
at 213-44 (covering topics such as "Cases of Replevin of Cattle Distrained for Rent
with Avowry of Rent in Arrear").
42. At least thirty-two states now have statutes or rules of procedure that dictate
the order of argument.
43. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 607
(West 1984); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 46(g); TEX. R. Crv. P. 269(a).
44. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940)
(defendant earned right to open and close by "substantially" admitting all allegations);
cf. N.C. SUPER. & DIST. CT. R. 10 (if defendant presents no evidence, he has the
right to open and close).
45. The states are North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (1982) (prosecuting attorney opens and closes unless
defendant introduces no evidence at all); FLA. R. CRwm. P. 3.250 (defendant who
offers no testimony other than his own is entitled to concluding argument). North
Carolina extends this rule to civil cases. N.C. SUPER. & DIST. CT. R. 10.
46. See, e.g., Ky. R. Crv. P. 43.02 (defendant first, plaintiff concludes); Ky. R.
CRIM. P. 9.42(f) (defendant first, commonwealth concludes); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
26.03(11)(h)-(i) (prosecution first, defendant concludes).
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2. Waiver of the Right to Argue
The law recognizes that a party may explicitly47 or implicitly" waive
his right to argue. To the extent statutes and rules address the matter,
most specifically provide for waiver. 49 Case law also assures a party's
right to waive argument. Therefore, if a party expressly waives argu-
ment, the case may go to the jury without it.5° The decision to give
or waive argument is left to the party; whether the judge and jury do
or do not want to hear arguments is irrelevant."
Two waiver issues regularly appear and are resolved in various ways
in different jurisdictions. The first is whether a waiver may be implied
from a party's conduct (particularly by silence). The second is whether
the party with the right to open and close may waive the opening
argument but still give a concluding argument.
A number of civil and criminal appellate cases have dealt with the
issue of implied waiver. All agree that the right to argue may be
waived either expressly or "by fair inference from the conduct of
counsel." 2 There is a split on whether waiver may be implied from
counsel's inaction, such as silence or failure to affirmatively request
47. E.g., Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.02(1).
48. See Tanford, supra note 1, at n.304 (in press) (discussing the split of authority
on implicit waiver).
49. "When the evidence is concluded, unless the case is submitted to the jury on
either side, or on both sides, without argument, the district attorney ... must open
and conclude the argument." NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.141 (1986) (emphasis added).
See also Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-201(vii) (1977) (unless the case is submitted without
argument, counsel for state goes first and last); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.02(1) (each side
may waive its right to argument). N.J.R. GEN. App. 1:7-1(b) (parties may make
closing statements). In total, statutes and rules in twenty-one states make it clear that
parties are not required to argue. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (1982) (statute says
the prosecution shall argue first and last; no mention of waiver); ALASKA R. CIv. P.
46(g) (one provision says arguments shall be given unless waived by mutual agreement,
but another provision discusses consequences of a waiver by one side only).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982); Chandler v.
Miles, 193 A. 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937); People v. Gore, 25 Mich. App. 700, 181
N.W.2d 654 (1970); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977); Commonwealth
v. Miller, 236 Pa. Super. 253, 344 A.2d 527 (1975). For examples of explicit waiver,
see Key Hotel Corp. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 172 Ind. App. 15, 359 N.E.2d 262
(1977) (court stated it assumed that both sides waived argument and asked if they
were ready for a decision; defense replied, "We are, your honor."); Garner v. State,
16 Md. App. 353, 297 A.2d 304 (1973) (court asked if there was any argument;
defense replied, "No argument.").
51. See Shippy v. Peninsula Rapid Transit Co., 197 Cal. 290, 240 P. 785 (1925)
(jurors voted on whether to hear argument; reversed).
52. McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 524, 73 P.2d 649, 656 (1937).
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argument. The problem is exacerbated by procedural rules requiring a
contemporaneous objection to trial errors to preserve the issue for
appeal." Therefore, a case in which a party has made neither a request
to argue nor an objection to the submission of the case without
argument presents two waiver issues: has the party waived his right
to argue (true waiver) and/or has he "waived" his right to appeal on
that issue (procedural default)?
The distinction between true waiver and procedural default is not
merely semantic. A true waiver precludes appeal, since one cannot
appeal for the denial of a right voluntarily given up. Procedural
default, however, is merely a rule of bureaucratic convenience. Not
all jurisdictions require contemporaneous objections and others rec-
ognize that errors affecting the fundamental fairness5 4 of a trial may
be taken up on appeal despite procedural default. Therefore, if one
has only defaulted his right to appeal, at least some courts go ahead
and decide the underlying issue-whether the party was denied its right
to argue. 5 If it is the right to argue that has been waived, then there
is nothing to appeal.
An unresolved issue is whether a party's silence can be an implied
waiver of its right to argue. Direct precedent is sparse and conflicting.
In the sample, only three cases dealt directly with the question, and
each reached a different result: one case implied that silence can never
be a waiver 5 6 one held that silence is a waiver, and one compromised,
holding that silence is a waiver only if a party had a realistic opportunity
to request argument but failed to do so.s
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Spears v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir.
1972) (defendant neither requested argument nor objected; proper timely objection
required, so court refuses to decide issue on merits).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant
did not object to denial of argument at trial, so court may consider issue only if
plain error affecting fundamental rights; court determines that denial of argument is
plain error, so issue may be presented for first time on appeal; court goes on to find
implied waiver of argument because of conduct of attorney); see infra text accompanying
notes 323-39 (procedural default discussed more fully).
55. Id.
56. City of Columbus v. Woodrick, 48 Ohio App. 2d 274, 357 N.E.2d 58 (1976).
57. State v. Mann, 361 A.2d 897 (Me. 1976); see also Piatt v. Head, 35 Kan.
282, 10 P. 822 (1886) (silence after a request is waiver); Commonwealth v. Miller,
236 Pa. Super. 253, 258, 344 A.2d 527, 529 (1975) (dissent states opinion that sitting
silently would be a waiver; not apropos, because counsel had requested argument).
58. United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Fuhrman v.
Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977) (failure to request argument not a waiver when
counsel had no realistic opportunity to assert right-no discussion of issue).
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In criminal cases, since Herring v. New York gave the right to argue
constitutional status, the standard for waiver of other constitutional
rights, especially other sixth amendment rights, should apply. When
the right to counsel is involved, the most frequently cited statement
of the waiver doctrine is from Johnson v. Zerbst.5 9 The Johnson court
stated, " '[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver'
of fundamental constitutional rights . . .60 [and] we 'do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' ",61 A waiver is ordi-
narily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. 62 This presumption against waiver of a sixth amendment
right can be overcome only if the record shows the defendant was
informed of the right 63 and had the opportunity to exercise or waive
59. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).
60. Id. at 464 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct.
809, 812, 81 L. Ed. 1177, 1180 (1936); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412, 1 S.
Ct. 307, 311, 27 L. Ed. 169, 171 (1882)).
61. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S. Ct. 724, 731, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)).
62. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)
(knowing and intelligent relinquishment of benefits); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1962) (presuming waiver from silent record
impermissible); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1938) (cited continually in sixth amendment cases); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708, 68 S. Ct. 316, 92 L. Ed. 390 (1948) (strong presumption against waiver);
see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854
(1973) (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) has
been applied to those rights which preserve the fairness of trial-right to counsel, to
confrontation, to a jury trial, to a speedy trial, to be free from double jeopardy, and
to the waiver of trial rights in "trial-type situations".).
63. In United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982), the court of appeals
pays lip service to the waiver doctrine but neither discusses nor requires that the
defendant be informed of his right to argue. If precedent is ignored, an argument
could be made that if the defendant is represented by counsel, counsel is presumed
to know of the right to argue and the defendant need not be informed of it; a lesser
waiver standard could be used, from seventh amendment cases (right to jury trial
waived unless requested), or fourth amendment cases, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) (defendant need not be
informed of his right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search). The problem with
this approach is that it ignores a series of unambiguous decisions that the full informed
consent requirement must be followed when sixth amendment rights are involved
because they address the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. See Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2055, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 871
(1973) (and cases cited therein, carefully distinguishing the waiver of fourth amendment
rights from the waiver of sixth amendment rights). Nor does the fact that defendant
is represented by counsel justify a relaxation of the informed consent requirement.
See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418
(1969) (Rule 11 case; failure of trial judge to address the defendant personally concerning
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the privilege. 64 Waiver is implied from silence or acquiescence only if
the defendant refuses to explicitly assert or waive the privilege. Thus,
silence in the face of a specific request by the trial judge to proceed
with argument could be an implied waiver. However, finding waiver
from failure to request argument, in the absence of an on-the-record
colloquy informing the defendant of his right and requesting that he
assert or waive it, would be contrary to fifty years of unambiguous
Supreme Court precedent. 65
In civil cases, it is less clear whether the right to argue is consti-
tutionally based, 66 therefore the appropriate waiver standard is more
elusive. Given the frequency of emphasis on the necessity of closing
arguments for a fair trial, 67 it is doubtful that mere silence should be
considered a valid waiver. Without suggesting that there is a single
waiver of trial rights vitiated guilty plea), discussed in C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 409-10 (1980); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct.
663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978) (guilty plea that waives trial rights must be voluntary
choice among known alternatives).
64. The requirement of a realistic opportunity to exercise a sixth amendment right
is hardly debatable. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982).
65. See City of Columbus v. Woodrick, 48 Ohio App. 2d 274, 357 N.E.2d 58,
60 (1976) ("[Flor a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it must be clearly
established that there was an intentional relinquishment of a known right."). Of
course, an ideologically conservative majority of the Supreme Court would not
necessarily adhere to precedent. Defendants asserting constitutional rights and relying
on precedent have not fared well in the Supreme Court recently. Between 1982 and
1984, defendants lost forty out of fifty constitutional rights cases. See, e.g., Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984) (all declining
to follow fourth amendment exclusionary rule precedent); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984) (creating exception to Miranda);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (specifically
disapproving Aguilar-Spinelli test for sufficiency of search warrant affidavits and
replacing it with standard more favorable to prosecution); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S.
410, 102 S. Ct. 1856, 72 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1982) (refusing to follow precedent requiring
entire verdict to be set aside if it rests in part on unconstitutional instruction).
66. A few cases suggest that it is a due process right generally or a seventh
amendment right in federal court. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania,
273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (dictum); Turley v. Kotter, 263 Pa. Super. 523,
398 A.2d 699 (1979). Others suggest that it is a right but not a constitutional one.
Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh.) 267 (1830) (natural law right); Fuhrman
v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977) (common law right); Americus v. McGinnis,
128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924) (statutory right). Others have decided that it is only
a privilege. E.g., Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904);
Roberson v. Roberson, 40 N.C. App. 193, 252 S.E.2d 237 (1979).
67. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa.
1967); see also Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh.) 267 (1830).
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first principle governing implied waiver, it would be inconsistent to
view a mere failure to assert a right as a waiver, at least in the absence
of clear evidence that a party had an opportunity to assert the right. 68
On the other hand, courts in civil cases have not imposed a duty on
trial judges to inform parties of trial rights as a condition of an
effective waiver. The rights to a jury trial and to open and close the
evidence, for example, usually are waived if the attorney fails to
properly assert them. 69 Thus, in civil cases it is probable that a valid
waiver exists if a party has the opportunity to request argument but
fails to do so.
The second and more common waiver issue is whether a party may
waive only part of its right to argue. The situation arises when the
party with the right to open and close (usually the plaintiff) seeks to
waive opening argument but still give the concluding argument. If the
partial waiver is permitted, the plaintiff will be able to respond to and
refute the defendant's argument. However, the defendant will be denied
the opportunity to respond to plaintiff's argument. It is obvious that
this practice is unfair to the defendant, as he is deprived of opportunity
to respond.
It is the constant effort of unfair and disingenuous advocates, who
represent the side of the issue which has the right to open and
close, to attempt, by waiving the opening argument, to put the
other party at the disadvantage of making his argument without
knowing the argument which he will have to meet, the prosecuting
counsel thus acquiring the advantage of delivering his entire ar-
gument in conclusion without giving to the defending counsel any
right of reply to the positions which he may take. This practice
ought never to be tolerated . . . for it is but just that the defendant
should have a right to reply to the positions taken by the prose-
cution, and a spirit of fair play would dictate that the party which
has the burden of opening should have the advantage of closing. 70
68. See, e.g., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 52 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
McCoRMICK] (failure to object to a question that seeks inadmissible testimony is a
waiver of that issue unless counsel did not have an opportunity to interpose the
objection); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (W. Keeton ed. 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (silence implies consent only where reasonable
person would have spoken if he objected).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 71 S. Ct. 524, 95 L. Ed.
582 (1951); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1964);
Shores v. Murphy, 88 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1956); FED. R. CIrv. P. 38(1). See also 5 F.
BuscH 419 n. 21 (claim of right to open and close must be asserted promptly).
70. S. THoMPSoN § 934. See also Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Sellers, 129 Ga. App.
811, 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973) (trial should be as far removed as possible from the
appearance of rule manipulation and gamesmanship).
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Many states have responded by enacting statutes or trial rules. With
two ambiguous exceptions,7 all appear to prohibit partial waiver, and
require the plaintiff to make a first argument if he wants to argue at
all. 72 The common law has developed less clearly, but exhibits a recent
trend toward prohibiting partial waiver.7 3 This trend is obviously sound,
based on the fact that partial waivers generally are disfavored in the
law to the extent that they permit a party to "waive" the burdens
but claim the benefits of trial procedure.
74
3. Denial of Right to Argue: Serious or Harmless Error?
If a party is completely denied his right to argue, the judge commits
error. This may only be an ordinary error that must be properly
preserved in order for the party to appeal, or it may be plain error.
It may be a serious infringement of a party's rights constituting per
se error, or it may be harmless. One can discern how important courts
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414(4) (1981) (prosecutor may commence argument);
WASH. R. CRm. P. 6.15(d) (prosecution may address jury first).
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977) (party who refuses to open shall be refused
the conclusion); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (1982) (party with right to open shall
open); IDAHO CODE § 19-2101 (1979) (prosecuting attorney must open); IND. CODE §
34-1-21-1 (1982) (party with burden of proof shall disclose in the opening all points
relied on); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-401(6) (1984) (county attorney must commence);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 175-141(5) (1986) (district attorney must open); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 831 (West 1958) (state shall commence); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-201(vii) (1977)
(counsel for state shall commence); ALASKA R. CIrv. P. 46(g) (if plaintiff waives
opening, he may not reply); CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 607(7) (West 1984) (plaintiff
must commence argument); IOWA R. CIv. P. 195 (party with burden of issue shall
disclose all points relied on in opening); LA. Cirv. DIST. CT. R. 14 (opening must
include the whole case); ME. DIST. CT. CRIM. R. 30 (attorney for state shall argue
first); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.02(1) (state's attorney shall make opening argument); TENN.
R. CRn.I. P. 29.1 (state may not waive opening argument unless all argument is
waived); TEX. R. CT. 269(b) (counsel shall present whole case in opening); VT. R.
CRim. P. 29.1 (prosecution shall open).
73. See, e.g., Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904)
(waiver of first argument is waiver of all argument); 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at
477 (party with right to open has obligation to open). Older cases were more likely
to permit a partial waiver. See, e.g., McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510,
524, 73 P.2d 649, 656-57 (1937) (dictum implying that plaintiff may waive first
argument and still give a final argument); Chandler v. Miles, 193 A. 576 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1937) (implying right to waive opening).
74. For example, a criminal defendant has the fifth amendment right to decline
to testify. He may not give some exculpatory testimony and then decline to answer
cross-examination questions. Once the right has been waived, it is gone. See, e.g.,
United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1969) (and "cases cited therein); see
also MCCORMICK, supra note 68 § 93 (no partial waiver of attorney-client privilege).
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think argument is to a proper trial by examining how frequently cases
are reversed when argument has been denied. The more often judgments
are reversed, the more important the right.
Forty percent of the cases in which a party claimed denial of the
right to argue were reversed on appeal, a considerably higher reversal
rate than the usual twenty-four percent.7 5 Only eight percent of the
cases were affirmed under the harmless error doctrine, half the usual
rate.76 In cases of denial, no judgment was affirmed because of
procedural default, e.g., failure to preserve the issue, although fifteen
percent of cases in the survey generally were affirmed on such grounds. 77
Two opinions were emphatic that argument is so fundamental to a
fair trial that its denial is plain error.
78
A recurring issue concerns whether the denial of the right to argue
can be harmless error, and if so, under what circumstances. In criminal
cases, since the defendant's right to argue is a sixth amendment right,
one must look to the harmless constitutional error doctrine of Chapman
v. California.79 Chapman stands for two things. First, the denial of
constitutional rights fundamental to a fair trial and affecting substantial
rights can never be harmless,10 despite overwhelming evidence. The
Supreme Court listed the right to counsel as an example for this
proposition. Second, errors may be harmless, but only if the state
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained. This harmless constitutional
error rule is different from the ordinary harmless error rule.8 Despite
retrenchment in other areas, the current Supreme Court has reaffirmed
75. See infra note 406 (for discussion of reversal rates).
76. In the sample of argument cases, 116 out of 692 (17%) were affirmed under
the rubric of harmless error. See People v. Berger, 284 Ill. 47, 119 N.E. 975 (1918)
(no discussion); State v. Tereau, 304 Minn. 71, 229 N.W.2d 27 (1975) (because of
strength of case); cf. People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948) (no explicit
statement, but uses harmless error language).
77. In the sample, 102 of 692 cases were affirmed because of procedural default.
78. United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. Mann, 361
A.2d 897 (Me. 1976); see also United States ex rel. Spears v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 1024
(3d Cir. 1972); Key Hotel Corp. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 172 Ind. App. 15, 359
N.E.2d 262 (1977); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977). In all the
cases the court decided whether there had been a denial of the right to argue on the
merits despite procedural default.
79. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).
80. Id. at 23.
81. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 88 n.2, 103 S. Ct. 969, 978 n.2, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 823, 835 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). The ordinary harmless error rule
is discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 349-69.
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the vitality of the Chapman doctrine. 2 Given the language in Herring
that a "denial of the opportunity for final argument . . . is a denial
of the basic right of the accused to make his defense","3 that "no
aspect of [partisan] advocacy could be more important than the
opportunity finally to marshal the evidence . . . before submission of
the case to judgment", 4 and that "there can be no justification for
a statute that empowers a trial judge to deny absolutely the opportunity
for any closing summation at all","5 it seems inconceivable that the
denial of the right to argue could ever be harmless constitutional error.
Therefore, the two cases in the sample applying the harmless error
test to closing arguments in criminal cases cannot be considered good
law.
In civil cases, the question is more difficult because the courts have
not clearly elevated closing arguments to a constitutional right. Although
argument is part of the due process right to be heard, the Chapman
rule of harmless constitutional error applies only to criminal cases,
and the courts have not articulated a similar rule for determining
harmless error in a civil trial. Nevertheless, the first part of the
Chapman standard may be applicable to. civil cases. Certain consti-
tutional rights are so fundamental to a fair trial that their denial
cannot be harmless error. Reasons making the right to argue a
fundamental right in criminal cases also apply to civil cases. The
fundamental role of argument makes it inappropriate to apply the
ordinary harmless error test used to affirm minor procedural irregu-
larities.
A related question concerns the result when a trial judge refuses to
allow part of an argument. The few scattered cases on this issue
suggest the obvious answer. If a party is prevented from arguing an
important and material issue, that party has been denied the right to
argue his case, just as if he had been refused argument altogether.8 6
82. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d
96 (1983); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S. Ct. 969, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823
(1983).
83. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 859, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2554, 45 L. Ed.
2d 593, 599 (1975); see also United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982)
(denial so fundamental it requires reversal whether or not defendant is prejudiced).
84. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862.
85. Id. at 863.
86. See, e.g., King v. Kaplan, 94 Cal. App. 2d 697, 211 P.2d 578 (1949) (plaintiff
denied an opportunity to argue main theory of negligence); Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill.
App. 570 (1925) (defense denied opportunity to argue "a material question"); Aetna
Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944) (defendant denied opportunity
to argue amount of damages).
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The question arises whether the denial of closing argument is so serious
that it is always plain error, or whether a claim of error must be
preserved by a proper request or objection. Denial of a constitutional
right does not decide the question. The federal courts have clearly held
that even constitutional errors normally must be preserved properly to
be considered on appeal.87 Procedural default rules requiring timely
objections have routinely been upheld, even when barring potentially
meritorious constitutional claims on appeal.8" However, the courts have
made it clear that, at least on direct appeal, there are limits to
procedural default. Errors which "are obvious, or . . . otherwise
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings" may be considered by appellate courts despite procedural
default. 89 Most of the cases in the sample suggest that, given the
fundamental role of argument, its denial is appropriately considered
plain error in both civil and criminal trials.
Clearly the cases demonstrate that the principle granting a party the
right to argue its case has been singled out and treated differently
from other rules of closing argument procedure. It is the only principle
to be elevated to the status of a constitutional right.90 Its denial is
less likely to constitute harmless error and more likely to result in
reversal than other summation errors. The doctrine of procedural
default, otherwise a device for avoiding too many costly retrials, might
not apply at all. The evidence makes it obvious that a party's right
to argue is being treated as the most important legal principle of
closing argument procedure.
87. E.g., United States v. Tercero, 640 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1980); see also People
v. Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d
594 (1977) (federal courts will not review a Miranda issue unless state procedural rules
have been strictly complied with); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691,
48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976) (federal courts will not grant habeas corpus for a due process
violation if the defendant failed to object at trial); cf. County Court of Ulster County
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979) (if state procedural
rules allow constitutional issues to be raised on appeal even in the absence of a timely
objection at trial, the federal courts also may hear the claim).
89. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392, 80 L. Ed.
555, 557 (1936). Recent Supreme Court cases, however, have all but eliminated a
defendant's ability to raise unpreserved errors on habeas corpus. See, e.g., United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 48 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1976). See generally Wangerin, "Plain
Error" and "Fundamental Fairness": Towards a Definition of Exceptions to the Rules
of Procedural Default, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 753 (1980).
90. See, e.g., Turley v. Kotter, 263 Pa. Super. 523, 398 A.2d 699 (1979).
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B. Procedural Rules Facilitating
Exercise of the Right to Argue
Courts are not hostile toward the exercise of the right to argue. To
the contrary, judges accept that partisan argument is an indispensable
(and sacred) component of a fair trial. In the exceptional cases discussed
in the next section, courts reluctantly impose significant procedural
limitations on the free exercise of the right of argument. Indeed,
procedures that facilitate argument, such as allowing preparation time,
preventing disruption, giving trial judges discretion to expand the
normal scope, are common. 91
As a matter of customary practice, a party is entitled to a reasonable
time following the close of the evidence to prepare for argument.
Although a reasonable preparation time is a matter of judicial discre-
tion, it generally is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse
to allow at least a few minutes' recess before argument for the attorneys
to gather their thoughts.9 2 However, considerations of efficiency impose
limits on this doctrine. Long recesses disrupt court schedules and delay
trials, and need not be granted. 93 Expensive new trials need not be
ordered for the mere refusal to allow preparation time. Therefore, to
be reversible error, the refusal must amount to a denial of the right
to argue.94 If it appears from the record that a party was able to give
a reasonably effective argument despite the lack of preparation time,
91. The author's conclusion that courts routinely facilitate argument is partly
intuitive. Surprisingly few cases appeared in the sample in which a party complained
on appeal that his opponent had been unfairly allowed the benefit of procedures to
facilitate argument. Lawyers usually are creative in their allegations of error. The
author concludes that the paucity of appeals is because the courts routinely indulge
all reasonable procedural requests by both sides related to argument-a conclusion
borne out by my own trial experiences. The conclusion is reinforced by recurrent
language in appellate opinions about the importance of argument and the need for
trial judges to have discretion to facilitate argument.
92. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177 (1974) (better
practice is to permit time to prepare; counsel's failure to request brief recess apparently
waived issue; implies that if counsel had requested fifteen-minute recess, it would have
been error to refuse it); see also Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. 552, 326
A.2d 602 (1974) (held proper to allow 45 minutes to prepare).
93. See Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230
P.2d 71 (1951) (request for a postponement of thirty days properly denied); Com-
monwealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177 (1974) (appellant apparently
wanted to postpone arguments until after Thanksgiving recess, refusal not error).
94. United States v. Dawson, 467 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1972).
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then there has been no prejudice to the party. The error is harmless, 9
despite the fact that the party could have given a better argument with
more preparation time.
The second procedural mechanism for facilitating argument is the
prohibition against interruption and disruption of argument. Simply
stated, no one may interfere with or disrupt argument except the judge
or opposing counsel, and they may interrupt only if they have a legal
basis for objection. 96 The trial judge may not interfere with or attempt
to nullify an attorney's argument. He or she may not make uncalled-
for negative comments about the argument, 97 tell the jury to disregard
a legally proper argument, 9 or otherwise interrupt argument except to
make sua sponte rulings preventing illegal arguments9 9 and for valid
procedural reasons.'0° Excessive interference effectively denies the right
to argue, and therefore either amounts to reversible error,10 ' or violates
95. See United States v. Dawson, 467 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1972) (fifteen-minute
recess refused; better practice is to allow preparation time, but in this case counsel
was able to fully summarize defendant's position, so no reversible error); Common-
wealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177 (1974) (based on review of
record, "obvious" that defense attorney was able to make effective argument; not
reversible error to order immediate arguments).
96. The legal bases for objection are varied. They are summarized in J. TANFORD
supra note 1, at 142-47, and in Table 2, infra. An analysis of the substantive law of
closing argument will be the subject of forthcoming articles.
97. See State v. Hardy, 189 N.C. 799, 128 S.E. 152 (1925) (judge criticized attorney
for making his argument).
98. See King v. Kaplan, 94 Cal. App. 2d 697, 211 P.2d 578 (1949) (instructed
jury to disregard proper argument); Messer v. State, 120 Fla. 95, 162 So. 146 (1935)
(instructed jury to decide case on evidence and not to be concerned with counsel's
arguments); Svensson v. Lindgren, 124 Minn. 386, 145 N.W. 116 (1914) (instruction
to forget arguments at the start of deliberations).
99. See Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, 28 S. Ct. 422, 52 L. Ed. 670 (1908)
(court interrupted defendant's argument and asked attorney not to make argument
that tended to degrade the administration of justice-that white man should be believed
before black man-interruption held to have been fully justified); People v. Ott, 84
Cal. App. 3d 118, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978) (interruption to give instruction on law
to correct counsel's misstatement is "right and . . . duty" of trial court).
100. See Turley v. Kotter, 263 Pa. Super. 523, 398 A.2d 699 (1979) (granting
directed verdict on liability, after defense argued against liability; valid legal procedure
despite fact that it nullified part of defense argument and made the defense attorney
look bad).
101. See 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 411 (citing cases for proposition that telling
jury to disregard argument is equivalent to denial of argument). See generally People
v. Gallo, 54 Ill. 2d 343, 297 N.E.2d 569 (1973) (court interrupted defense argument
to question attorney and involve him in frequent discussions; held harmless error
because record showed the defendant made full and complete argument); Martin v.
Philadelphia Gardens, 348 Pa. 232, 35 A.2d 317 (1944) (general proposition that
excessive interference denies due process).
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
the prohibition against the judge's showing partiality. Additionally, the
judge is not permitted to suggest to the jury what he thinks the correct
verdict would be; he must remain neutral.1 0 2
Also it is improper for the opposing attorney to interrupt or interfere
with argument except to assert valid objections. °3 Attorneys may not
interrupt in responding to their opponent's arguments,' °0 may not make
noise or attempt to distract the jury,0 5 may not make groundless
objections for the purpose of disruption, 0 and may be required to
remove distracting charts, exhibits, and demonstrative evidence.' 0 7 Sim-
ilar to the rule against judicial interference, this procedural rule is
subject to the harmless error test on appeal, and a judgment will not
be reversed unless the interruptions effectively prevented a party from
making a complete closing argument.' 08
Theoretically, there should be similar rules preventing interference
from other persons present in the courtroom such as jurors, parties,
witnesses, and the public audience. However, this author was unable
to find any cases on this issue.'0 9 Additionally, the judge's general
power to preserve order, including the power to clear the courtroom
and even bind and gag a defendant in order to prevent disruption of
102. The author does not mean to imply that this is a bad rule. It prohibits both
the good judge from helping the jury reach a correct verdict and also the bad judge
from coercing a bad verdict. The risk of the latter, given the political way in which
our judges are selected, may outweigh the benefits of the former.
103. See generally Auz. R. Crv. P. 51(d) (interruption not permitted except to raise
question of law).
104. See People v. Higgins, 88 A.D.2d 921, 450 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982) (strong
condemnation of prosecutor's conduct in interrupting summation with improper re-
mark).
105. See Wyo. LOCAL R. OF DIST. CTS. 17 (X) (counsel shall not walk about nor
make comments so as to divert the jury's attention); see also Wyo. UNIF. R. DIST.
CT. 801(A)(B)(l)-(5); cf. Coburn v. State, 461 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(prosecutor cried during defendant's summation; matter for trial court's discretion;
appeals court will not reverse if trial court did not think it serious enough to warrant
mistrials).
106. See generally State v. Darnell, 14 Wash. App. 432, 542 P.2d 117 (1975).
107. See 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 548 (local practice requires removal of charts
and exhibits before opponent argues; no citations).
108. See People v. Higgins, 88 A.D.2d 921, 450 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982) (interruption
of defense argument strongly condemned but found harmless error because proof of
guilt overwhelming).
109. The closest case is Shippy v. Peninsula Rapid Transit Co., 197 Cal. 290, 240
P. 785 (1925), a fascinating case in which the trial judge asked the jurors if they
cared to hear argument, and ten of the twelve answered "no". The California Supreme
Court held that the denial of argument under these facts was reversible error.
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the trials," '0 undoubtedly carries over to closing argument. On a less
spectacular level, attorneys should be able to demand that jurors remain
awake, not make verbal comments on the arguments, and not read
newspapers or talk among themselves; otherwise, the right to argue is
meaningless. However, it is extremely unlikely that juror interruption
would ever be grounds for reversal on appeal. " ' The difficulties arise
in proving juror inattentiveness resulting in prejudice. The one exception
appears to be intoxication: if a juror is inebriated during argument,
a mistrial or new trial is justified because the problem is not easily
remedied at the time." 2
C. Procedural Rules Inhibiting Exercise of the Right to
Argue
Generally, the right to present a closing argument is given an
expansive reading. Appellate opinions usually proclaim that attorneys
110. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353
(1970) (three constitutional ways to handle an obstreperous defendant-bind and gag
him, cite him for contempt, or remove him from courtroom); FED. R. CRIM. P.
43(b)(2) (defendant may be removed from courtroom for persisting in disruptive
conduct).
111. Of the few appellate opinions that address this issue, all but one have rejected
the position that juror inattention is ground for reversal. See Dolan v. State, 40 Ark.
454 (1883) (juror fell asleep for short time during argument, not reversible error);
Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 120 Cal. App. 2d 685, 262 P.2d 95 (1953)
(insufficient proof that jurors were sleeping); Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368 (1846) (juror
became ill, had chills, lay down on mattress during argument; not ground for new
trial because jurors not comprehending all of argument is commonplace); Ferman v.
Estwing Mfg. Co., 31 111. App. 3d 229, 334 N.E.2d 171 (1975) (juror refused to look
at counsel, kept eyes closed and groaned audibly; no prejudice); McClary v. Stat, 75
Ind. 260 (1881) (juror falling asleep for short time during argument is not sufficient
ground for new trial); State v. Jones, 187 Kan. 496, 357 P.2d 760 (1960) (juror fell
asleep during argument; failure of counsel to object at time; no reversal); Braunie v.
State, 105 Neb. 355, 180 N.W. 567 (1920) (juror appeared to pay no attention to
argument; no showing of prejudice); Wofford v. State, 494 P.2d 672 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972) (juror was inattentive, yawned, and cleaned fingernails, was chosen jury
foreman; no prejudice); see also People v. Spady, 64 Cal. App. 567, 222 P. 191
(1923) (juror leaving seat to adjust window during testimony held not prejudicial).
But see Goldring v. Escapa, 338 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (The one case
in which a new trial was ordered. A juror was intoxicated, made grimacing motions,
waved his hands, and attempted to talk with other jurors during the trial.).
112. See Myers v. State, 111 Ark. 399, 163 S.W. 1177 (1914); State v. Crocker,
239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954) (dictum); cf. People v. Groves, 188 Cal. App.
2d 785, 10 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1961) (alternative remedy is to substitute an alternate
juror); State v. Tatlow, 34 Kan. 80, 8 P. 267 (1885) (alternative remedy is to grant
recess until juror sobers up). But see People v. Leary, 105 Cal. 486, 39 P. 24 (1895)
(not sufficient ground for new trial); Hatfield v. State, 243 Ind. 279, 183 N.E.2d 198
(1962) (use of prescribed tranquilizers during trial insufficient to warrant new trial).
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should be given wide latitude and considerable leeway in argument.
Yet despite the preference for free exercise of the right of argument,
several procedural restrictions have become well established. Rules and
rulings limit the time available for argument, the number and sequence
of arguments, the number of attorneys who may participate, the scope
of certain arguments, the method of delivery, and the attorney's ability
to present what he thinks is an appropriate argument. This section
will explore these procedural constraints and procedural devices re-
stricting argument.
1. Limiting the Length of Arguments
Three devices limit the length of arguments: time limits, restrictions
on the number of attorneys for each party who may argue, and
restrictions on the number of arguments an attorney may make.
In most jurisdictions, the trial judge has discretion to limit the time
available for argument. A reasonable exercise of this discretion is "not
subject to review."" 3 The trial judge is free to set reasonable limits
in the absence of a statutorily mandated minimum or maximum time. 114
The judge takes into account the length and complexity of the trial,
the amount of evidence, and similar factors. Routinely, appellate courts
approve all time limits, however short, by stating the need for insti-
tutional efficiency. Those courts rarely pay serious consideration to
whether short or long arguments better serve the interests of verdict
accuracy." 5 The general pattern of appellate approval evidences that
113. The spectre of an appellate court reviewing a trial judge's exercise of discretion
and approving it by citing the principle that the reasonable exercise of discretion is
"not subject to review" is ludicrous. Of course the exercise of discretion is reviewable;
it is just difficult to reverse. In only two instances have courts really established rules
of unreviewability. The federal courts have consistently held that a judge's decision
about the sequence of arguments is not subject to review. See Day v. Woodworth,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Anderson-Tully Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 192
(5th Cir. 1951); Silver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940). The
North Carolina court, in State v. Collings, 70 N.C. 241 (1874), refused to review
time limits. The State legislature promptly responded by enacting a statute prohibiting
time limits. See S. TnoMPsoN, supra note 1, at 711-12. That statute has since been
repealed and the case overruled.
114. For example, Georgia statutes provide for a thirty-minute maximum in mis-
demeanor cases, but a one-hour minimum in felonies, and a two-hour minimum in
capital felonies and civil cases. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-180, 17-8-72-73 (1982); see
also S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-330 (1977) (two hours); ME. R. Ctv. P. 51(a) (one hour);
R.I. R. Cirv. P. 51 (one-hour minimum).
115. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 239 Ala. 38, 193 So. 417 (1940); People v. Norton,
45 Cal. App. 2d 789, 115 P.2d 44 (1941). But see State v. Kay, 12 Ohio App. 2d
38, 230 N.E.2d 652 (1967) (forty-five minute limit imposed because of crowded court
schedule; reversed because trial judge did not consider merits of case).
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the time allowed for closing argument is steadily shrinking, despite the
fact that litigated issues seem to be becoming more complex.116
Jurisdictions follow one of four time limit versions. In most states,
the trial judge has complete discretion to set limits as long as at least
some argument is allowed. 1 17 A few states have created a bright line
rule requiring certain minimum time and giving the judge discretion
to allow more time but not less."' At least three states set an ideal
time and give the judge discretion to allow either more or less time." 9
Finally, at least two states have rules prohibiting any time limits. 20
Within applicable statutory boundaries, trial courts have discretion
to limit the time for argument. The courts should consider the factual
or legal complexity of the dispute, the amount of evidence presented,
the length of the trial, and the seriousness or importance of the case.' 2'
In reviewing time limits, appellate courts often refer to the simplicity
or complexity of the facts. They discuss whether the evidence is direct
or circumstantial, uncontradicted or conflicting, and whether the factual
issues are few or numerous. 22 Appellate courts also take into account
116. Recent Development, 60 Or. L. Rev. 355 (1981).
117. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1977); Chandler v. Miles, 38 Del. 431, 193 A. 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937);
Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Fetner, 269 Pa. Super. 455, 463, 410 A.2d 344,
349 (1979); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S.W.2d 7 (1948); see also ALASKA R.
Crv. P. 46(h) (the court may fix the time allowed); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.02(1) (the
court shall fix the length of time).
118. See ME. R. Civ. P. 51(a) (counsel shall be allowed one hour; additional time
if good cause shown); see also State v. Nyman, 55 Conn. 17, 10 A. 161 (1886)
(ordering new trial for restricting argument to less than full time specified in statute);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-180 (Supp. 1986) (counsel shall be limited to two hours)
(interpreted by Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945), as
setting the minimum time; no discretion to restrict argument to less than two hours);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-181 (1982) (explicitly permits an extension of time).
119. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 56-6-24 (1966) (two hours; more or less time may
be allowed); MAss. R. CRrm. P. 24(a)(2) (similar); MASS. R. Civ. P. 51(a) (each side
allowed thirty minutes; court may reasonably reduce or extend the time); VT. R. Civ.
P. 51 (one hour; court may grant more time or limit to less time).
120. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 831(6) (West 1986) (in criminal cases, court shall
not limit time for argument); see also IOWA R. Civ. P. 195 (court may limit time in
bench trials but not in jury trials). The Iowa rule is unique in having been continuously
in force since the nineteenth century. It is cited in 1 S. THOMPSON supra note 1, at
712 as MILLER REV. CODE IA. § 2783.
121. E.g., Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S.W.2d 7 (1948).
122. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983) (simple
case, event lasted less than one minute); Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo.
117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904) (conflicts in evidence); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213
S.W.2d 7 (1948) (complexity of case, whether evidence direct or circumstantial, whether
evidence contradicted); see also ALASKA R. Civ. P. 46(h) (parties shall be given
adequate time for argument, having due regard for the complexity of the case).
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the number and complexity of the issues involved.' 23 Additional factors
considered include the number of witnesses, the quantity of documents
presented,' 24 and the length of the trial or lapse of time between the
evidence and arguments. 25 Finally, appellate courts consider the seri-
ousness of the case; for example, holding that more time may be
needed in capital cases and jury trials than misdemeanors and bench
trials. '2
The question remains whether there is some irreducible minimum
amount of time that must be allowed, or some amount of time that
is presumptively sufficient. 27 Time limits of fifteen, ten, or even five
minutes are sometimes proper and sometimes erroneous. 2  Five to
fifteen minute limits have been upheld while ninety minute limits have
been struck down.' 29 State rules of procedure sanction everything from
123. See, e.g., Moses v. Proctor Coal Co., 166 Ky. 805, 179 S.W. 1043 (1915)
(number of instructions); State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (single issue);
Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904) (elaborateness of
instructions).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 693 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1982) (number of
witnesses and exhibits); Moses v. Proctor Coal Co., 166 Ky. 805, 179 S.W. 1043
(1915) (number of witnesses); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S.W.2d 7 (1948)
(amount of testimony and number of witnesses); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85
P. 251 (1906) (length of transcript, number of witnesses).
125. See, e.g., Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904)
(length of trial); Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584 (1874) (length of trial and number
of adjournments); State v. Cecotti, 31 Wash. App. 179, 639 P.2d 243 (1982) (length
of trial).
126. See In re Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1977) (nonjury v. jury trial); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251 (1906)
(capital v. noncapital crimes); see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-8-72, 17-8-73 (1982)
(thirty minutes for misdemeanors, one hour for noncapital felonies, two hours in
capital cases). A review of the time limits cited in 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 422-
30, indicates that trial judges generally award two to four hours in murder cases, but
not more than one and one-half hours in other kinds of cases.
127. At least one court thought so, and cited the fact that Cicero had been able
to defend Caius Rabirius on a charge of murder in half an hour as presumptive
evidence that any case can be argued in that length of time. State v. Page, 21 Mo.
257 (1855); see also Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co., 159 Ky. 354, 167
S.W. 146 (1914) (ten minute limit is per se error).
128. Compare Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983) (fifteen-
minute limit upheld); In re Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1977) (ten-minute limit upheld); Burson v. Mahoney, 65 Tenn. 304
(1873) (five-minute limit upheld) with Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co.,
159 Ky. 354, 167 S.W. 146 (1914) (ten-minute limit reversed); Reagan v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904) (fifteen-minute limit reversed); State v.
McIntire, 221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1952) (five-minute limit reversed).
129. See State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251 (1906) (ninety-minute limit
reversed).
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thirty minutes to two hours.'3 0 Yet, a historical trend from longer to
shorter time limits 3 ' is evident in the cases. The trend falls short of
creating a bright line rule, but provides some insight into the proper
exercise of discretion.
The earliest reported appellate opinions reviewing time limits appear
in the 1850's. Subsequently, the stated legal rule has remained constant:
the setting of reasonable time limits is a matter of judicial discretion,
reviewable only for abuse of that discretion. However, the appellate
interpretation of the legal rule determining where to draw the line
between reasonable and unreasonable restrictions, and when to reverse
judgments, has changed over time.3 2 Appellate courts have become
increasingly tolerant of the imposition of time limits, reversing fewer
and fewer cases. In the nineteenth century, despite the rule of discretion,
over twenty percent of all cases appealed because of time limits were
reversed. This percentage is well within the expected reversal rate for
cases generally. In the first half of this century that rate dropped to
fifteen percent and has fallen to around five percent since 1950. A
similar decline in the reversal rate occurred in cases involving time
limits of more than one-half hour: down from five percent to one
percent. These data are summarized in Table 1.13
In the absence of a contrary statute or practice rule, 34 the trial
judge also has discretion to limit the number of attorneys and the
130. Statutes currently in force prescribe everything from thirty minutes to two
hours. See supra note 134.
131. Corboy, The Right to Trial by Jury, 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 65 (1980) (Author
argues that the jury system is too important to limit based on motion that judicial
time is a "luxury" or "scarce resource".).
132. See generally Goodman, Crisis in Closing Arguments, 74 ILL. B.J. 120 (1985).
133. The table summarizes 300 appellate cases (not part of the sample). Some of
the more interesting cases are: People v. Fernandez, 4 Cal. App. 314, 87 P. 1112
(1906), overruled, People v. Burton, 359 P.2d 433 (1961) (defense "limited" to two
hours; error); Hunt v. State, 49 Ga. 255 (1873) (a thirty-minute limit in a felony is
per se error); and any of the South Carolina cases trying to interpret a statute that
provided for two hours of argument; State v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 P. 3 (1903)
(any limit in capital case is error). Compare State v. Cash, 138 S.C. 167, 136 S.E.
222 (1927) (statutory two-hour limit interpreted as minimum requirement, one-hour limit
reversed) with State v. Blackstone, 113 S.C. 528, 101 S.E. 845 (1920) (statutory two-hour
limit interpreted as maximum allowed; twenty-minute limit upheld).
134. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-70 (1982) (maximum of two counsel per side, only
one in conclusion); IDAHO CODE § 19-2103 (1979) (two counsel per side in capital
cases); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-49-9 (civil), 99-17-11 (criminal) (1972) (maximum of
two attorneys per side); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175-151 (1986) (in capital cases, two
counsel allowed); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.08 (Vernon 1981) (in felony
19861
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TABLE 1
Cases Reversed on Appeal for Abuse of
Discretion in Setting Time Limits on Argument
All time limits Time limits of more than30 minuts
Reported case raising Number Percent Number Percent
time limit issue* reversed reversed reversed reversed
1850-1900 57 12 21.1% 3 5.307o
1900-1950 147 23 15.607o 6 4.106
1950-present 96 5 5.2% 1 1.00
*Estimate
number of arguments. Basic procedural fairness is satisfied when each
party is given one opportunity to argue; anything beyond that is
discretionary. This obvious point rarely has been the subject of appellate
review. The issue arose in only six cases in the sample. In each, the
appellate court upheld the decision of the trial judge. However, many
arguments had been permitted as being within the trial judge's discre-
tion. "I
At one time, argument was more important than it is now. In 1889,
four pages in a noted source on trial procedure were devoted to a
discussion of limiting attorneys, I36 in 1960, only three sentences were deemed
necessary. 137 Several factors appear to account for its demise as an important
issue. In the nineteenth century, it was common for a party to be represented
by both the senior and junior counsel. The expectation was that both
would argue: junior counsel first, and senior counsel last. 38 To restrict
cases; at least two arguments per side permitted); W. VA. CODE § 56-6-24 (1966)
(maximum of two attorneys per side); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.10 (West 1977) (maximum
of two attorneys per side); IowA R. CRIm. P. 18 (defendant entitled to have two
attorneys argue); PA. R. CGRIm. P. 1116(b) (one argument per party). In one old case,
a state statute prohibiting time limits was interpreted as also prohibiting limits on the
number of attorneys. State v. Miller, 75 N.C. 73 (1876).
135. Complaints that too few arguments were permitted were summarily dispensed
with, see Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d
656 (1978); Varela v. State, 561 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); as were complaints
that too many arguments had been allowed, see also Holmes v. Black River Elec. Coop.,
274 S.C. 252, 262 S.E.2d 875 (1980); Roberts v. State, 571 P.2d 129 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1977).
136. 1 S. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 709-13.
137. 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 420.
138. See generally United States v. Mingo, 26 F. Cas. 1270"(C.C.D. Mass. 1854)
(No. 15,781).
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a party to one argument meant either that junior counsel was denied
the experience of arguing in an important case or that the party was
denied the full services of the senior. In some circumstances it was
common for the entire bar of a county to appear on one side or the
other in important cases. Because circuit courts often sat only for
fixed terms, if lawyers were still arguing at the end of the term, a
mistrial would be required and that case postponed until the next
term. 39 Theoretically, if arguments were unlimited, a person able to
hire enough attorneys could effectively prevent his case from ever being
sent to the jury. None of these circumstances exists today. The use
of junior and senior counsel, or multiple counsel in any configuration,
is rare. Courts now sit in continuous session, so lengthy argument
cannot force a mistrial. Questions about limiting the number of
arguments for these reasons are of little importance.
The issue of the number of arguments still occurs in multi-party
lawsuits. Assume that an injured plaintiff is represented by a single
attorney suing a car dealer, a car manufacturer, and a component part
manufacturer for negligence and product liability. Each defendant hires
its own law firm, and each law firm assigns both a litigation partner
and an associate to the case. When time comes for closing arguments,
seven attorneys request permission to argue. If the judge only limits
each attorney to one hour, the defendants can argue for six hours,
the plaintiff only for one. Even if the judge sets the time limit per
party at one half hour, the defendants may argue for three hours to
the plaintiff's one. If the judge sets a one-hour time limit per side,
then each individual defendant is allowed only twenty minutes, to the
plaintiff's hour. However, the defendant may have to make a more
complicated argument. While the plaintiff may be content to argue
liability and damages, each defendant must also argue about the
allocation of responsibility among the several defendants. If the judge
sets no limits on the number of attorneys who may argue, the plaintiff
may be outnumbered six to one and arguments may last several days.
If the judge limits the number of attorneys to one per party, it may
prejudice a defendant whose counsel had divided the issues among
several attorneys. If the judge limits the three defendants to a single
attorney-spokesperson, the other defendants may be deprived of their
rights to be heard since their interests may not exactly be the same.
In multiple party lawsuits, several rules of thumb have developed.
First, it is a fundamental requirement that each party participate in
139. 1 S. THompsoN, supra note 1, at 712.
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the process. If parties have diverse interests, each is entitled to argue.
However, when the interests of coparties are identical, the judge may
limit them to a single argument.' 4° If the right to argue allows several
defendants to argue against a single plaintiff, the court must use its
discretion to assure some kind of fair balance. A fair balance can be
brought by imposing limits on the defendants so that the plaintiff is
not overwhelmed by the sheer volume of their arguments. Also, assuring
the defendants enough time to adequately argue their positions will
create a balance. Some combination of time limits and restrictions on
the number of defense attorneys usually is appropriate, but the court
need not give each attorney the same amount of time, nor balance
exactly the total number of arguments or time allotted to each side.' 4'
2. Regulating the Sequence of Arguments
A combination of common law, statutes, rules of procedure, and
judicial discretion regulates the sequence of arguments. Most jurisdic-
tions provide a standard model for the proper order of arguments.
However, the trial court is given discretion to vary that order in
unusual cases. Also, the proper scope of each successive argument is
specified and enforced to varying degrees by procedural sanctions that
may be imposed if an attorney exceeds or falls short of the requirements.
The standard practice has three arguments: plaintiff first, then
defendant, followed by plaintiff's rebuttal. Only six states deviate from
this practice and permit only two arguments. In all but one, the
140. See 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 421; 1 S. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 710
(even if parties were joined involuntarily as defendants, the court may restrict the
number of attorneys who argue if their interests are identical). E.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 15-14-2 (1969). A strange variation of this statute is found in a few
states that only mentions defendants with separate defenses, e.g., Ky. R. Crv. P.
43.02(e). Statutes also can be found that appear to give a right to argue to coparties
without regard to whether their interests are diverse, e.g., IOWA R. CRIM. P. 18
(codefendants may be heard by one counsel each), and which simply dump the whole
problem into the lap of judicial discretion, e.g., ME. R. CIv. P. 51(a) (when multiple
parties are involved, the order and division of the arguments shall be subject to the
direction of the court). See also Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh) 267
(1830). This issue is addressed by statute in many states. One common form specifies
that if several parties appear with separate interests and different counsel, each is
entitled to argue.
141. See Lemons v. St. John's Hosp., 5 Kan. App. 2d 161, 613 P.2d 957 (1980)
(plaintiff given forty minutes, two defendants given thirty minutes each; upheld as
within trial court's discretion); Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509,
260 S.W.2d 596 (1953) (within court's discretion to give plaintiff fifty minutes, one
defendant thirty minutes, and a second defendant twenty minutes).
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defendant goes first and the plaintiff concludes.' 42 The standard three-
argument format is familiar. It appears in formal debates, appellate
arguments, and the complaint-answer-reply sequence of civil pleadings.
It permits each side the opportunity both to state its position and to
respond to the opponent's argument. The more limited two-argument
format undoubtedly evolved from a desire to save time in the crowded
trial courts. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Massa-
chusetts, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are four of the six
states that follow this practice. Allowing only two arguments may save
time, but it creates an imbalance in argument. The side required to
go first is denied the opportunity to respond to the opponent's
argument, however outrageous it may be. The side going second gets
to both state its own position and respond to the opponent's argument.
Several courts have commented on the unfairness of such a practice. 143
The flexibility of the plaintiff-defendant-plaintiff sequence varies
depending on jurisdiction and type of case. In civil cases, the rule is
flexible. In most states, whichever party has the primary burden of
proof determines the order, regardless of whether they are plaintiff or
defendant.'" In a small number of states, the order is fixed according
to the plaintiff/defendant designation, but may be reversed if the
defendant presents no evidence. 145 However, in criminal cases the rule
is more likely to be inflexible. In a majority of states, the prosecution
142. Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.42(0; Ky. R. CIv. P. 43.02(e); N.J. GEN. APP. 1:7-1(b);
N.Y. CIv. PRAc. R. 4106; PA. R. CRIM. P. 1116(b). Only Minnesota gives the
defendant the final argument. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03 subdiv. 1 (h-i).
143. See, e.g., Heddendorf v. Joyce, 178 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
People v. Davis, 58 Mich. App. 159, 227 N.W.2d 269, 271 n.2 (1975); Misch v. C.B.
Contracting Co., 394 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Hamric, 151 W. Va.
1, 24, 151 S.E.2d 252, 267 (1966). While the author recognizes that the three argument
model is not universal, it will be used as the standard reference throughout this
section.
144. It is senseless for the author's purposes to try to distinguish between the party
with the burden of going forward and the party with the ultimate burden of persuasion.
The statutes and cases are not sufficiently precise. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miles, 38
Del. 431, 193 A. 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937) (party "with the affirmative" has right
to open and close); Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970)
(party with "burden of proof" has right to open and close); IND. CODE § 34-1-21-1
(1983) (party having the "burden of the issue" shall have the opening and closing);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1107 (1979) (party "required first to produce his evidence"
shall open and close); ARm. R. CIv. P. 51(c) (party having "burden of proof on the
whole case" entitled to first and last argument); see also Silver v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940) (burden "seems to be on defendant," so it was
entitled to open and close).
145. North Carolina, and maybe South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. See N.C.
SUPER. & DIST. CT. R. 10.
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always argues first and last, regardless of who has the burden of
proof. The order is set assuming the prosecution has the burden.
Flexibility is found in four southeastern states where the normal order
may be reversed if a defendant presents no evidence.'4 In Texas, the
judge has discretion to set the order for all arguments except the last
argument which is the prosecution's. 147 In Arkansas, the trial judge
apparently has the authority to reverse the normal order of the
argument. 4
8
Most states have different rules for civil and criminal cases. In civil
cases, the party with the burden of proof argues first and last, but in
criminal cases the prosecution always opens and closes regardless of
the burden of proof. In criminal trials where the defendant assumes
the burden of proof, for example, by relying on self-defense or
insanity, 49 he is not permitted to open and close the argument. The
defendant is precluded from opening and closing even when he admitted
all elements of the offense the state must prove.
Lawyers, judges, and legislators certainly think the order of arguments
makes a difference. Going first and last is seen as the position of
advantage. Statutes and case law refer to a party earning the right or
privilege to speak first or last.' 50 Evidence in social science literature
supports this perception.' Since bearing the burden of proof is an
146. State v. Rodgers, 269 S.C. 22, 235 S.E.2d 808 (1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-71 (1982); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; N.C. SUPER. & DisT. CT. R. 10.
147. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.07 (Vernon 1981); see Martinez v. State,
501 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (specifically rejecting principle that order of
argument is to be determined by who has burden of proof).
148. The Arkansas statute appears to permit a criminal defendant to open and close
if he has the burden of proof. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977). The author found
no case interpreting it.
149. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRMNAL LAW 46-51 (1972) (for a discussion of
shifting burdens of going forward and persuasion in the criminal law).
150. See, e.g., Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981) (noting that
the order and extent of argument is well within the court's discretion); Moss v. Mittel,
253 Ky. 504, 69 S.W.2d 1046 (1934) (denial of right is reversible error); State v.
McCaskill, 47 N.C. App. 289, 267 S.E.2d 331 (1980) (defendant lost right to open
and close); Reagan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904) (going
first and list is a privilege); State v. Rodgers, 269 S.C. 22, 235 S.E.2d 808
(1977) (request is substantial); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-88 (West 1985) (State shall
be entitled to open and close); see also W. BEST, RIGHT TO BEGIN AND REPLY 84-85
(Am. ed. 1880).
151. See, e.g., Inski, Lind & LaTour, Persuasion, Recall and Thought, 7 REPRE-
SENTATIVE RES. IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 66 (1974) (principle of recency-jurors remember
best what they hear last); Stone, A Primary Effect in Decision Making by Jurors, 19
J. COMM. 239 (1969) (principle of primacy-first impressions carry disproportionate
weight).
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obvious disadvantage, it seems only fair that whoever has the burden
of proof should be given the advantage of opening and closing the
argument. This occurs in civil but not in criminal cases.
This difference in civil and criminal cases may have a historical
explanation. The right to open and close the argument, in both types
of cases, was one part of a broader right to go first and last throughout
the trial. The party with the burden of proof conducted the first voir
dire, gave the first opening statement, presented its evidence first and
last, and argued first and last. Therefore, it was necessary to decide
who bore the burden of proof before the trial started.5 2 In civil cases,
a judge could usually tell from the pleadings who would bear the
ultimate burden of proof. In criminal cases, the defendant filed no
pleadings, therefore, it was impossible to discern who bore the burden
before the trial. Since the prosecution usually bore the burden, it
always went first. This rule still exists despite erosion of the underlying
premises. However, many states now require criminal defendants to
raise affirmative defenses by filing special pleadings. Therefore, now
the trial judge can tell before trial when a defendant will bear the
burden of proof. Also, many states have now abandoned the rule that
the order of arguments must remain the same throughout civil trials.5 3
Perpetuating the rule in criminal cases allows the prosecution to have
a double advantage in the form of no burden of proof and the right
to argue first and last.
The standard three-argument sequence assumes the plaintiff states
his position in the first argument, the defendant then responds to
plaintiff's argument and states his position, and finally the plaintiff
responds briefly to the defendant's argument. Attorneys usually follow
this structure because it is generally thought to be the most effective
tactical approach. 5 4 But unresolved is the appropriate judicial response
152. See, e.g., Moss v. Mittel, 253 Ky. 504, 69 S.W.2d 1046 (1934) (right to open
and close should be set at beginning of trial and not changed); Sirgany v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society, 173 S.C. 120, 175 S.E. 209 (1934) (defendant had burden of
proof under pleadings but did not request right to open and close argument until
after all evidence was presented; request not timely); see generally W. BEST, RIGHT
TO BEGIN AND REPLY (Am. ed. 1880).
153. See, e.g., Homey v. McKay, 138 Neb. 309, 293 N.W. 98 (1940) (defendants
failed to request right to open and close argument at the close of the evidence);
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bernfield, 101 S.W.2d 1025 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
(order of argument set after all the evidence); see also LA. Civ. DIST. CT. R. 14 (the
judge may designate the sequence of arguments); TEx. R. Cirv. P. 269 (order of
argument may be determined by which party has burden of proof on the issues actually
submitted to the jury).
154. See J. TANFORD, supra note 1, at 173-74.
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if any attorney deviates from this model. An attorney may decide that
he will gain tactical advantage by waiving argument, saving important
arguments for rebuttal to preclude response, or addressing only part
of the controversy. This kind of manipulation of the rules may not
be within the wide latitude given to attorneys.
The most common situation exists where the plaintiff tries to sandbag:
waive his first argument or give a minimal argument to comply with
the rule and wait until after the defendant has spoken to present his
full argument. Allowing such a maneuver creates an imbalance in
argument. By his actions the plaintiff unilaterally deprives the defendant
of the opportunity to respond to the plaintiff's argument, while
preserving his own opportunity to respond to the defense argument.
It would be unfair to tolerate such gamesmanship in analogous situ-
ations. One cannot imagine a petitioner informing an appeals court
that he or she decided to make the respondent argue first, or a plaintiff
deciding not to file a complaint until after the defendant files a non-
amendable answer. However, many states permit the practice in closing
argument. At least ten states have rules or statutes that make the first
argument optional, 55 and others have reached that conclusion by
common law.156
While only the plaintiff has the opportunity to manipulate the
sequence of arguments, both sides may try to manipulate the scope
for tactical reasons. A plaintiff may give an incomplete first argument,
saving crucial issues until rebuttal when the defense cannot respond.
A defendant, realizing the plaintiff's maneuver, may restrict the scope
of its own argument or waive it altogether. Where there is nothing to
rebut, plaintiff does not get the opportunity to make the final argument.
155. There are two common forms of such a rule. Some rules state that the party
with the burden of proof may (but is not required to) open the argument. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414 (1981) (prosecuting attorney may commence); WASH.
CRuM. R. 6.15 (prosecution may address the jury). Others state ambiguously that a
party "shall have the opening" of the argument, usually construed to mean that first
argument is waivable. See, e.g., Hickman v. Layne, 47 Neb. 177, 66 N.W. 298 (1896);
see also Potapoff v. Mattes, 130 Cal. App. 421, 19 P.2d 1016 (1933) (statute provided
that plaintiff "must" commence, but no error found in case where plaintiff waived
first argument).
156. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miles, 38 Del. 431, 193 A. 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937)
(opening may be nominal or real); State v. Rodgers, 269 S.C. 22, 235 S.E.2d 808
(1977) (prosecution not required to give first argument); Brown v. State, 475
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (no requirement that prosecution give full first
argument); see also State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 365 A.2d 1135 (1976) (a single
violation of scope of rebuttal is not error); Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997 (Del. 1982)
(rule against sandbagging honored more in breach than in observation).
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Several states permit this result, 117 sending the jury off to deliberate
without aid of meaningful discussion by counsel on the issues.
Even in those jurisdictions limiting these tactics and requiring a fair
three-argument format, the rules are not always enforced. In some
jurisdictions, there are no sanctions for rule violations. 5 ' In others,
rule violations are ignored. 5 9 In many instances, the violations are
dismissed as procedural, as within the discretionary control of the trial
judge, or as harmless error. 60
A few jurisdictions actively restrict such blatant tactics. Some require
the plaintiff to make a full and fair first argument unless he waives
argument altogether. A full and fair argument raises the main issues
and points on which the plaintiff relies. The defendant is then given
the opportunity to discuss all material issues. The plaintiff, in rebuttal,
responds to the defense argument and raises new arguments he inad-
vertently omitted in his first argument. Finally, the defendant may be
given surrebuttal if any new issues have been raised in the plaintiff's
final argument.'
6
'
Nevertheless, the predominant judicial attitude toward manipulation
of the order and scope of closing argument is one of tolerance. In
the sample, thirteen cases presented situations where one party appealed
157. See, e.g., McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 73 P.2d 649 (1937)
(if defendant waives, plaintiff usually may not close); Chandler v. Miles, 38 Del. 431,
193 A. 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937) (minimal opening runs risk that defendant will
decline to argue and that further argument will not be allowed); MICH. GEN. CT. R.
2.507 (plaintiff entitled to final argument only if defendant makes an argument). But
see Peacock v. Stinson, 72 Ga. App. 48, 32 S.E.2d 921 (1945) (plaintiff may give
final argument even if defendant waives argument); James v. State, 563 S.W.2d 599
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (if defendant waives, court has discretion to permit prosecution
to give a second argument anyway).
158. See State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 365 A.2d 1135 (1976) (single violation not
error); State v. Williams, 353 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1977) (only remedy is admonishment
of counsel).
159. See Sherwood v. State, 271 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grassmyer
v. State, 429 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. 1981).
160. See Hale v. United States, 410 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1969) (discretion of trial
judge); State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 365 .A.2d 1135 (1976) (trial court discretion);
Weinbauer v. Berberich, 610 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (reasoning unclear;
probably trial judge discretion); Misch v. C.B. Contracting Co., 394 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965) (inadequate record submitted, cannot reverse); State v. Hamric, 151
W. Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1966) (harmless error); Jewell v. Wisconsin-Minnesota
Light & Power Co., 181 Wis. 56, 194 N.W. 31 (1923) (condemns rule violation but
refuses to call it reversible error).
161. See, e.g., Heddendorf v. Joyce, 178 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-
2-2 (Burns 1983) (criminal cases); TENN. R. CRrM. P. 29-1.
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because the other party disregarded or manipulated rules concerning
the sequence of arguments. Two cases were reversed and four were
affirmed under the harmless error doctrine. However, in eight cases
the court conceded that the rules had been manipulated but found
nothing wrong with that.
162
Some jurisdictions treat civil and criminal cases differently. In
criminal cases, some states' attorneys are permitted to withhold all or
part of their argument until after the defendant speaks. Withholding
deprives the defendant of an opportunity to respond directly to the
prosecutor's arguments, but does not allow the defendant to prevent
the state from closing by waiving his argument. The defense may
waive, but the state will be allowed to argue anyway. These jurisdictions
also generally prohibit surrebuttal by the defense.' 63 The prosecutor
may always employ tactical maneuvers in order to assure that the
defendant cannot respond to his argument, but the defense is not
allowed to make the countermoves available to civil defendants.
Three other unusual aspects of the rules are worth noting. In the
federal courts, the rule has evolved that the discretion to regulate the
sequence and scope of arguments is entirely vested with the lower trial
court and will not be reviewed on appeal even for abuse of that
discretion.'" Several populous northeastern states take an opposite
approach, and have established an inflexible routine that each side
gets one argument, and there is no rebuttal or surrebuttal.' 65 In unusual
or complex cases involving multiple burdens of proof or multiple
parties, all jurisdictions have abandoned any pretense of adhering to
162. One of the two courts that reversed a judgment seemed less than enthusiastic
about doing so. Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Mo. 1961) (declined
to set hard and fast rule).
163. See State v. Williams, 353 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1977) (if prosecutor raises new
issues in final argument, defense not entitled to surrebuttal); Brown v. State, 475
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (similar); see also Grassmyer v. State, 429 N.E.2d
248 (Ind. 1981) (statute prohibits sandbagging; court found no error when prosecutor
referred to a confession for the first time in rebuttal, stating that it was permissible
for the prosecutor to argue in "greater detail" during rebuttal).
164. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Hale v. United States,
410 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1969); Anderson-Tully Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 192 (5th
Cir. 1951); Silver v. New York Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940); see also
LA. Cirv. DIST. CT. R. 14 (the judge shall designate the sequence of arguments).
165. MAss. R. CRM. P. 24; N.J. R. GEN. App. 1:7-1; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. R. 4016;
PA. R. CRm. P. 1116. Two other states also have two-argument rules; Ky. R. CRIM.
P. 9.42; Ky. R. Crv. P. 43.02 (with discretion to allow more arguments); MINN. R.
CiM. P. 26.03 subdiv l1(h-i).
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rules in favor of complete trial court discretion to set the sequence
and permissible scope of argument.
166
D. Enforcing the Rules of Argument in the Trial Court
1. Procedure for Claiming Benefits
To maximize his closing argument, a party may wish to assert
procedural rights, exercise privileges, and request discretionary benefits
permitted by law. Each party has the right to argue, and one party
in each trial has the right to open and close. In several jurisdictions,
a party has a right to a minimum amount of time for argument, to
have two attorneys argue, and to surrebuttal if his opponent does not
argue on all the crucial points. Generally, a party must be given these
procedural rights if they are properly requested. In contrast, many
jurisdictions grant the judge discretion to decide whether to confer
additional procedural benefits such as a recess in which to prepare,
an additional argument, and an extension of time, all of which the
judge may or may not give to a party after a proper request.
The requirements of a proper request are set out in general terms
in the common law and are not codified nor specific. 167 These char-
acteristics distinguish proper requests from most other procedural rules
regulating how a party requests rights and benefits (such as demanding
a jury trial, obtaining discovery, or suppressing illegally seized evidence)
which generally are spelled out in great detail in codified rules of civil
and criminal procedure. The common law generally imposes two
166. See, e.g., Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Const. Co., 117 Ariz. 11, 570 P.2d 782
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (trial court discretion to set order in case involving third-party
complaint; no discussion of any guiding principles); Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App.
214, 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970) (discusses right to open and close in multi-party cases,
then bases affirmance on trial court discretion); Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218,
46 A.2d 349 (1946) (if multiple parties are involved, cannot follow usual rules, so
trial court has discretion); ARmZ. R. CIv. P. 51(c) (in simple cases, the party with the
burden of proof may open and close, but if there are several parties, the court sets
the order of argument); ME. R. Civ. P. 51(a) (in simple cases, plaintiff goes first
and is limited to fifty minutes, defendant argues next for one hour, and plaintiff then
has ten minutes for rebuttal; but if there are multiple parties, the court sets the order
and division of arguments).
167. There is one exception. Statutes in several states establish strict procedures for
requesting additional time. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-209 (West Supp.
1986) (one hour limit "unless the court, on motion for special cause, [made] before
the commencement of an argument, allows a longer time").
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requirements: the request must be explicit and must be made at the
proper time. 68 While the request must be explicit, the survey did not
reveal any suggestion that it had to be made in writing or adhere to
any particular format. An oral request appears to be sufficient. 169
There is some indication that the request must be reasonably specific
and that, at least when made for a discretionary benefit, a general
objection is insufficient.'70
Little specific guidance exists as to the proper time when a request
must be made, except that it must be made in advance. 71 The one
firm rule that seems to have survived in some states concerns request
for more time: if the time allotted for argument by statute or by the
judge in the exercise of his discretion is inadequate, an attorney may
be required to request more time before the arguments begin. 172
Additionally, an attorney may be required to renew the request after
expiration of the allotted time, 173 but it appears this rule has disap-
peared.
168. Busch states that a party must also protest (take an exception to?) the court's
refusal to permit its exercise, 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 423, but the author could
find no indication in the cases that such a protest or exception was required.
The one exception may be a criminal defendant's right to be heard in argument.
While some post-Herring cases have held that the court is not obligated to grant
argument absent an explicit request, see United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th
Cir. 1982), most have held that failure to request argument does not constitute a
valid waiver of the right nor relieve a trial judge of his obligation to provide an
opportunity for the defendant to be heard.
169. See generally People v. Trolia, 107 Ill. App. 3d 487, 437 N.E.2d 804 (1982)
(request for additional time); Durden v. State, 406 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(request for further argument on new jury instruction required); Moldovan v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d 656 (1978) (court looked to see
if the record showed any kind of request to have two attorneys argue); Horney v.
McKay, 138 Neb. 309, 293 N.W. 98 (1940) (appellate court looked to see if any kind
of request to open and close appeared on the record).
170. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177 (1974)
(defendant objected to being forced to make an immediate closing argument because
he was not ready, but judge was not required to grant a short recess, because counsel
did not specifically request one); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-181 (1982) (in request
for more time, counsel must state how much additional time will be required).
171. See United States ex rel. Spears v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir. 1972)
(request not made until habeas corpus petition; not timely); Horney v. McKay, 138
Neb. 309, 293 N.W. 98 (1940) (request to open and close can be made at close of
evidence); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177 (1974) (implies
that request made immediately before argument would have been sufficient).
172. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-209 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
10-181 (1982); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 15-14-17 (1984); MASS. R. Crv. P. 51.
173. Busch cites three cases in support of his statement that a party must renew
the request after using up the allotted time, 5 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 423 n.32,
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2. Objection Procedure
Violations of the law of closing argument most commonly occur
when an attorney goes too far in the heat of the argument and makes
an improper argument or violates proper procedures. If the other party
wishes the law enforced, he must make an objection. Although the
trial judge has the power to make sua sponte objections, 174 the judge
is not required to do S0.175 The burden of initiating procedures to
enforce the rules of argument rests on the aggrieved party, similar to
objections to improper evidence. These objection procedures can be
quite complex. However, the judge may or may not choose to rule
only on procedurally proper objections. In practice, most judges
probably are not sticklers for procedural detail.
Proper objection procedures are spelled out almost exclusively in the
common law. In general they are as follows: (1) the judge must permit
a party the opportunity to object; (2) the party must make a timely
objection; (3) the objection must state specific grounds; and (4) the
party must make specific request for a remedy. Several jurisdictions
have an additional rule requiring objections to be made out of the
hearing of the jury.
Within our adversarial system, the concept that a party must have
an opportunity to make an objection is so fundamental that there is
little explicit law on the subject. The system simply assumes that the
partisan objection is an integral component of a trial. Enforcement of
the rules depends at least in part on the presence or absence of an
objection. Only one statute explicitly gives a party the right to object
but this supposed "rule" does not appear in any of the cases in the sample, nor can
this author find any additional support for this proposition. It sounds like taking an
exception. Cf. Frazier v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 432, 342 S.W.2d 115 (1961) (defendant
who does not use all allotted time cannot complain that it was too short).
174. See, e.g., Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, 28 S. Ct. 422, 52 L. Ed. 670
(1908).
175. One occasionally sees in the opinions some vague suggestion that the judge
may have the obligation to intervene sua sponte when necessary to preserve a fair
trial, but the courts cannot agree on exactly when that is. Viereck v. United States,
318 U.S. 236, 63 S. Ct. 561, 87 L. Ed. 734 (1943) (dictum) (appeals to wartime
prejudices); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1934) (intemperate
attack on credibility of witnesses); Hillson v. Deeson, 383 So. 2d 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (counsel asserting personal opinions); State v. Rollie, 585 S.W.2d 78 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979) (when argument is glaringly offensive); State v. Thompson, 290 N.C.
431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976) (adverse inference from failure to call spouse as witness).
This author suggests that such language appear in an opinion when the appellate court
has decided to reverse despite the absence of an objection and ruling, and it is trying
to articulate something the judge did or did not do as the error.
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during closing argument. 76 In the one sample case in which a party
was prevented from making an objection, the judgment was reversed
on appeal. 77 The other procedural rule facilitating the opportunity to
state an objection is that the judge must be present during argument
in order to hear the objection. 78
The second requirement is that the objection must be timely. Most
jurisdictions adhere to the contemporaneous objection rule found in
the law of evidence: a party is supposed to object at the time of the
rule violation as soon as the grounds become apparent. 79 In some
jurisdictions, objections at other times also may be proper. Occasional
cases in the sample approved objections made before argument and
renewed at the close of argument,'80 made for the first time at the
completion of argument, i '8 and made after the jury had retired.8 2
In all jurisdictions, a contemporaneous objection is proper, despite
the mistaken belief that objections should not be made until the end
of argument." 3 The real 'issue is what happens when an objection is
176. W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. VI(a) (counsel may interrupt argument to object and
obtain a ruling).
177. Johnson v. Zadworny, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 934, 381 N.E.2d 1119 (1978) (attorney
rose to object, judge motioned him down; judgment reversed, although not specifically
on this ground).
178. See Caplan v. Reynolds, 191 Iowa 453, 182 N.W. 641 (1921); Poe v. Arch,
26 S.D. 291, 128 N.W. 166 (1910). But see Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701
(4th Cir. 1978) (record showed trial judge not on bench; did not seem to disturb the
court of appeals). Texas has a statute that adds one additional requirement-counsel
may "ask leave of the court to rise and present his . . . objection." TEX. R. Cirv. P.
269(g).
179. See, e.g., Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244
(1977); Caplan v. Reynolds, 191 Iowa 453, 182 N.W. 641 (1921); Houston v.
Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Watts v. State, 630 S.W.2d 737
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982). It is suggested in 1 S. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 737-38
that an objection must always be made at the time of the misconduct, but the cases
do not support so absolute a statement.
180. United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981); see Henslee v. Marta,
142 Ga. App. 821, 237 S.E.2d 225 (1977) (Court approved objection made before
argument; not necessary to renew the objection.); see also Crum v. Ward, 146 W.
Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961) (proper objection should be made before argument
begins; not necessary to renew it).
181. Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978); Delott v. Roraback,
179 Conn. 406, 426 A.2d 791 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244,
431 N.E.2d 880 (1982); Graham v. Simplex Motor Rebuilders, 191 Neb. 320, 215
N.W.2d 641 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 500 Pa. 226, 455 A.2d 632 (1983);
Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 232 S.E.2d 778 (1977); see also Werner v. Lane,
393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978) (objection made at end of instructions proper where
attorneys stipulated that objections could be made that late).
182. Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971).
183. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRUMINAL CASES § 445 (2d ed. 1979).
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made at some other time. In a majority of jurisdictions, an "untimely"
objection is not sufficient to require judicial action. In the course of
lengthy arguments, the trial judge may have forgotten exactly what
was previously said or done. If the trial judge were required to rule
on an untimely objection, the trial might have to be stopped while
the court reporter read back through the stenographic transcript; this
would be an inefficient use of the court's time. However, the courts
are not prohibited from acting without a timely objection. All juris-
dictions permit the judge the discretion to rule on an untimely objection
"in the interests of justice". Many even permit objections to the most
serious rule violations, coupled with motions for mistrial, to be made
after arguments are over.'8
4
The third requirement is that the objecting attorney state specific
grounds for his objection. A vague or general objection'85 does not
compel the court to take action; the judge can safely ignore an objection
if the attorney cannot state a legal basis for it. This requirement is
universally stated but seldom explained.1 6 Only one appellate court in
the sample of cases offered a justification for the rule: a specific
objection gives the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently and
avoids unnecessary retrials.' 7 Implicit in this statement is that it is
thought that a ruling by the judge actually repairs the damage caused by
improper argument, 8 8 and that one is willing to let the attorneys'
relative abilities affect the trial's outcome. As in the case of the
timeliness requirement, serious errors may be corrected in the judge's
discretion despite an inadequate objection or no objection. Several
cases create an exception to the specificity requirement: if an argument
is clearly improper or manifestly prejudicial, or if in the context the
error was so obvious that the judge could not reasonably have failed
184. See, e.g., People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 2d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr.
640 (1982); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
185. E.g., State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. St. Louis, 575 S.W.2d 712 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978) ("improper and irrelevant"); DeBolt v. State, 604 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980) ("I just don't think it's proper jury argument". Id. at 169.).
186. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Constr. Co., 439 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1969); Jones
v. State, 644 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.11 (West
1977). But see Bew v. Williams, 373 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (at trial,
defendant objected but stated no grounds; court of appeals refers to it in passing as
a "proper objection"; propriety of objection not an issue).
187. Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 232 S.E.2d 778 (1977).
188. The empirical evidence suggests otherwise-judicial "corrective" action may in
fact increase the prejudice. See infra text accompanying notes 358-60.
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to understand the reason for the objection, then a general objection
obligates the judge to take corrective action.8 9
The fourth requirement is that the attorney request an appropriate
remedy. An objection by itself technically only requires a ruling. While
a judge might go further and try to remedy a procedural error by
allowing more time to argue, or reduce the impact of an improper
argument by admonishing the attorney, instructing the jury to disregard
it, or declaring a mistrial, the judge is not required to take any action
absent a specific request. 190 In general, courts expect an attorney to
follow a predictable, routinized pattern from an objection to a request
for a corrective remedy to a mistrial motion. If the objection is
sustained, the attorney should request a specific procedural remedy or
move that an improper argument be struck and the jury instructed to
disregard it.' 9' If the judge overrules the objection, refuses to strike
the argument, does not instruct the jury, or otherwise fails to adequately
cure the error, the aggrieved party must move for a mistrial. 92
It is far from clear whether an attorney's request for a remedy must
be made at the same time as the objection. The majority rules seem
to be as follows: (1) motions to strike the offending argument or to
admonish the attorney must be made at the same time as the objection;' 93
(2) requests for a curative instruction must be made at the time of
the objection if the general instructions have been given prior to
argument, 94 but may be made at any time prior to instructions if the
189. People v. Terry, 57 Cal. 2d 538, 370 P.2d 985, 21 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1962);
State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. St. Louis, 575 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 232 S.E.2d 778 (1977).
190. See Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361, 11 S. Ct. 355, 34 L. Ed. 958
(1891) (attorney must request remedy for substantive error); Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d 656 (1978) (court need not grant procedural
remedy absent specific request).
191. See Dean v. State, 433 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. 1982); State v. Hayes, 624 S.W.2d
16 (Mo. 1981); Beck v. Modern Am. Life Ins. Co., 589 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); State v. Wright, 304 N.C. 349, 283 S.E.2d 502 (1981); Boyd v. State, 643
S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982).
192. See Bew v. Williams, 373 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (if instruction
insufficient to cure, attorney must move for mistrial); State v. Terrio, 442 A.2d 537
(Me. 1982) (court need not grant mistrial if defendant does not request it); Barnes v.
Quality Beef Co., 425 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1981) (if instruction to disregard is inadequate,
attorney must move for mistrial). But see State v. Dupre, 408 So. 2d 1229 (La. 1982)
(no motion for mistrial necessary if judge overrules objection).
193. See Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1977).
194. See Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978).
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instructions follow argument;195 and (3) motions for mistrial may be
made at any time prior to jury deliberations, since they may be based
on cumulative errors or on the judge's failure to adequately correct
an error through the jury instructions. 96
In a number of jurisdictions, there is a fifth requirement: arguments
supporting or opposing an objection must be made out of the hearing
of the jury. Generally it is proper to make an objection, state the
grounds for it, and request an immediate remedy in open court.
97
However, any argument on how the judge should rule addresses a
question of law and should not be heard by the jury. t98 The reasons
are fairly obvious. Such arguments do not address the merits of the
case, they may require discussion concerning the impact of the objec-
tionable argument, and they may emphasize the very argument the
judge eventually rules to be illegal. In most jurisdictions, however,
when an attorney objects that an opponent's argument is factually
inaccurate, he is permitted to explain the inaccuracy in front of the
jury. 199
195. See Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 286 S.E.2d 172 (1982). But see
Graham v. Simplex Motor Rebuilders, 191 Neb. 320, 215 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (when
objection and request for instruction are made after argument, court has discretion
to decline to give instruction).
196. See Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997 (Del. 1982) (motion for mistrial made after
arguments; apparently sufficient); Bew v. Williams, 373 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (motion for mistrial must be made before case goes to jury); State v.
Terrio, 442 A.2d 537 (Me. 1982) (motion for mistrial made after verdict is too late);
Graham v. Simplex Motor Rebuilders, 191 Neb. 320, 215 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (motion
for mistrial may be made at close of arguments). See also Commonwealth v. Lowe,
15 Mass. App. 262, 444 N.E.2d 1314 (1983) (failure to complain after instructions
shows that attorney is satisfied that error has been cured). But see Barnes v. Quality
Beef Co., 425 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1981) (motion for mistrial must be made at time
inadequate curative instruction given).
197. See Wexler v. Martin, 367 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (improper for
counsel to argue points of law in front of jury); Wvo. DIST. CT. R. 17(n) (when
making objection, only the legal ground may be stated in jurors' presence).
198. See Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966)
(proper to refuse to permit attorney to read law in support of objection in presence
of jury); Rowley v. Rousseau, 81 111. App. 3d 193, 400 N.E.2d 1045 (1980) (error to
object to defendant's argument implying he would pay loss personally by stating in
jurors' presence that insurance company would pay); MINN. Crv. TRIALBOOK § 31
(any objection to final argument shall be argued outside jurors' hearing); Wvo. DIST.
CT. R. 17(n) (objections may not be argued in presence of jury).
199. See Powers v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 92 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 416 N.E.2d
1161 (1981) (plaintiff argued in rebuttal that defendant had conceded $80,000 in lost
future earnings; defendant objected on the ground that he had said $80,000 total
damages); Edwards v. Lacy, 412 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Mo. 1967) (court gives the following
example: plaintiff improperly argues that the last time the case was tried, plaintiff
won; defense says, "Objection; the last time resulted in a nonsuit").
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How seriously do the trial courts take these technical requirements?
This is a separate question from the extent to which appellate courts
require proper objections to preserve error.200 In the trial court, the
judge has the power and discretion to enforce the rules of argument
despite a faulty objection or no objection. If the judge takes sua
sponte action, he or she can be reversed for an incorrect ruling but
not for failure to follow proper procedures. If the judge takes no
action, he or she can be reversed if plain error (to which no objection
is necessary) was committed, but again not on procedural grounds
alone. Because discretion is given to the trial judge, it is not possible
to fully examine on appeal the judge's action in the absence of a
proper objection without observing trials in action or reading trial
transcripts. Although the answer cannot be found in appellate opinions,
those opinions give some indication of what should go on at trial. It
appears that, in contrast to the rather rigid treatment of technical
requirements on appeal, requirements are treated loosely at the trial
court level. It is considered both proper and desirable for a trial judge
to be primarily concerned with the propriety and fairness of the closing
arguments and not with whether a technically correct objection has
been made.20 1 This attitude is the opposite of that of the appellate
courts.
3. Responses to Rule Violations
After an objection has been made to an improper argument, several
avenues of response are open to the opposing attorney and the judge.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 323-34 (for general discussion of the extent
which instructions "cure" error).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981); Commonwealth
v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 444 N.E.2d 374 (1983) (trial courts should not make a fetish
out of formal objection requirements). The sample included dozens of cases in which
it was apparent from the appellate opinion that the trial judge had made a ruling or
tried to correct an error despite inadequate objections. In none of these is there the
slightest indication that the trial judge should have required rigid adherence to objection
procedures. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 U.S. 150,
237, 60 S. Ct. 811, 851, 84 L. Ed. 1129, 1177 (1940) (trial judge gave curative
instruction despite absence of objection or request); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163,
1170 (6th Cir. 1982) (trial judge instructed jury despite late objection and no request);
People v. Rhoads, 110 Il1. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982) (trial court admonished
prosecutor despite absence of request for any remedy); State v. Dupre, 408 So. 2d
1229 (La. 1982) (trial judge sustained objection and instructed jury to disregard
argument, despite late objection and no request); State v. Davenport, 33 Wash. App.
704, 657 P.2d 794 (1983), rev'd, 675 P.2d 1213 (Wash. 1984) (attorney requested
mistrial but not a curative instruction, trial judge gave instruction).
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While the attorney could simply ignore the objection and forge ahead,
the rules at least implicitly require that he stop so that the error may
be corrected. 20 2 The attorney may employ a self-help remedy such as
withdrawing, apologizing for, or correcting an improper argument, or
he may defer to the trial judge. The judge must rule on the objection
and select an appropriate remedy. Possible remedies are admonishing
the offending attorney, giving the jury a curative instruction, or granting
a mistrial. A judge has some discretion in selecting an appropriate
remedy, but there are limits to that discretion depending on the
seriousness of the error.
Courts appear to treat responses as falling into three categories:
weak responses, ordinary responses, and drastic responses. All attorney
self-help actions, withdrawal, apology and correction, and those judicial
remedies not focusing directly on the impropriety of the challenged
argument, sustaining the objection, or generally instructing the jury
on how to decide the case properly without singling out any particular
improper arguments, are considered weak responses. Judicial corrective
actions that focus directly on improper arguments while permitting the
trial to continue-admonishing the attorney, instructing the jury to
disregard an argument, or promptly correcting an attorney's misstate-
ment-are considered ordinary responses. The most drastic response is
the judge's declaration of a mistrial.
The appropriate level of response depends on how serious the error
is. In one sense, generalizations concerning the relative seriousness of
argument errors are impossible to make. Courts are inconsistent.
Particular errors considered serious in one jurisdiction are seen as
inconsequential in others. 203 However, it is possible to posit a tentative
and somewhat vague hierarchy of types of errors. Without understand-
ing that there are different degrees of error, it is impossible to make
sense out of the cases.
202. See generally Clemons v. State, 320 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1975) (attorney continued
to argue, ignoring objections; conduct held "reprehensible" but not reversible error).
Continuing to argue also may increase the likelihood of a mistrial, or that an error
will rise to such a level that it becomes reversible. See infra text accompanying notes
295-311, and 380-89.
203. Compare People v. Dukes, 12 Ill. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14 (1957) (weeping
during argument is reversible error) with Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W.
341 (1897) (shedding tears is not reversible error).
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This article classifies closing argument errors according to category and
level of seriousness. Errors fall generally into four categories: improper
procedures, improper marshalling of the evidence, improper arguments
concerning the law and its application, and improper emotional appeals.
Within each category errors occur at three levels of seriousness: trivial, in-
termediate, and egregious. While their boundaries are imprecise, this hi-
erarchy is not arbitrary; it corresponds to the way courts treat violations of
closing argument rules. Trivial errors rarely warrant reversal, egregious er-
rors almost always require reversal, and intermediate errors sometimes re-
quire reversal. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve very deeply into
this hierarchy. It is enough to understand that courts treat errors differ-
ently. Across jurisdictions, some agreement exists concerning where most
errors fit into this scheme. A general classification is suggested in Table 2.20
4
a. Responses by the Attorney
Because of the nature of the adversary system, the first response to an
objection should come from the attorney who made the challenged argu-
ment. If the challenged attorney believes the objection to be valid, he may
withdraw the argument, apologize for it, and/or attempt to correct the er-
ror on his own by further explanatory argument. These actions are more
than just courtesies or good tactics to avoid being reprimanded by the judge.
They are court-approved procedures for handling improper arguments. In
many cases these procedures are deemed to neutralize the effect of an im-
proper argument and cure the error.
In the survey, twenty-two cases addressed the extent to which attorney
self-help is an appropriate response to closing argument errors. The cases
covered situations in which attorneys withdrew improper arguments, at-
tempted to explain, clarify, or correct them, or apologized for or discon-
tinued them. Only two of the cases were reversed where the attorney's self-
help was an inappropriate response to the error: one involved an argument
concerning the relative wealth of the parties, and the other a so-called
204. A full analysis of the substantive law of closing argument will be the subject
of forthcoming articles. For now, the reader will have to rely on the author's promise
to substantiate this in the future, because few court opinions explicitly articulate this
kind of hierarchy. One of those rare cases is Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584
S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979), which separates "curable" errors from "incurable" errors
such as appealing to racial prejudice, using epithets like liar, cheat or fraud, and
making an unsupported charge of perjury.
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TABLE 2
Seriousness of Selected Closing Argument Errors
Categories Level of Seriousnes
Trival Intermediate Egregious
Procedural Errors 1. Attorney prevented 1. Attorney prevented 1. Attorney com-
from arguing tan- from arguing ma- pletely prevented
gential issue. jor issue. from arguing.
2. Sandbaging. 2. Judge showing fa-
3. Short time limits. voritism to one
4. Arguing out of side.
proper sequence.
Errors in Fact Ar- 1. Misstating unim- 1. Misstating facts on 1. Introducing new
guments portant facts. contested issue, facts on crucial is-
2. Attributing testi- 2. Referring to mate- sue.
mony to wrong rial facts from at- 2. Commenting on
witness. torney's personal defendant's failure
knowledge. to testify.
3. Commenting on
excluded evidence.
4. Commenting on
defendant's failure
to produce evi-
dence.
5. Introducing new
facts concerning
character.
Errors in Argu- 1. Stating option on 1. Misstating or crit- 1. Discussing appeals
ments about Law correct outcome. icizing law. paroles and par-
2. Misapplying legal 2. Raising immaterial dons.
doctrine, laws.
3. Attempts to cir-
cumvent law.
Errors in Appeal- 1. Injecting commu- 1. Inviting sympathy 1. Appealing to racial
ing to Emotions nity values.
2. Attacking other at-
torney's tactics or
ethics.
3. Insulting witnesses.
or antipathy.
2. Raising wealth or
insurance.
3. Referring to public
clamor.
4. Asking for verdict
as example to other
wrongdoers.
5. Suggesting defan-
dant will comit
more crimes if re-
leased.
6. Asking jurors to
put themselves in
client's shoes
(Golden Rule).
or religious preju-
dice.
2. Threatening that
verdict will have
personal impact on
jurors.
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"Golden Rule" arguments, 205 both of which are generally considered to be
intermediate errors, but among the most serious at that level. In the other
twenty cases, the attorneys' self-help actions were held to be appropriate
and adequate substitutes for judicial intervention. The cases involved mostly
trivial errors, such as obviously inadvertent misstatements of fact,2°6 the use
of exaggerated colorful language,207 the injection by an attorney of his own
or the government's credibility into the case,208 and attacks on the credi-
bility of the other attorney. 20 9 In two cases, the attorney's self-help was held
to be appropriate for the intermediate errors of misusing evidence admitted
for a limited purpose210 and misstating the law. 21 1 Prompt attorney self-help
is an appropriate response in the case of trivial errors, but is not adequate
for most serious errors.
b. Responses by the Trial Judge
The opposing attorney has the option of responding; the trial judge does
not. Unless the attorneys' self-help in trivial error situations relieves the
judge of his obligations, the judge must respond to an objection. He must
rule on it and select the appropriate remedy, which may be admonishing
the attorney, correcting a misstatement, instructing the jury to disregard
the argument, or granting a mistrial. The standard rhetoric that the judge
has broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy is misleading. What
constitutes an appropriate response will be decided by the common law. The
trial judge has fairly wide discretion to decide how he will instruct the jury,
205. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d 546 (1937)
(attorney argued: if you return a verdict for the plaintiff, there will not be a meal
missed by a railroad official); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. American Airlines, 408 P.2d
789 (Okla. 1965) (attorney asked jurors to put themselves in plaintiff's position and
award what they would want for themselves).
206. See State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689, 705 (La. 1981) ("the defendant pleaded
guilty-I mean, not guilty").
207. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960)
(defendant did an evil to the plaintiff).
208. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct.
811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940) (we-attorney and government officials-believe in justice
of our case); Kessner v. McDonald, 46 Ill. App. 3d 333, 360 N.E.2d 1178 (1977) (our
office thinks this is a no-liability case).
209. See Funk v. Venture Stores, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 3d 115, 418 N.E.2d 498 (1981)
(defense attorneys high-priced); Poole v. State, 295 Md. App. 167, 453 A.2d 1218
(1983) (defense made inconsistent argument).
210. See People v. Handy, 657 P.2d 963 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (suggesting that
defendant's prior record should influence the jurors' decision).
211. See People v. Millard, 90 A.D.2d 590, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1982) (misstated
law of entrapment).
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if an instruction is the appropriate response, but he does not have the dis-
cretion to select an inappropriate remedy. He may neither take drastic ac-
tion for trivial errors, nor respond weakly to egregious errors.
The trial judge must rule on objections. Ideally, he should make a ruling
on every objection. 212 However, there does not appear to be any enforce-
ment device to encourage compliance with this rule. Only one case consid-
ered a judge's failure to rule on a procedural error. Additionally, that was the
only case in which a trial judge was criticized for failure to rule. 213 In fact,
in several cases the appeals courts criticized the attorneys for failing to se-
cure definitive rulings.2"" Failure to rule is generally ignored on appeal or
considered the equivalent of overruling the objection. Only if the under-
lying argument was serious enough to require corrective action will the fail-
ure to sustain and take further corrective action result in the judgment being
reversed.2 15 The focus is on the adequacy of the corrective action rather than
on the ruling. This is apparent from the number of cases in which the judge
ruled incorrectly on the objection but took corrective action. The erroneous
ruling is universally ignored.21 6 Considering the seriousness with which ap-
pellate courts take other procedural devices, this one exception is surpris-
ing.
If the trial judge decides that an argument is improper, he or she must
select an appropriate response. Although the objecting attorney should re-
quest the remedy he believes appropriate, the primary burden of selection
falls on the trial judge. If the argument is improper, the trial judge may: (1)
sustain the objection but take no further action, (2) give general instruc-
tions to the jury about the proper way to deliberate, (3) admonish or re-
primand the offending attorney, (4) give a specific instruction to the jury
to disregard the argument, or (5) grant a mistrial. Not all responses are ap-
212. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lacy, 412 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Mo. 1967).
213. Pecor v. Home Indem. Co. of N.Y., 234 Wis. 407, 291 N.W. 313 (1940)
(court refused to rule on three objections; abuse of discretion).
214. E.g., Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d 841, 139 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1977) (although Ford objected, it failed to secure a definitive ruling, so error waived).
215. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lacy, 412 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1967) (objection to "Golden
Rule" argument not ruled on; no error, because such argument not considered a
serious error in Missouri); Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(objection to gross misstatement of law not ruled on; reversible error because court
did not correct a serious misstatement of the law on a crucial issue).
216. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 243 S.E.2d 1 (1978); State v. Caldwell,
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 53 N.E. 497 (1899);
Norlin Music, Inc. v. Keyboard "88", 425 A.2d 74 (R.I. 1981). In all of these
cases the trial judge erroneously overruled an objection but undertook some corrective
action. On appeal, the courts only looked to the sufficiency of the judge's remedy,
and either ignored the erroneous ruling or stated that it did not matter.
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propriate in all situations. The weaker responses are not adequate for egre-
gious errors, mistrials are not appropriate except for serious errors, and
creative efforts to fashion other kinds of remedies are discouraged.
21 7
Overly broad language in some cases suggests that the scope of a trial
judge's discretion to select an appropriate remedy is very wide, and that the trial
judge has virtually unbridled discretion to select a remedy. 2 8 A critical
reading of the cases, however, suggests otherwise. The trial judge appar-
ently has some discretion in selecting from among equivalent responses, may
have broader discretion when the objecting attorney does not make a re-
quest, and has some discretion in choosing between instructions and grant-
ing a mistrial for moderately serious errors. Also, the trial judge probably
has discretion in responding after an attorney undertakes corrective action
for a trivial error. This discretion is limited, at least generally, and the trial
judge is required, under penalty of reversal, to select from a limited list of
remedies deemed appropriate by the appellate courts for particular errors.
The ordinary response is for the judge to instruct the jury to disregard an
improper argument. Such an instruction is almost always considered an ap-
propriate response whether the error is trivial, intermediate, or egregious,
and is never considered too drastic a remedy. 2 9 It is the most common rem-
217. See, e.g., Minneapolis, S.P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 51 S.
Ct. 501, 75 L. Ed. 1243 (1931) (reversing the trial judge's use of remittitur to correct
error resulting from an appeal to passion and prejudice); Waldron v. Waldron, 156
U.S. 361, 15 S. Ct. 383, 39 L. Ed. 453 (1895) (corrective instruction inadequate to
cure serious error); Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1982) (general
instructions insufficient to cure series of moderately serious errors); Bishop v. Watson,
367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (error to grant new trial for a nonserious
error-mistatement of law that could have been corrected).
218. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga. App. 24, 274 S.E.2d
74 (1980) (trial judge vested with broad discretion, and ruling will not be overturned
absent an abuse); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willis, 140 Ga. App. 225, 230 S.E.2d
363 (1976) (admonition and mistrial equally available remedies; trial court could 'have
selected either one); Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 232 S.E.2d 778 (1977) (trial
court has discretion to decide appropriate remedy).
219. In the sample, seventy-two discussed the appropriateness of an instruction to
disregard. In 82% of them (59/72), the instruction was sufficient to cure the error
and in 18% (13/72) it was insufficient. In no case was the instruction considered too
harsh a remedy. See People v. Vanda, 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982)
(usually, any error is cured by instruction to disregard); Parker v. Kangerga, 482
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (instruction to disregard ordinarily overcomes harm
caused by improper argument).
Cases holding an instruction to disregard to be an inadequate remedy involve
arguments raising the possibility of appeal, pardon, or parole. Howell v. State, 411
So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1982) (argument repeated several times); introducing new "evidence"
on a crucial issue, State v. Barnes, 598 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (state's case
weak); and commenting on the defendant's failure to testify, Ledford v. State, 568
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edy and can be considered the presumptively correct judicial response. 2 0
Under most circumstances the trial judge should instruct the jury promptly
to disregard an improper argument. The interesting issues concern the cir-
cumstances under which the judge may take weaker or more drastic cor-
rective action.
Weaker responses include sustaining an objection but taking no other ac-
tion, giving general instructions to the jury on how to properly deliberate
without focusing on or criticizing the improper argument, and admonish-
ing the attorney rather than the jury. These weak responses were found in-
appropriate more often than instructions to disregard. In the survey, fifty
percent of the cases in which the judges merely sustained objections were
reversed. Thirty-one percent of the cases in which only general instructions
were given were reversed, a number significantly higher than the eighteen
percent reversal rate for cases in which instructions to disregard were given.
This sample lacked enough cases discussing admonitions to the attorney for
a precise comparison, but several opinions suggest that in some situations
an admonition would not be appropriate but an instruction to disregard
would be adequate. 22'
The weakest response, then, is for the judge to sustain an objection but
take no other action. This remedy has been held to be adequate only when
the judge is responding to the most trivial improper arguments: saying un-
kind things about the opposing attorney, 222 misstating unimportant facts, 223
S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (state's case weak). Under the circumstances,
in all these cases the judge should have granted a mistrial. To be effective, the
instruction must unambiguously tell the jury to disregard an improper argument. See
Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Vandament, 256 Ark. 434, 508 S.W.2d 49, 51 (1974)
(court said: "I suppose it is improper . . . [and] probably is not a proper argument
... [and] you are instructed to disregard it"; held inadequate).
220. In the sample, 139 opinions discussed the appropriateness of the remedy selected
by the trial judge to correct an improper argument. In seventy-two of those cases,
the discussion concerned an instruction to disregard.
221. E.g., Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d 546 (1937)
(admonition did not cure; jury should have been instructed to disregard argument);
see also People v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982) (admonishing
attorney was adequate where defendant never asked for instruction to disregard).
222. People v. Trolia, 107 Ill. App. 3d 487, 437 N.E.2d 804, 815 (1982) ("1
believe the defense has attempted to confuse you and to distort the issues in this
case"); Boyd v. State, 643 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (defense attorneys are
well paid).
223. People v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982) (misstating
facts related primarily to the defendant's character); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509,
212 S.E.2d 125 (1975) (going beyond the record to suggest a reason for lack of
fingerprints; court calls it a "minor transgression").
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referring to other well-known cases,224 and referring to a juror by name. 225
If the improper argument constitutes a more significant error, one that is
either intermediate or egregious, then merely sustaining an objection is an
insufficient response. 226
The next weakest response is the trial judge's permitting an improper ar-
gument to stand, but giving the jury a relevant general instruction on how
to deliberate properly. One such instruction tells the jurors that arguments
are not evidence and that they must base their verdict only on the facts in
evidence. If the attorney misstated the law, the court may give an instruc-
tion that correctly states the law without pointing out the attorney's error.
If the attorney improperly appealed to emotions, the judge may give the
jury a general instruction not to let passion or prejudice affect its judgment.
Such general instructions may be given immediately following an objection 2 7
or at the end of arguments. 22 However, the instruction's timing does not
appear to have an impact on the question of sufficiency. The trial judge
may tailor the instruction to the particular error, instruct the jurors to con-
sider only their own recollection of the facts after counsel has misstated evi-
dence, 229 instruct the jurors to disregard sympathy and decide the case
dispassionately if counsel has made an emotional appeal, 230 or inform the
jurors of the correct law and instruct them to follow it if counsel misstated
the law.23 ' However, the trial judge need not specifically tailor general in-
structions, but may simply tell the jurors that arguments are not evidence
224. People v. Tolefree, 85 Ill. App. 3d 844, 407 N.E.2d 604 (1980) (reference to
Kitty Genovese case in New York).
225. Lane v. Mathews, 74 Ariz. 201, 245 P.2d 1025 (1952), rev'd 251 P.2d 303
(Ariz. 1953).
226. See State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975) (prosecutor implied
that defendant had a criminal record despite no evidence of it; sustaining objection
without an instruction to disregard does not cure); Fortenberry v. Fortenberry, 582
S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (one argument circumvented court's evidence ruling,
another appealed to self-interest of jurors; neither cured by merely sustaining objec-
tions).
227. See United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1978); Calloway v. Lemley,
382 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 1980); State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La. 1981); State v.
Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
228. See Laguna v. Prouty, 300 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1981); People v. Millard, 90
A.D.2d 590, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1982).
229. See Osborn v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1978); Jones v. State, 381 So. 2d
983 (Miss. 1980); MNN. Crv. TRUALBOOK R. 31.
230. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Jarvis, 266 Ala. 440, 97 So. 2d 549 (1957); Spiess
v. Traversa, 172 Conn. 525, 375 A.2d 1007 (1977).
231. See State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); Makino v. Spokane, P.
& S. Ry., 155 Or. 317, 63 P.2d 1082 (1937).
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or that they should disregard any part of argument that goes beyond the
evidence, to cure all kinds of errors.
23 2
A general instruction is better than no instruction at all. Like merely sus-
taining an objection, it is an appropriate response to trivial errors such as
aggrandizing one's own witnesses, 233 saying unkind things about one's op-
ponent, 234 misstating evidence or inviting speculation about missing evi-
dence of only tangential relevance, 235 injecting general social values, 23 6 or
injecting one's personal credibility into the case without implying that
counsel has knowledge of unintroduced evidence.
23 7
Unlike merely sustaining an objection, giving a general instruction some-
times is an adequate response to an intermediate error. The cases are evenly
split. Thirty-one opinions in the sample explicitly discussed the adequacy
of general instructions to cure intermediate errors. Eighteen opinions con-
cluded that they were not sufficient. A consistent rationale is not apparent.
Some jurisdictions consistently follow one rule or the other, 238 but the de-
cisions from a particular state are more likely to go both ways. 239 Addition-
ally, the cases are not reconcilable by looking at the category of improper
argument. The holdings are inconsistent, whether the error involves mis-
stating evidence, 240 misstating law, 241 or appealing to emotions. 242 In fact,
232. See United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1978); People v. Barney,
111 Ill. App. 3d 669, 444 N.E.2d 518 (1982); State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La.
1981); State v. Bissantz, 3 Ohio App. 3d 108, 444 N.E.2d 92 (1982).
233. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1978).
234. People v. Trolia, 107 Ill. App. 3d 487, 437 N.E.2d 804 (1982).
235. People v. Barney, 111 Ill. App. 3d 669, 444 N.E.2d 518 (1982); Jones v. State,
381 So. 2d 983 (Miss. 1980).
236. State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832 (1971) (rising crime rate); State
v. Bissantz, 3 Ohio App. 3d 108, 444 N.E.2d 92 (1982) (need for public officials with
integrity).
237. Joseph v. Monroe, 419 A.2d 927 (Del. 1980).
238. For example, all four decisions in the sample from Alabama held that general
instructions were sufficient. Calloway v. Lemley, 382 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 1980); Osborn
v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1978); Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So. 2d 1049 (Ala.
1977); Southern Ry. Co. v. Jarvis, 266 Ala. 440, 97 So. 2d 549 (1957).
239. Compare Wilson v. State, 126 Ark. 354, 190 S.W. 441 (1916) (general instruction
held to be sufficient); People v. Newsome, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634
(1982); State v. Parker, 425 So. 2d 683 (La. 1982); People v. Millard, 90 A.D.2d
590, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1982) with Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490,
107 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Basden v. Kiefner Bros., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 218, 414 N.E.2d
951 (1980); State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La. 1981); DeCicio v. Methodist
Hosp. of Brooklyn, 74 A.D.2d 593, 424 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1980) (all finding general
instructions insufficient).
240. Compare Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981) (argued facts
not in evidence; general instruction adequate); People v. Newsome, 110 Ill. App. 3d
1043, 443 N.E.2d 634 (1982) (misstated facts and argued facts not in evidence; general
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this author could find no logical rationale to explain the holdings. This au-
thor's opinion is that the holdings resulted from courts weighing the seri-
ousness of the error and finding that general instructions were appropriate
for the relatively less serious. One might speculate that a general instruction
would be found adequate more often in criminal than in civil cases because
of the reluctance of appellate courts to free convicted defendants. It was
considered whether a general instruction would more likely be adequate for
isolated errors than multiple errors, or whether the nature of the attorney's
request for a remedy could explain the apparently random results. The cases
do not confirm any of these hypotheses, leading to the unfortunate conclu-
sion that whether a general instruction is likely to be considered an ade-
quate remedy for an intermediate error in any particular case is arbitrary
and random.
The third weak response is a prompt admonition to the attorney making
the improper argument. This response is infrequently used; only ten cases
in the sample discuss this remedy, and only five of those explicitly address
the issue of appropriateness.2 43 In four of the five cases, this remedy was
held to be appropriate. This remedy was approved 2" in all cases where it
was used in response to intermediate errors. The two cases presenting egre-
gious errors split. One upheld the use of an admonition when an attorney
made a racist argument,24 5 the other held it an inadequate response to an
instruction adequate) with Moss v. Mittel, 253 Ky. 504, 69 S.W.2d 1046 (1934)
(misquoted witness; instruction did not cure); State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La.
1981) (misstated facts; instruction did not cure).
241. Compare People v. Millard, 90 A.D.2d 590, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1982) (misstated
law of entrapment; general instruction adequate) with Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d
400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (misstated law of contributory negligence; instruction not
adequate).
242. Compare Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (plaintiff
argued that a few thousand dollars would not mean anything to the defendant; general
instruction adequate) with Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107
S.W.2d 546 (1937) (defense argued that if a verdict were returned for plaintiff, there
would not be a meal missed by a railroad official; instruction not adequate).
243. In the others, either the court simply included boilerplate dicta that admon-
ishment is one of a number of available remedies, see, e.g., Wilhelm v. State, 272
Md. 404, 326 A.2d 707 (1974), or the opinion focused on the propriety of a more
powerful remedy, see Thundereal Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (mistrial); Ledford v. State, 568 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)
(instruction to disregard).
244. People v. Rhoads, 110 I11. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982) (counsel
misstated law); State v. Wallace, 644 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (grounds
unclear; probably counsel misstated facts); Hoffer v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 49 N.W.2d
282 (1951) (counsel misstated evidence).
245. Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, 28 S. Ct. 422, 52 L. Ed. 670 (1908).
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attorney's attempt to interject his own knowledge of facts not proved on a
crucial issue.
2 16
Despite the small number of cases, the admonition can reasonably be ca-
tegorized as a more effective response than a general instruction, although
it is a weaker response than a specific instruction to disregard. Admonitions
were approved on appeal more often (80°0) than general instructions (69%).
A weaker response than an instruction to disregard is amply illustrated by
two of the cases. One approved an admonition only because an instruction
to disregard was not requested, 47 and the other (despite the absence of a
request) held that an admonition was inadequate under the circumstances,
because the trial judge should have instructed the jury to disregard the im-
proper argument.
248
The only response more drastic than an instruction to disregard is the
declaration of a mistrial. This remedy is appropriate only in response to
egregious errors, and even then, not for all egregious errors. Three princi-
ples concerning mistrials are stated frequently in the cases: (1) mistrials are
required for certain egregious errors, (2) mistrials are forbidden for non-
egregious errors, and (3) the judge has discretion to choose between grant-
ing a mistrial and giving an instruction to disregard. Plainly, the two absolute
rules are incompatible with the rule of discretion.
Cases indicate there must be absolute rules that some kinds of arguments
so reduce the likelihood of a fair trial that mistrials are required. Opinion
after opinion includes pronouncements that where improper remarks are
of such character that their prejudicial impact cannot be removed from the
minds of jurors, a new trial must be ordered. 9 Of course, those opinions
usually conclude that the case on appeal did not present such a serious er-
ror, 250 leaving one to wonder if the boilerplate language has any concrete
meaning.
More helpful are the cases that explicitly decide whether mistrials are re-
quired following particular improper arguments. Courts have held that
mistrials are mandatory for improper arguments such as going beyond the
record and introducing new facts likely to prejudice the jury for or against
246. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d 546 (1937).
247. People v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982).
248. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d 546 (1937).
249. See, e.g., Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 383, 15 S. Ct. 383, 388, 39 L.
Ed. 453, 459 (1895); Eastern S.S. Lines v. Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Wren, 643 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1983); Lopez v. State, 643 S.W.2d
436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
250. In the sample, eleven cases contained boilerplate language that mistrials are to
be granted for serious errors, but in seven of them the court held that the argument
reviewed was not of such a serious kind.
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a party;25' making an unsupported charge of perjury;"' commenting on
a criminal defendant's failure to testify; appealing to racism;25'4 appealing
to sympathy or passion; 25 suggesting that wealth, insurance, or ability to
pay should affect the verdict;25 6 arguing that a verdict will raise the jurors'
taxes or insurance premiums;25" using unwarranted epithets like liar, cheat,
and fraud; 258 and suggesting that a defendant could be paroled or pardoned
from a long jail term. 59
Yet for each of these improper arguments, which are each a serious error,
other cases exist, sometimes from the same state, holding that mistrials are
not required. 260 In explaining the discrepancy, some opinions suggest that
it really is a matter of judicial discretion when a serious closing argument
error has so indelibly stained the fairness of the trial that a mistrial must be
granted. 261 This author does not believe that that is an accurate statement.
There are too many cases in which a trial judge's exercise of discretion is
reversed on appeal-not only in outrageous cases under the rubric of "abuse
of discretion," but also in run-of-the-mill cases where the appellate court
declines to give any weight at all to the trial court's supposed advantageous
perspective .262
251. See Waldron, 156 U.S. at 383 (party's adultery); Coleman v. State, 420 So.
2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (accuracy of witness's description); State v. Mayfield,
506 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974) (demonstrating that a shotgun could have been concealed
by using a different one with a short barrel); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (imaginary testimony); Lopez v. State,
643 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (party's criminal record).
252. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
253. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
254. State v. Wildon, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981); Standard Fire Ins. v. Reese, 584
S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979); Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1
P.2d 221 (1931).
255. Eastern S.S. Lines v. Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
256. White v. Piles, 589 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
257. Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
258. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
259. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-76 (1982) (mistrial mandatory).
260. See, e.g., Thundereal Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (appealing to passion, prejudice); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga,
App. 24, 274 S.E.2d 74 (1980) (racial prejudice); State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709
(Minn. 1982) (charging perjury); North County School Dist. v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 539 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (wealth of parties); Standard Fire Ins. Co.
v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979) (unsupported charge of perjury).
261. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga. App. 24, 274 S.E.2d
74 (1980); Poole v. State, 295 Md. App. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983); State v. Wren,
643 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1983).
262. The best example is State v. Mayfield, 506 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974), in which
the prosecutor referred to and used evidence outside the record. The trial judge denied
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A pattern does not exist in the cases. Mistrials are not restricted to cases
where egregious errors have been committed. At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, mistrials are required when one of the more serious errors is com-
mitted and specific aggravating factors also are present. In the sample of
cases, mistrials were mandated both for egregious errors, such as arguing
that facts not in evidence could resolve a crucial issue,2 63 and also for in-
termediate errors involving emotional appeals, such as encouraging the jury
to decide a contested issue according to passion or prejudice, 64 and making
an unsupported charge of perjury365 Such errors require mistrials when one
or more of the following aggravating factors are present: (1) the argument
was made in bad faith, with knowledge of its impropriety;2 66 (2) the infrac-
tion is repeated;2 67 (3) the argument encourages the jurors to decide the case
contrary to the facts and the law; 261 (4) the jurors are told they will be af-
fected personally by the verdict;269 or (5) the improper argument bolsters an
otherwise weak case. 270
a mistrial motion, stating that he had watched the jurors' reaction and that the
evidence seemed to have no effect. The appellate court reversed and ordered a new
trial. See also Bishop v. Watson, 367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Evans
v. Multicon Constr. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 375 N.E.2d 338 (1978); Graham v.
Simplex Motor Rebuilders, Inc., 191 Neb. 320, 215 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (all reversing
the trial court's decision to grant a mistrial); Beam v. Beam, 18 Wash. App. 444,
569 P.2d 719 (1977).
263. See Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 15 S. Ct. 383, 39 L. Ed. 453 (1895)
(adultery in alienation of affections case); Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (accuracy of only eyewitness's description); State v. Caldwell,
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982) (commenting on defendant not testifying); State v.
Mayfield, 506 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974) (using wrong shotgun to demonstrate conceal-
ability).
264. See Eastern S.S. Lines v. Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(telling jury that plaintiff had witnessed his son being killed); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Willis, 140 Ga. App. 225, 230 S.E.2d 363 (1976) (inflammatory character assassi-
nation); White v. Piles, 589 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (insurance); State v.
Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981) (racial prejudice); Williams v. North River Ins.
Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (verdict will increase insurance premiums);
Lopez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (defendant's criminal record);
see also GA. CODE ANN § 17-8-76 (1982) (arguing possibility of parole or pardon).
265. See State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982); Standard Fire Ins. Co.
v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979) (dictum).
266. See Poole v. State, 295 Md. App. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983) (no mistrial;
conduct not "intentional"); Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305,
1 P.2d 221 (1931).
267. See Lopez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Schotis v. North
Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1 P.2d 221 (1931).
268. See White v. Piles, 589 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (wealth, insurance).
269. See Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(their insurance premiums would rise).
270. See Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); People v.
Scott, 108 III. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130 (1982).
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Mistrials are not appropriate for trivial errors. They appear to be too
drastic a response to intermediate errors that are procedural, factual, or le-
gal, rather than emotional. Even for egregious errors, granting a mistrial is
inappropriate if one of several mitigating factors is present: (1) the oppo-
nent failed to object or request a mistrial-not because this may be a pro-
cedural default, but because it supposedly shows that the attorney did not
think the error seriously prejudicial; " ' (2) the improper argument was made
in retaliation for an opponent's improper argument, or to offset prejudice
inherent in the case;272 and (3) if the error was that counsel injected new,
unproved facts whether similar evidence was properly before the jury2 3 or
the matter is within common knowledge and experience. " 4
The scope of the trial judge's discretion is best understood in light of this
model. It is not accurate to say that the judge has discretion to grant or deny
a mistrial. Discretion is not involved in the first part of the test: the error
either will support a mistrial or it will not; and the common law has already
made that determination. The judge may not declare a mistrial2 75 if the er-
ror is neither egregious nor involves emotional appeals. If the error is egre-
gious or is an intermediate, emotional appeal error, then the judge must
decide if it has made an accurate verdict unlikely. If so, a mistrial is re-
quired; if not, a mistrial is inappropriate, and judicial discretion is irrele-
271. See People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1967); Evans v. Multicon Constr. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 375 N.E.2d 338 (1978);
State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
272. See Thundereal Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(retaliatory argument); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga. App. 24, 274
S.E.2d 74 (1980) (attorney representing black client arguing that Georgia jurors tend
to return racially biased verdicts); Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (normally incurable error would not warrant mistrial if in
retaliation).
273. See State v. Wren, 643 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1983); Beam v. Beam, 18 Wash.
App. 444, 569 P.2d 719 (1977). This factor is inextricably bound up with the harmless
error test; see infra text accompanying notes 378-97.
274. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979) (argument
that plaintiff drove past 1000 doctors to find this one obviously only a figure of
speech to emphasize that plaintiff had selected his own expert witness).
275. People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967)
(attorney stating personal opinion of defendant's guilt); Bishop v. Watson, 367 So.
2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (misstating evidence concerning interest of parties);
Evans v. Multicon Constr. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 375 N.E.2d 338 (1978)
(improperly arguing adverse influence from failure to call a witness); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979) (exaggerating evidence; using hyperbole);
Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. Jones, 403 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (misquoting
or exaggerating testimony); Beam v. Beam, 18 Wash. App. 444, 569 P.2d 719 (1977)
(incorporating otherwise inadmissible evidence that had been introduced without
objection).
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vant. Whether an accurate verdict has become unlikely is not purely a
question for judicial discretion, but one of limited discretion to determine
if the effects of the improper argument have been aggravated or mitigated
according to general common law rules.
The limited scope of discretion can be illustrated by several examples, all
of which involve an attorney's going beyond the record and arguing facts
not in evidence. First, suppose the prosecutor in a criminal case states his
own personal opinion of the defendant's guilt, asking the jury to use that
information to help resolve the question of guilt or innocence. The judge
may not use his discretion to grant a mistrial, because the courts consider
this only an intermediate error, not an egregious one, and it does not appeal
to emotions. No further inquiry is required. 276 Second, suppose the prose-
cutor does commit an egregious error, for instance, raising new facts in his
argument that relate directly to a crucial contested issue. The trial judge
may not use his discretion to make an intuitive judgment about whether an
accurate verdict has become unlikely and grant or refuse a mistrial accord-
ingly. If a mitigating factor was present, such as retaliation, a mistrial is
inappropriate. 277 If an aggravating factor was present, such as a weak pros-
ecution case that rests on the testimony of a single witness, the mistrial must
be granted. 278 Third, suppose the prosecutor again commits an egregious
error by creating new evidence on a crucial issue, but this time his case, al-
though far from overwhelming, turns on three witnesses instead of one.
Additionally, the attorney is retaliating for an improper defense argument.
Now the trial judge must use his discretion first, to decide if the prosecu-
tion's case is weak or strong; and if he decides it is weak, to balance one
aggravating factor against one mitigating factor and decide if an accurate
verdict is still possible.
Asserting the theory that aggravating factors should always outweigh
mitigating factors is tempting. The accuracy and impartiality of the verdict
should perhaps be the primary concern, so that new trials should be granted
whenever both aggravating and mitigating factors are present. The cases do
not support such an idealistic position. Some courts seem to favor finality,
institutional convenience, and even upholding convictions at all costs, cau-
276. See People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1967).
277. See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d
1 (1985) (The Court condemned the retaliation doctrine, yet finds that no new trial
is required because the defendant's similar improper argument mitigated the harm
caused by the prosecutor's improper argument.).
278. See Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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tioning against granting mistrials in all but the clear cases. 279 Since com-
promise is impossible (there is no such thing as a half-mistrial), the mistrial
cases that fall into this gray area will inherently remain inconsistent, with
some courts favoring new trials and others being reluctant to ever grant
them.
Procedural errors are one area where the court has a great deal of dis-
cretion in fashioning a remedy. Unless the procedural error results in a party
being denied the right to be heard, in which case a new trial is required,
280
the judge has virtually unlimited discretion in selecting a remedy for a pro-
cedural error. For procedural errors affecting the sequence and number of
arguments, the ordinary response of instructing the jury to disregard the
error is not appropriate. It does not redress the problem if one party has
been procedurally hampered in the exercise of his right to be heard. The
question facing the judge is how best to restore the balance so that both
parties have similar opportunities to argue. Different situations require dif-
ferent remedies. Imposing a restriction on one party, giving the other party
more time or an additional opportunity to argue, or giving both parties ad-
ditional argument may be acceptable. Fashioning an appropriate proce-
dural remedy for a procedural error must, by the nature of the problem, be
left to the judge's discretion. 281
c. Responses that Aggravate the Error
This article has focused on responses by the attorney and trial judge that
tend to ameliorate the harmful effect of an improper argument. In some
cases, responses to objections have the opposite effect, tending to aggra-
vate the situation. This section will look at four recurring situations: (1) when
an attorney ignores the judge's ruling and continues or repeats an improper
argument; (2) when an attorney criticizes the ruling and makes an argument that
279. E.g., State v. Wren, 643 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1983) (mistrials are to be employed
sparingly).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 98-110.
281. See, e.g., Hall v. Weare, 92 U.S. 728, 23 L. Ed. 500 (1875) (order of argument
is discretionary and not subject to appellate review); United States v. Patterson, 678
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1982) (extending time limit by five minutes within discretion);
Stephens v. Shelbyville Cent. Schools, 162 Ind. App. 229, 318 N.E.2d 590 (1974)
(discretion to give defendants a few minutes of surrebuttal to answer new matters
brought up by plaintiff for first time in rebuttal); Weinbauer v. Berberich, 610 S.W.2d
674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discretion to widen scope of rebuttal to allow argument as
to matters inadvertently omitted from first argument); Cowan v. McElroy, 549 S.W.2d
543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (discretion to give both sides further argument when judge
gives new instruction during deliberations).
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asks the jury to ignore it; (3) when the judge gives a proper corrective
instruction but overrules the objection; and (4) when a judge compounds
an error by phrasing an instruction poorly.
The conduct of the attorney does not appear to affect the seriousness of
the error. If an attorney makes an improper argument, the judge takes some
remedial action, and the attorney accepts the ruling, the error usually is
considered cured and will withstand an appeal. In the sample, almost eighty
percent of such cases were affirmed. In those cases in which the attorney
ignored or evaded the rulings there was no increase in reversal rate; again
close to eighty percent were affirmed. Even when attorneys directly con-
travened the judges' rulings,282 repeated improper arguments after an ob-
jection had been sustained, 2s3 or tried to get the jury to ignore rulings, 28 4 the
judgments were affirmed at the usual rate. Only one appellate court even
commented on such conduct by attorneys, and while it "disapproved" of
an attorney disregarding a ruling, it found no error. 285
If the judge aggravates an error by overruling a proper objection, his er-
roneous ruling does not have a significant impact on the outcome of the
case where the judge employs a proper remedy to correct it. Obviously, if
the judge overrules a proper objection and takes no corrective action, the
judgment will be reversed on appeal unless it is harmless error. 2 6 However,
if he attempts to respond properly to the error, but in the process does
something that aggravates it, the case is no more likely to be reversed on
appeal than if he did not aggravate the error. The focal question is whether
the judge took steps to cure an error, not how he ruled. 287 If the judge does
282. E.g., James v. State, 563 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (prosecutor who
was denied permission to reopen argument to address punishment, stated in front of
jury that he felt a life sentence should be imposed; no error).
283. E.g., Bonner v. State, 43 Md. App. 518, 406 A.2d 646 (1979) (misstating
evidence); Clemons v. State, 320 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1975) (arguing that marijuana
causes women to jump off buildings and drown their babies in bathtubs); Powers v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 92 111. App. 3d 1033, 416 N.E.2d 1161 (1981) (mischaracterizing
defense argument).
284. E.g., Brokapp v. Ford Motor Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d 841, 139 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1977) (argument contradicted evidence as to marks on a power steering belt; attorney
marked belt with crayon; judge ordered marks removed and admonished attorney;
attorney resumed and told jury that if they looked closely at belt they could still see
marks).
285. James v. State, 563 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
286. Karriker v. Sigmond, 43 N.C. App. 244, 258 S.E.2d 473 (1979).
287. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nail, 379 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1980) (trial judge overruled
objection to argument appealing to prejudice; reversed because trial court did not
seek to cure the error); Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976) (error
in argument reversible unless trial court removes prejudice by corrective action);
Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (court did not rule on
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undertake some corrective action such as admonishing the attorney or in-
structing the jury, then the fact that he incorrectly overruled the objection
seems to be irrelevant, despite the mixed signals the jurors received on the
argument's propriety.
288
In only one situation does a response aggravating the harm of an im-
proper argument appear to affect the likelihood of reversal. This occurs
when the judge compounds the error by the way he words a corrective in-
struction. In one such case, the judge sent mixed signals to the jury, imply-
ing that the argument was proper, while reluctantly instructing them to
disregard it.289 In the other, the court inadvertently compounded the prob-
lem by explicitly telling the jury what the attorney had been insinuating. 29°
However, it should not be assumed that an instruction aggravating an error
will necessarily be considered as increasing the harm. In several other cases
where the judge did a similarly inept job of correcting an error, the appel-
late courts gave it no weight at all. 9'
E. Enforcing the Rules of Closing Argument Through the
Appellate Process
A party, who loses at trial and believes that infractions of closing argu-
ment rules contributed to that loss, may appeal. 292 Theoretically, a party
objection but gave general instruction, case reversed because instruction inadequate);
Karriker v. Sigmon, 43 N.C. App. 224, 258 S.E.2d 473 (1979) (objection improperly
overruled; new trial ordered because trial court had a duty to correct the error).
288. See, e.g., Laguna v. Prouty, 300 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1981) (objection overruled;
not error since court gave general instruction); State v. Parker, 425 So. 2d 683 (La.
1982) (objection overruled at the time, jury given general instruction later; error cured
just as if court had properly sustained the objection); Norlin Music, Inc. v. Keyboard
"88" Inc., 425 A.2d 74 (R.I. 1981) (court overruled objection but gave jury a corrective
instruction; case reversed because instruction inadequate; refusal to sustain held not
usually grounds for reversal).
289. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Vandament, 256 Ark. 434, 436, 508 S.W.2d 9,
51 (1974) ("1 suppose it's improper argument . . . it is the law but probably is not
a proper argument to present to the jury. In any event, you are instructed to disregard
it".) (emphasis added).
290. Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 Ill. App. 3d 855, 414 N.E.2d 1266 (1980) (the case
was tried on special interrogatories; attorney made indirect suggestion that if the jury
wanted to return a plaintiff's verdict, they had to answer one interrogatory in a certain
way; court instructed jury not to tie the two interrogatories together).
291. See Calloway v. Lemley, 382 So. 2d 540, 542 (Ala. 1980) (court said, "The
jury heard what was said in that regard, it's not for the court to say, but I'll overrule,
and I'll caution the jury that this is argument"; held adequate instruction) (emphasis
added); Joseph v. Monroe, 419 A.2d 927 (Del. 1980) (court gave ambiguous instruction
on whether argument proper or improper; held adequate); see also State v. Chapman,
410 So. 2d 689, 706 (La. 1981) (jury instructed to "disregard ...any evidence that
wasn't heard in this courtroom, but ...I'll overrule"; held harmless error).
292. The one exception is found in the federal courts, where the trial judge's
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appeals because the trial judge failed to properly enforce the rules of ar-
gument, not because the other attorney broke the rules. The appellate courts
are supposed to decide whether the trial judge ruled correctly on objections
and responded appropriately to errors. For that reason, appellate courts
require as a threshold matter that the appellant first bring any claim of error
to the attention of the trial judge by an objection, request, or motion. Fail-
ure to comply with this hierarchical procedure may mean a procedural de-
fault. The appeals court might not hear the appeal. Even if a claim has been
preserved properly, and an appellate court finds that closing argument rules
were violated, it need not reverse the judgment. Appellate courts have rea-
sonably broad power to characterize errors not only as waived, but also as
invited, cured, or harmless, and thereby avoid reversal. Often confused,
these four classifications are similar but analytically distinct. They have
evolved for different reasons, reflect different principles, and technically
are appropriate in different situations. This section will examine all four of
these reversal-avoidance doctrines, as well as some secondary doctrines de-
veloped to temper their harsh application.
Our system generally assumes that its rules of procedure and its substan-
tive laws can and will be enforced by the appellate courts. The extent to
which they are, and the situations in which (and reasons put forward to ex-
plain why) they sometimes are not, sheds interesting light on contradictory
principles that have shaped this field of law. It will be seen that the appellate
courts do not always enforce the rules; indeed, the rules of closing argu-
ment go unenforced on appeal more often than they are enforced.
293
1. Avoiding Review: Procedural Default
The requirements for preserving an issue for appeal are easily and often
stated. The courts say, as a threshold matter, an attorney must make a proper
objection, request an appropriate remedy from the trial judge, and supply
the appeals court with a record of the improper argument; otherwise, he
may not appeal. The implication is brutal: the courts seem to say they will
enforce the legal rules of closing argument if an appellant's attorney fol-
lows proper procedures. However, except in extraordinary circumstances,
the courts will not enforce the rules if the attorney neglects some possibly
trivial procedural formality. The client can suffer from an unfair verdict
decision on the order in which the parties argue is not reviewable. See Hall v. Weave,
91 U.S. 728 (1875); Anderson-Tully Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 192 (5th Cir.
1951).
293. In the sample, of 692 cases, 163 (24%1o) were reversed because of trial court
errors, and 340 (49%) were affirmed despite errors.
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resulting from improper argument and have no way to appeal. The party is
said to have "waived" his right to appellate review, although rarely will he
have knowingly given up anything. This doctrine, correctly known as pro-
cedural default, has taken on added importance since the United States Su-
preme Court announced that such procedural technicalities can take
precedence even over substantive constitutional errors.2 94
The first of these requirements is that a proper objection must have been
made. A proper objection is one that follows the guidelines discussed ear-
lier; it is timely and specifies the grounds on which it is based. 295 If an ad-
equate objection is not made, then any claim of error based on that improper
argument has been "waived", and the appellate court will not review it.
This is not a waiver in the usual sense. The failure to properly preserve an
issue for appeal is rarely the result of the client intelligently and voluntarily
relinquishing the right to appeal. It usually results from the attorney's ig-
norance, incompetence, or neglect. It is therefore more correctly termed a
procedural default. An exception to this default doctrine is made for "plain
errors"; the courts will review cases for the most serious kinds of errors,
even if objections were not made. 296 In the sample, this general rule was
stated in ninety-eight opinions from thirty-two different jurisdictions; no
case explicitly said otherwise. 297
294. If failure to comply with State procedural rules for preserving error would
waive an issue in State court, the federal courts will not entertain a habeas corpus
petition based on that ground. There is an "independent State procedural ground"
for affirming the conviction despite the existence of constitutional law violations.
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed.
2d 777 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594
(1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976).
See generally Tanford, supra note 1.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 174-88; see also N.J.R. GEN. APP. 1:7-2.
296. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 167, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1042, 84
L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1985) (absent a timely objection, a court can review only "plain
error"); United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980) (in the absence of
objection, a court will review only if "necessary to prevent clear miscarriage of
justice"); People v. Constant, 645 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1982) (no objection; review for
"plain error affecting substantial rights"); People v. Davis, 104 Ill. App. 3d 512, 432
N.E.2d 1134 (1982) (no objection; review for "per se error" that denies a fair trial);
Burris v. State, 444 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1983) (no objection; review for "fundamental
error"); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982) (no objection; review for
"gross improprieties"); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (failure to object not a waiver if error "incurable" by prompt instruction);
State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982) (no objection; reversal only to prevent
"manifest injustice").
297. Two opinions indirectly suggest a different rule. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d
574 (Minn. 1982) (failure to object is a factor in deciding whether to order a new
trial); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 308 Pa. Super. 370, 454 A.2d 581 (1982) (absence
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If the requirement of a proper objection were "real", one would expect
that in those cases in which objections were not made, the appellate courts
would less often reach the merits and more often rule against the appellant
on procedural grounds. The overall reversal rate should therefore be sig-
nificantly lower in cases where the appellant did not properly object than
in cases where proper objections were made. The sample identified 116 cases
in which no objection had been made. Twenty-nine were reversed because
of closing argument error. In other words, the courts of appeals reversed
twenty-five percent of those cases in which no objection had been made.
This is the same rate of reversal as for all cases in the sample.298 Therefore,
the rule requiring a contemporaneous specific objection may be meaning-
less; appellate courts seem to selectively invoke or ignore it in order to jus-
tify a result. 299
The common law states a second default rule: no claim of closing argu-
ment error is preserved unless the appellant makes an explicit request for a
remedy in the trial court. Failure to request a remedy is a procedural de-
fault, and the argument will be reviewed only for plain error.3°° The courts
of timely objection is a factor in determining whether the argument was actually
prejudicial). Three southeastern states have an exception to the rule that permits a
review of the whole record, despite the absence of objections, in death penalty cases.
See Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978) (in capital case, court reviews
all errors that might have influenced sentencing whether objected to or not); State v.
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982) (prosecutor's argument in capital case
subject to limited review for gross improprieties despite lack of objection); State v.
Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 1982) (court will review record in death
penalty cases despite absence of objections). Two opinions suggest that the rule should
be applied only loosely. United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (court
rejects "senseless technicalities"); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981) (court
will ignore the rule in the interests of justice). An Illinois court creates an exception
for reviewing multiple unobjected-to errors for whether their cumulative effect warrants
reversal. See Manninger v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d
719, 381 N.E.2d 383 (1978).
298. In the sample generally, 163 of 692 cases were reversed-a rate of 24%. When
no objection was made (so that supposedly no issues were preserved for appeal), the
reversal rate was 2507. When an objection was made, but it was either untimely or
nonspecific (so that supposedly no issue was preserved for appeal), the reversal rate
was actually greater than for cases in which the error had been preserved-ten of
twenty-eight, or 350o.
299. See People v. Boyd, 88 Ill. App. 3d 825, , 410 N.E.2d 931, 954 (1980) (court
used same analysis in deciding whether to reverse for a preserved error as it did for
whether to review and reverse for an unpreserved error).
300. See, e.g., United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1982); Russell v.
Guider, 362 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Boyd v. State, 643 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982); see also
United States ex rel. v. Spears v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir. 1972) (failure to
request argument waives issue on appeal).
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appear to pay some attention to this rule, and actually consider a proper
request to be a procedural prerequisite to appeal. In the cases in which re-
quests were not made, only twelve percent were reversed. This is half the
rate for cases generally.3 01 While a number of appellate courts ignore this
rule and reach the merits, it does appear to be a real procedural default rule
that results in a number of cases being affirmed that would otherwise be
reversed. 302
In theory, the default rule should work as follows. If the underlying error
is trivial it would not be reversible even if properly preserved, so failure to
request a remedy is irrelevant. 303 If the underlying error is intermediate, it
may be reversible if properly preserved and the judge refused to give the
jury a corrective instruction. If the attorney neglected to request a remedy,
however, he cannot complain on appeal that he did not get something at
trial he never asked for, such as an instruction,3°4 nor can he ask for some-
thing for the first time on appeal, e.g., a new trial, that he did not request
from the trial judge. 05 If the trial error is egregious and requires a mistrial,
then it also constitutes "plain error" -the exception to the default doctrine
for which no objection and request for remedy are required.3 °6 Thus, the
doctrine of nonreviewability for failure to request a remedy actually affects
the outcome on appeal only for intermediate errors.
301. The sample contained fifty-one cases in which it was clear that the appellant
had not requested any remedy. Only six were reversed.
302. See, e.g., Russell v. Guider, 362 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (argument
was clearly improper, but party's failure to request remedy is a waiver); State v.
Purvis, 525 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (argument contravened law, usually
reversible error, but appellant who did not ask for mistrial cannot complain about
not getting relief he did not request); Queen City Land Co. v. State, 601 S.W.2d 527
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (argument improper, but point waived because no objection or
request for corrective instruction).
303. See Spadaccini v. Dolan, 63 A.D.2d 110, 407 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1978) (claim of
error for not allowing defense to reopen summation waived for failure to request it);
Queen City Land Co. v. State, 601 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (attorney
characterized party as "greedy;" held improper argument, but point waived for failure
to object or request a curative instruction).
304. See Dean v. State, 433 N.E.2d 1172, 1178 (Ind. 1982) ("Golden Rule" argument
improper, but issue not preserved because of absence of request for instruction to
disregard); Fiorot v. State, 641 P.2d 551 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (arguing facts not
in evidence; failure to request corrective instruction waives errors).
305. See Russell v. Guider, 362 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (blatantly
improper emotional argument, but failure to move for mistrial is a waiver); State v.
Terrior, 442 A.2d 537 (Me. 1982) (reference to matter not in evidence improper, but
defendant did not ask for mistrial, so error waived).
306, See Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976) (commenting on
defendant's not testifying; reversed despite absence of timely request for mistrial);
State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981) (racial remarks; mistrial mandatory whether
or not there is an objection or request for mistrial).
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The final prerequisite to appeal is that the offending argument, and usually
the court's response, must be recorded so that a transcript can be supplied
to the appellate court. The necessity for a transcript is obvious. Before the
court can review the propriety of an argument, it must determine that the
argument was made. The appellant bears the burden of proving that his op-
ponent in fact made a particular argument, and usually can meet this bur-
den only by supplying a transcript. °7 For most allegations of impropriety,
the entire arguments of both sides must have been transcribed. The record
must contain a party's own complete argument when a party is appealing
a prohibitory ruling, 0 8 because it is harmless error if the appellant made an
adequate argument despite the restriction. The transcript must include the
opponent's complete argument when a party complains that part of it was
improper, so that the appellate court can decide if the argument was illegal,
if it was corrected or modified, °9 or if the party waived the point because
he did not object to a similar argument. Both arguments must be provided
in most cases so that the court can determine if an illegal argument was re-
taliatory, or similar to an argument the appellant made and therefore harm-
less. 31° Thus, a party must be sure that the complete arguments are recorded
307. See, e.g., Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244
(1977) (allegation that defense made improper argument is without merit since the
words are not in the transcript); Feller v. State, 442 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1982) (burden
on appellant to present record; failure to do so bars raising issue on appeal); FED.
R. App. P. 10 (transcript usually required if proceedings recorded; if not recorded,
court-approved statement may be substituted).
308. See Kelly v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983) (cannot review
complaint about restrictive time limit); Raffile v. Stamford Housewrecking, Inc., 168
Conn. 299, 362 A.2d 879 (1975) (unable to review effect of court's restricting party's
use of exhibits); Bing Fa Yuen v. State, 43 Md. App. 109, 403 A.2d 819 (1979)
(unable to review complaint that defendant was prevented from reading excerpts of
official transcript).
309. See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 309 N.E.2d 196 (1974) (cannot tell
whether counsel limited, corrected, or explained allegedly exaggerated argument, because
whole argument not included in record, therefore cannot reverse); Caradori v. Fitch,
200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978) (cannot determine if remark was improper
reference to insurance without a complete record); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 308
Pa. Super. 370, 454 A.2d 581 (1982) (court could not decide if reference to defendant's
gang affiliation was error without seeing complete context).
310. See Misch v. C.B. Contracting Co., 394 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)
(whether plaintiff exceeded scope of rebuttal cannot be determined unless all arguments
included in record); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 308 Pa. Super. 370, 454 A.2d 581
(1982) (both arguments must be included to review entire context where argument
probably was retaliatory); cf. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. American Airlines, 408 P.2d
789 (Okla. 1965) (duty of appellee to include appellant's argument in record if appellee
hopes to defend an illegal argument as retaliatory; improper arguments presumed
erroneous unless appellee proves they are retaliatory) (emphasis added).
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for assurance of appealing any errors.3 1' Since an appellate court cannot
decide the issue without knowing the argument, this particular procedural
default rule is almost always adhered to and is not controversial.
One other pattern emerged from an analysis of the appellate courts' use
of procedural default. Although the doctrine supposedly applies equally in
civil and criminal cases, there is a disparity in how often it is applied. In
eighty-nine cases in the sample it could be reasonably certain that an inter-
mediate error had been committed and that the appellant had not properly
preserved his claim of error for appeal. Only fourteen percent of the crim-
inal cases were reversed. The doctrine was invoked less often to affirm civil
judgments, and thirty-six percent were reversed.
2. Avoiding Reversal Despite Error
The appellate courts in the sample found errors in over seventy percent
of the cases decided. They found relatively serious closing argument errors
in about fifty-five percent, yet only twenty-four percent were reversed. Pro-
cedural default accounts for only another fifteen percent. The remaining
two hundred and forty cases, making up more than one-third of all cases
in the sample, were affirmed despite the presence of error, for one of three
reasons: courts found the error to have been invited, cured, or harmless.
Harmless error was the most frequently used reversal-avoidance doctrine,
followed by cured error cases and invited error cases.112 However, invited
error appears to be the strongest of the three. Over ninety percent of cases
in which the courts could have invoked invited error were in fact affirmed,
compared to seventy-eight percent of potential cured error cases, and fifty-
six percent of potential harmless error cases. These three doctrines will be
discussed in the order of their strength.
a. Invited Error
The most interesting doctrine that appellate courts use to avoid reversal
is invited error, or retaliation. The retaliation doctrine states that an im-
311. Several of the more outrageous decisions turn on this point. See Harris v.
State, 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976) (in death penalty case, defense had requested
that arguments be transcribed, but court did not summon reporter; argument errors
waived for failure to have them transcribed); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.
1977) (defendant requested that arguments be recorded after plaintiff had begun; held
that trial court acted "responsibly" in denying request since not made prior to start
of argument).
312. The numbers total more than 240 because many courts had opportunities to
assert, and did assert, several reasons for affirming a judgment despite the presence
of error.
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proper argument cannot be grounds for reversal if it was invited by the ap-
pellant's own improper closing argument. The ambivalence of the courts
toward this doctrine is well illustrated by a recent opinion of the United
States Supreme Court:
The situation brought before the Court of Appeals was but one example
of an all too common occurrence in criminal trials-the defense counsel
argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind, and
the trial judge takes no corrective action. Clearly two improper argu-
ments-two apparent wrongs-do not make for a right result. Never-
theless, a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis
of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements ... must
be viewed in context [to determine] whether the prosecutor's conduct
affected the fairness of the trial. To help resolve this problem, courts
have invoked what is sometimes called the "invited response" or "in-
vited reply" rule, which the Court [approved] in Lawn v. United States,
355 U.S. 339 (1958)... This Court's holding in Lawn was no more
than an application of settled law. 313
In the sample, the retaliation doctrine was the reason for affirming sixty
cases from twenty states, five federal circuits, and the Supreme Court. In
only three cases were there even slight suggestions that this doctrine might
have limits, 31 4 however, no jurisdiction has rejected it. 311
Such universal acceptance of the invited error rule is extraordinary, con-
sidering that it stands for the proposition that two wrongs do make a right.
If one improper argument is made, there is a twenty-four percent chance
the case will be reversed on appeal, but if two improper arguments are
made-one by each side-so that it becomes twice as likely that the jury's
verdict will rest on improper grounds, the chance of reversal drops toward
zero. On one level these may seem like "offsetting fouls" that cancel each
other out and justify the invited error doctrine. However, both arguments
are improper because they tend to cause the jury to disregard the law and
313. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-12, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1044-45, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 9-10 (1985). The majority opinion by Burger criticizes the doctrine and also
appears to approve it.
314. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)
(The Court criticizes the retaliation doctrine but does not disavow it. The Court
reverses the underlying Tenth Circuit opinion that had outlawed retaliation.); Werner
v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978) (retaliatory "foul blows" have no place in a
court of justice, although general rule restated); Busch & Latta Painting Corp. v.
State Hwy. Comm'n, 597 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (dictum) (suggesting that
the retaliation doctrine might not apply to misstatements of law).
315. Cf. United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1963) (rejecting
retaliation doctrine), rev'd 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985).
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evidence. The more times the attorneys argue about the defendant's ability
to pay, the more are likely the jurors to decide the case on an impermissible
basis instead of deciding whether and to what extent the plaintiff was in-
jured.
The invited error doctrine was invoked to affirm cases involving closing
argument errors of all levels of seriousness. While courts occasionally ex-
pressed qualms about applying the doctrine in cases involving the most se-
rious kinds of errors, they applied it nonetheless.
At the trivial error end of the spectrum, it is often hard to distinguish
which affirmance device is being used. Appellate decisions concerning such
minor errors often give multiple reasons for affirming judgments, only one
of which is retaliation.31 6 At the more serious error levels, the uniqueness
of the retaliation doctrine emerges. In cases involving intermediate errors,
while many opinions still confuse the various alternative reversal avoidance
doctrines,3 1 7 one can begin to see that the retaliation doctrine is used to af-
firm some cases that otherwise probably would have been reversed.' In
316. See, e.g., United States v. Flemino, 691 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1982) (Minor
misuse of evidence was admitted for limited purpose. The Court held that the
government has a right to respond, that the remark may have been proper, that it
may have been harmless error, and that the error may have been cured.) (emphasis
added).
317. Some cases seem to imply that the retaliation doctrine is merely part of the
harmless error doctrine. This author submits that such opinions are wrong. See
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 277, 431 N.E.2d 880, 900 (1982); People
v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 430 N.E.2d 885, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1981); State v. Lee,
631 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Others treat the retaliation and harmless
error doctrines as if they were the same, and do not distinguish between them. See
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2991, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Thundereal
Corp. v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Gangestad,
105 111. App. 3d 774, 434 N.E.2d 841 (1982); State v. Morris, 404 So. 2d 1186 (La.
1981). For a good illustration of the majority view that the two doctrines are distinct,
see People v. Blackman, 88 A.D.2d 620, 450 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1982). In that case, four
errors were collectively found to constitute harmful error because of the close factual
issue, and the case reversed. A fifth error was singled out as not reversible because
it was invited.
318. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 91 111. 2d 502, 440 N.E.2d 83 (1982) (prosecutor
argued that defendant could be paroled unless given death penalty; sentence vacated,
but court suggests that it could be a proper retaliatory argument if the defendant
argued that a life sentence meant no release); Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579
S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (defendant suggested that verdict for plaintiff would
raise jurors' insurance premiums; argument would not be harmless error and could
not be cured by an instruction, but would be permissible in retaliation) (emphasis
added); see also Pierce v. State, 34 Md. App. 654, 369 A.2d 140 (1977) (prosecutor
made improper argument attacking the integrity of defense attorney; court holds the
argument not justified as retaliation, but case could be affirmed under harmless error
principles); Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236 (1982) (improper
for attorney to express personal opinion of witness's credibility except to retaliate).
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cases involving egregious errors, retaliation emerges as the only reversal
avoidance doctrine strong enough to permit seriously flawed judgments to
stand.31 9
The "true" retaliation doctrine must be distinguished from its misuse-
cases in which the language of invited error is used but the principle in-
volved is something else. The true retaliation doctrine permits only reason-
ably commensurate responses in kind, with the effect of correcting or
negating the prejudice caused by an opponent's improper arguments.3 2° Yet,
the sample contained a significant number of cases in which courts af-
firmed improper arguments going far beyond any reasonable response and/
or lacking any logical relation to the provoking argument under the rubric
of invited error. A court held a prosecutor's argument that the defense at-
torney could not get anyone to say anything on the defendant's behalf was
invited by a defense argument that the state had not called res gestae wit-
nesses.3 21 A court affirmed a case in which a prosecutor told the jury that a
319. The sample contained forty-eight cases in which appellate courts explicitly
discussed invited error concepts. In only three is there any indication-all dicta-that
there might be situations in which the doctrine would be insufficient justification to
affirm a flawed judgment. Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978) (overall not a
fair trial because of many errors; court criticizes notion of invited error in opinion);
State v. Barnes, 598 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (causing the introduction of
dramatic, new probably misleading evidence from the audience; no discussion); Busch
& Latta Painting Corp. v. State Hwy. Comm'n., 597 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (concept might not apply to misstatements of law; issue not reached). The
doctrine has been invoked, for example, in cases in which the prosecutor commented
on, and asked the jury to infer guilt from, a defendant's constitutionally protected
silence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978);
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976), and made reference
to race, nationality, or religion; State v. Lee, 631 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982).
320. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-14, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1045, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 10-11 (1985) (discusses doctrine in terms such as: "responded reasonably",
"response-in-kind", and "respond . . . in order to 'right the scale' "); United States
v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1982) (defense argued "major investigative
failure" because agent did not check for fingerprints; prosecutor's response was that
such an additional search might have turned up defendant's fingerprints also; held
"fair rebuttal"); People v. Devin, 93 Il. 2d 326, 444 N.E.2d 102 (1982) (defense
argued that another person was probably guilty because he had gone to see a lawyer;
prosecution properly responded that defendant also had talked to a lawyer); Thorsen
v. City of Chicago, 74 Ill. App. 3d 98, 392 N.E.2d 716 (1979) (party cannot complain
about improper remarks invited by their own "like remarks"); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 444 N.E.2d 374 (1983) (retaliation only available to correct
errors); Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236 (1982) (retaliation
must be commensurate); Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
(invited error rule permits prosecutor to go outside record to retaliate only if defense
went outside record).
321. People v. Barney, 111 111. App. 3d 669, 444 N.E.2d 518 (1982).
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codefendant had been sentenced to death on the ground that the argument
was invited by an innocuous defense statement that the prosecutor had a
duty to the people of the state. 322 An appellate court failed to reverse a case
in which a prosecutor commented on the defendant's not testifying, on
grounds that the comment was invited by a defense argument that the state
was overzealous. 3 Another court upheld a prosecutor's questioning of
personal and professional integrity, holding it to be invited by the defense's
attack on the credibility of witnesses.3z2 An appellate court held that a pros-
ecutor's unconstitutional comment on the defendant's failure to testify was
invited by the defendant's proper explanation that he need not take the
stand.125 In other opinions, prosecutors were permitted to make improper
arguments in "retaliation" for proper ones,3 26 or which aggravated rather
than corrected improper ones.3 27 These cases have only one thing in com-
mon, they are all criminal cases in which the appellate courts uphold con-
victions.
The retaliation doctrine is being applied differently in civil and criminal
cases, so that fewer criminal defendants receive new trials. The courts mis-
use the doctrine, permitting excessive retaliation, far more often in criminal
cases. In the sample, courts reversed only ten percent of criminal cases in-
322. People v. Gangestad, 105 Ill. App. 3d 774, 434 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
323. Brown v. State, 639 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
324. People v. Clearlee, 101 Ill. App. 3d 16, 427 N.E.2d 1005 (1981); Salinas v.
State, 625 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
325. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
326. United States v. Mitchell, 613 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1980) (defense argued
permissible inference from missing witness, prosecutor responded with improper com-
ment on failure of defendant to call wife); State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La.
1981) (defense argued against death penalty, prosecutor's response implied that death
penalty was presumptively appropriate sentence); Commonwealth v. Moure, 15 Mass.
App. Ct. 924, 443 N.E.2d 1366 (1983) (defense argued permissible inference from
missing evidence, prosecutor responded by asking jury to speculate about unrelated
evidence); State v. Johnson, 628 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (prosecutor
improperly attacked defense attorney's integrity; held permissible response to anticipated
defense argument about credibility of witnesses).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d
1 (1985) (defense attacked integrity of prosecution, prosecution responded by stating
personal opinion of defendant's guilt and by exhorting jury to do its job and convict);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed.
1124 (1940) (Defendant argued governmental acquiescence as an antitrust defense.
Prosecutor responded with a personal opinion of guilt and with the claim that other
governmental officials thought defendant was guilty.); People v. Smylie, 103 Ill. App.
3d 679, 431 N.E.2d 1130 (1981) (defense attacked police as evil and racist, prosecutor
responded by attacking defense attorney's character); Oliver v. State, 644 S.W.2d 135
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (defense argued clients had been in business a long time, and
State responded with speculation about how much they had earned and with plea to
get some of the money back).
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volving excessive retaliation, but reversed fifty percent of civil excessive re-
taliation cases. In intermediate error cases, those in which the outcome is
most likely to be affected, the numbers are not quite as dramatic, but one
can still see a significant difference. Only twenty-three percent of criminal
appellants were successful despite the prosecution's claim that his error was
invited, while thirty-three percent of civil appellants prevailed over the as-
sertion of the doctrine.3 28 No court articulates a deliberate anti-defendant
bias, but it appears harder for a criminal defendant to get a new trial than
a civil litigant.
b. Cured Error
The "cured error" doctrine also permits a judgment to be affirmed de-
spite the presence of closing argument errors. In practice, this is a less pow-
erful doctrine than invited error. The concept is straightforward: appropriate
remedial action by the trial judge or the offending attorney may reduce the
likelihood that an improper argument will affect the jury's verdict, thereby
eliminating the need for a new trial. The doctrine enjoys overwhelming sup-
port among appellate courts. Courts recognized it in seventy-nine cases from
twenty-six jurisdictions in the sample. No opinion explicitly rejects it or even
questions its basic validity,3 29 despite the fact that it rests on the shaky prem-
ise that anything can cause a juror to forget what he or she has just heard.
This article has already discussed the types of responsive actions attor-
neys and judges can take during trial to reduce harm of an improper ar-
gument.330 An attorney who commits the error may withdraw it, apologize,
or correct a misstatement. A judge deciding that an improper argument was
made may admonish the attorney or give the jury a corrective instruction.
The appellate courts assume that such remedial action reduces the likeli-
hood that the jury's verdict will be influenced by the improper argument.
The concept of cured error rests on the questionable premise that jurors
will in fact be able to disregard an improper argument. Lawyers have long
analogized this to "unringing a bell," and argued, for example, that it is
unrealistic to think that any sensible juror would acquit a defendant who
has confessed to child molesting, no matter how many times the juror is
told to disregard the confession. Justice Jackson stated, "The naive as-
328. In criminal cases, six of twenty-six were reversed; in civil cases, three of nine
were reversed.
329. Several opinions from Florida appear in the sample, all of which confirm the
principle of cured error but label it part of the harmless error doctrine. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 205-47.
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sumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury,
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."",1 The evidence from
social scientists also appears to undercut this premise. In one experiment,
model jurors actually gave more weight to improper information when told
to disregard it.332 The weight of published research indicates, while jurors
follow positive instructions, such as those describing the elements of an of-
fense, reasonably well, they ignore instructions to limit their use of or to
disregard potentially prejudicial information.33 Nevertheless, the pattern
is that cases involving intermediate errors are reversed if no corrective ac-
tion was taken, and affirmed if the trial judge gave an instruction to dis-
regard the improper argument,3 4 despite the fact that bad verdicts seem
equally likely in both kinds of cases.
Weak remedial action may cure trivial errors, ordinary remedial action
may cure intermediate errors, and only the most drastic remedial action may
cure egregious errors. In fifteen identified cases, only the weakest kinds of
corrective action were taken: the attorney clarifying or withdrawing the ar-
gument, the judge sustaining an objection without taking further action, or
the judge giving a general "this is argument not evidence" instruction. All
331. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 64 S. Ct. 716, 723, 93 L. Ed.
790, 795 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The gap between lawyers and judges is
illustrated by a 1968 survey in which fifty-seven percent of judges, but only two
percent of lawyers believed that jurors could follow an instruction that a defendant's
prior record could not be used to assess guilt. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to
Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 215 (1968).
332. Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368, 377-78 (1958). In that experiment, jurors' average
verdicts increased from $34,000 to $37,000 when they found out that an insurance
company would pay the bill. However, when jurors were told to disregardithat
information, their average verdicts did not go back down, but jumped to $46,000.
333. See Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in The Psychology of the
Courtroom 29-31 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J.
APPLIED SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 344 (1973); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 37 (1985); Wolfe & Montgomery, Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the
Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1977).
334. See Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976) (we will always
reverse where attorney goes beyond record and brings up new prejudicial facts, unless
court's action removes prejudice); Parker v. Kangerga, 482 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972) (an instruction to disregard ordinarily overcomes harm or prejudice caused
by improper argument). Of the sixty-one cases in the sample in which an attorney
committed an intermediate error and some corrective action was taken, forty-six were
affirmed (seventy-five percent).
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cases but one were affirmed.335 In the other twelve cases, the judges used
ordinary remedies, giving specific instructions to disregard improper ar-
gument, and all were affirmed.336 In forty-three cases in the sample it could
be identified both that an intermediate error occurred and exactly what
remedy was used. The weaker remedies were less often effective in avoiding
reversal: only sixty-seven percent of the cases in which the judge took weak
action were affirmed and only seventy-four percent of cases in which the
court responded with an ordinary remedy were affirmed.133 7 The sample also
contained four cases involving attempts to correct serious errors. While the
number is too small to draw definitive conclusions, the trend is as expected:
corrective action of any kind was still effective only fifty percent of the
time.338
When dealing with a concept such as reducing harm to an "acceptable"
level, one tends naturally to think of the harmless error doctrine. Is cured
error really any different from harmless error? In at least one jurisdiction,
and in a scattering of opinions from other states, courts have treated them
335. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 17 S. Ct. 375, 41 L. Ed. 799
(1897) (withdrawal cures trivial error); People v. Tolefree, 85 Ill. App. 3d 844, 407
N.E.2d 604 (1980) (trivial error cured by judge promptly sustaining objection); State
v. Bissantz, 3 Ohio App. 3d 108, 444 N.E.2d 92 (1982) (trivial error cured by general
instruction that arguments are not evidence).
336. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 438 N.E.2d 966 (Ind. 1982); Smith v. State, 656
P.2d 277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
337. Compare People v. Grigsby, 111 Ill. App. 3d 38, 443 N.E.2d 746 (1982)
(prosecutor speculated that defendant would have killed victims, judge instructed jury
to disregard,; affirmed); State v. Kroll, 87 Wash. 2d 829, 558 P.2d 173 (1976)
(prosecutor speculated that defendant would commit future crimes, judge instructed
jury to disregard; affirmed) with McMillian v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (pr6secutor speculated that defendant would commit future crimes, judge
instructed jury to disregard; reversed); Fortenberry v. Fortenberry, 582 S.W.2d 188
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (attorney speculated about excluded evidence of forgery, judge
sustained objection; reversed),
338. United States v. Samuelson, 697 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor commented
on defendant's not testifying, clarified his own remark, and judge instructed; affirmed);
Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prosecutor made up
new evidence on crucial issue, judge instructed; reversed); People v. Gangestad, 105
Ill. App. 3d 774, 434 N.E.2d 841 (1982) (prosecutor told jury that codefendant had
received death penalty, judge instructed; affirmed); Ledford v. State, 568 S.W.2d 113
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (prosecutor commented on defendant's not testifying, judge
instructed jury and admonished counsel; reversed).
Dicta from other opinions also suggest that corrective action is least effective in
serious error cases. See Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 383, 15 S. Ct. 383, 388,
39 L. Ed. 453, 459 (1895) (as general rule, instruction removes cause for reversal
unless error is serious); Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (serious error would not be curable by instruction); Parker v. Kangerga,
482 S.W.2d 43 (Tx. Civ. App. 1972) (except where serious, errors are deemed cured
where withdrawn, corrected, or jury instructed to disregard).
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as the same.3 9 The articulable difference between them is that the harmless
error test assumes that there has been an error, but views it in the context
of the whole trial to decide whether to reverse, while the cured error test
views a potential error in the context of any corrective action, to determine
whether any cognizable error occurred at all.
If this author's theory is correct that the cured error doctrine is both a
separate and more powerful reversal avoidance device than harmless error,
then cases should exist in which an error is prejudicial, not harmless, yet
the judgment is affirmed because of the trial judge's curative action. In-
deed, several cases appeared where, because of the trial judge's corrective
actions, appellate courts affirmed judgments despite the presence of errors
universally held to be harmful. Those cases involved direct comment on a
criminal defendant's failure to testify,34 appeals to racial prejudice, 4' ar-
guments raising the wealth and insured status of defendants,3 42 and state-
ments to the jury that the defendant had a similar case pending against it.141
Appellate courts reversed several other cases because errors were harmful,
but stated that they would have affirmed if curative instructions had been
given. 344 Other opinions contain dicta that any error can be cured by ap-
propriate remedial action.3 45
339. In the sample three cases from Florida treat cured error and harmless error
as the same. E.g., Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). An
article written on Florida's law of closing argument suggests, but is not explicit, that
the two are part of a single standard of review. DeFoor, supra note 1, at 472-74
(1983); see also People v. Scott, 108 I11. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130 (1982) (error
may be cured by instruction if other evidence of guilt overwhelming); Johnson v.
Zadworny, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 934, 381 N.E.2d 1119 (1978) (general instruction did
not cure because close case, little other evidence); Ledford v. State, 568 S.W.2d 113,
117 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (cautionary instruction was not sufficient to cure error
so thoroughly as to render it harmless); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59
VA. L. REV. 988 (1974) (cure is considered only one factor in harmless error analysis).
340. United States v. Samuelson, 697 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1983).
341. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga. App. 24, 274 S.E.2d 74 (1980).
342. Spiess v. Traversa, 172 Conn. 525, 375 A.2d 1007 (1977).
343. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jackson, 347 So. 2d 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
344. See Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976) (always reverse
when attorney goes beyond record unless court's action removes prejudice); Georgia
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willis, 140 Ga. App. 225, 230 S.E.2d 363 (1976) (unwarranted
character assassination); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975) (comment
on defendant's failure to testify); Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982) (prosecutor asking jury for long sentence so that defendant could not be paroled).
345. See, e.g., Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 17 S. Ct. 375, 41 L. Ed.
799 (1897) (prejudicial errors are curable); People v. Vanda, 111 Ill. App. 3d 551,
444 N.E.2d 609 (1982) (usually any error is cured by instruction); Parker v. Kangerga,
482 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (instruction ordinarily overcomes harm or
prejudice caused by improper argument).
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The question bears examination whether the cured error doctrine shows
the same pattern of differential application between civil and criminal cases
that was seen for invited error. It does; it is used to affirm a significantly
higher percentage of criminal cases than civil. In the sample thirty-four were
criminal cases and twenty-seven were civil cases involving both intermedi-
ate errors34 and attempts to cure those errors during trial. Appellate courts
granted new trials in only eighteen percent of the criminal cases, but thirty-
three percent of the civil cases. There is nothing in the sample cases to sug-
gest that the errors in criminal trials are less serious or the corrective action
more effective than in civil cases.3 47
One significant aberrational case appeared in the sample. Despite ubiq-
uitous judicial pronouncements that jurors are presumed to follow their in-
structions and are able to disregard an argument when told to do so, in State
v. Monroe,3 41 one court stated the exact opposite. In that case, the judge
improperly sustained an objection to a valid defense argument. If, as courts
keep saying, the instruction really was effective, the jurors would have ig-
nored the defendant's argument, depriving him of his right to be heard, and
a new trial would have to be granted. Despite the fact that courts have "pre-
sumed" jurors follow their instructions when such a fiction prevents a new
trial, in this case such a presumption would have required a new trial. The
court abandoned the presumption and found that such court action does
not erase it. The rationalization is different but the result was the same-
the defendant's conviction was affirmed.
c. Harmless Error
The third, and best known, reversal avoidance device is the harmless er-
ror doctrine. It is hardly unique to the review of closing argument errors,
and has been written about often,3 49 presumably because it illuminates how
the justice system balances truth-seeking, fairness, and efficiency. This au-
346. Since almost all cases involving only trivial errors are affirmed, and no civil
cases involving serious errors showed up on the sample, cases involving intermediate
errors made the best comparison.
347. See, e.g., People v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982)
(misstating facts, objection sustained; affirmed); State v. Green, 416 So. 2d 539 (La.
1982) (attacking integrity of defense attorney, instruction that argument not evidence;
affirmed); State v. Thompson, 293 N.C. 713, 239 S.E.2d 465 (1977) (unjustified attack
on defense witnesses, instruction to disregard; affirmed); Oliver v. State, 644 S.W.2d
135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), rev'd, 692 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (rousing
antipathy against defendants; instruction to disregard; affirmed).
348. 397 So. 2d 1258, 1269-70 (La. 1981).
349. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 339.
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thor therefore assumes familiarity with it and will devote attention to its
role in closing argument cases.
Harmless error is the least powerful of the three reversal avoidance doc-
trines discussed in this section. Courts generally do not consider it unless
neither invited nor cured error concepts are applicable. Those two doctrines
allow the court to take the position that no cognizable error occurred at all,
while under the harmless error doctrine, an error must be conceded. It must
be admitted that the trial was unfair to some extent in order to affirm.
The author selected a subsample of 253 harmless error cases assuming the
validity of that hierarchy. The subsample includes opinions that discuss
harmless error explicitly, and all cases not decided on some other basis such
as procedural default, invited error, cured error, cumulative error, or the
complete absence of error, whether or not those opinions explicitly refer to
the harmless error test. This was necessary because, unlike the other doc-
trines which tend to be explicitly accepted or rejected, harmless error con-
cepts are often only implicit. This is especially true in cases that were
reversed. Few opinions state explicitly that the court considered harmless
error but found otherwise.
In the subsample 140 appellate opinions invoked the harmless error doc-
trine as one of the reasons for affirming. Those opinions come from the
United States Supreme Court, seven federal circuits, and thirty-six states.
In no opinion does a court question the validity of the doctrine nor its appl-
icability to closing argument errors.3 50 There are, however, differences in
350. The one notable exception was United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301 (7th
Cir. 1981), which explicitly refused to consider a harmless-error analysis. It was
promptly reversed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499,
103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). In another opinion, a different court stated
it did not tacitly approve of harmless error but affirmed the case nonetheless because
it did not believe the error had influenced the jury. State v. Dupre, 408 So. 2d 1229
(La. 1982).
A scattered few cases have suggested that harmless-error analysis is inappropriate
in certain narrow situations: (1) constitutional law violations, e.g., Bryant v. State,
205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322 (1933) (trial court refusal to let jury consider state
constitutionality of statute under facts presented); United Coin Meter Co. v. Lasala,
98 Mich. App. 238, 296 N.W.2d 221 (1980) (complete denial of right to be heard);
People v. Joyner, 54 A.D.2d 966, 388 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1976) (commenting on defendant's
refusal to talk to police); (2) violations of specific statutory provisions, e.g., Raybestos
Manhattan, Inc. v. Friedman, 156 Ga. App. 880, 275 S.E.2d 817 (1981) (statutory
time limits); Americus v. McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924) (statutory right
to pro se representation); Peot v. Ferraro, 83 Wis. 2d 727, 266 N.W.2d 586 (1978)
(statutory limit to amount recoverable); (3) attempts to define "reasonable doubt,"
e.g., Clemons v. State, 320 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1975); State v. Shelby, 634 S.W.2d 481
(Mo. 1982); and, (4) for some inexplicable reason, the per diem rule, e.g., Worsley
v. Corcelli, 119 R.I. 260, 377 A.2d 215 (1977) (trial court reversed for not allowing
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the ways it is defined. While courts agree that it is a balancing test with the
seriousness of the error weighed against the strength of the other evidence,
they differ on how the scales are preset and by how much they must tip.
Some courts start with a presumption that all errors are reversible,351 others
with no presumption,352 and others with a presumption that all errors are
harmless. 3" Some will usually reverse, unless the evidence is overwhelm-
ing;3 4 others will sometimes reverse, whenever there is a realistic possibility
that the error affected the verdict; 5 5 and others will rarely reverse, unless
they are reasonably certain that the verdict was affected.35 6 Most, however,
a per diem argument when it should have); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122
S.E.2d 18 (1961) (trial court reversed for allowing per diem argument when it should
not have).
351. See, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978) (for
constitutional errors); Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1982) (unless
assured error had no effect); State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1982) (court must
presume that factor influenced jury); People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 315
N.W.2d 876 (1982) (must reverse unless evidence overwhelming); State v. Caldwell,
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982) (if error serious, presumed reversible unless court is
certain it was harmless); Clemons v. State, 320 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1975) (in absence
of full record, presume that error reversible); Kopp v. C.C. Caldwell Optical Co.,
547 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (errors generally will be reversible).
352. See, e.g., Ott v. Fox, 362 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1978) (statements are to be taken
in context and read as a whole to determine if reversible or harmless error); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Jarvis, 266 Ala. 440, 97 So. 2d 549 (1957) (no hard and fast rules); State
v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982) (for intermediate errors, no presumption);
State v. Darnell, 639 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (to determine if error reversible,
consider it in context).
353. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983) (even if
error, defendant must show prejudice); Carter v. Liberty Equip. Co., 611 S.W.2d 311
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (even if error, appellant must show prejudice); DeBolt v. State,
604 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (not reversible unless extremely improper).
354. See, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978) (reversible
unless beyond reasonable doubt no possibility that it contributed to conviction);
Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversible unless court
is certain beyond reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to conviction); People
v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982) (reversible unless evidence
of guilt overwhelming); State v. Mayfield, 506 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974) (reversing trial
judge for applying a standard requiring prejudice to be shown); Girard v. State, 631
S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (reverse if absent a reasonable doubt).
355. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314
(1935) (reverse where case not strong, prejudice "probable"); People v. Haskett, 30
Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 150 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982) (reverse where reasonably
probable that result was affected); Power v. United States, 455 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1982)
(reverse unless assured that judgment not substantially swayed by error); State v.
Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1982) (reverse where there is reason to believe
defendant was prejudiced).
356. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1934) (reversed
if error affected verdict); People v. Smith, 111 Ill. App. 3d 895, 444 N.E.2d 801
(1982) (reverse only if errors were material factor in conviction); State v. Sparks, 298
S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982) (will not be reversed unless clear prejudice).
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make no serious attempt to define harmless error, but appear to bend the
doctrine to fit the case.357
The harmless error doctrine does not necessarily lead to inconsistent re-
sults. However, in cases involving relatively trivial errors and relatively
strong evidence supporting the verdict, there certainly is little controversy.
Courts affirmed eighty-seven percent of such cases under the harmless er-
ror rule. Of the seven cases that courts reversed for trivial errors, all but
two cases were reversed because extrinsic evidence indicated the juries ac-
tually had been affected by the error, and all were civil cases." 8
At the other end of the spectrum are cases involving relatively serious er-
rors. Here, appellate courts also seem to consistently apply the harmless
error rule. Indeed, thirty-three out of forty-three cases involving serious er-
rors were reversed, while only ten were affirmed. In all but three of the cases,
the court either "wrongly" decided the case (i.e., it was an aberrational case
finding no error where most other courts would have found serious er-
ror),15 9 or referred repeatedly to the overwhelming strength of the evi-
dence. 316
The harmless error doctrine becomes incomprehensible in the broad mid-
dle range of intermediate errors. Not only do descriptions of the proper bal-
ancing test differ, but the results are inconsistent. Virtually identical cases
357. Compare People v. Smith, 111 111. App. 3d 895, 444 N.E.2d 801 (1982)
(affirmed; error not reversible unless it clearly affected verdict) with People v. Walker,
91 Ill. 2d 502, 440 N.E.2d 83 (1982) (reversed; error probably always reversible);
People v. Scott, 108 Ill. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130 (1982) (affirmed; error usually
reversible, but in this case other evidence overwhelming); and compare State v. Darnell,
639 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (no presumption; look at error in context) with
Carter v. Liberty Equip. Co., 611 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (presumed harmless
unless appellant shows prejudice) and State v. Barnes, 598 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. App.
1980) (presumed reversible unless jury could not have been influenced).
358. E.g., Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980) (jury
returned verdict in precisely the amount improperly argued); Weisbart v. Flohr, 260
Cal. App. 2d 281, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1968) (defense counsel's use in closing argument
of items not in evidence affected verdict); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Friedman,
156 Ga. App. 880, 275 S.E.2d 817 (1981) (inadmissible evidence allowed and admissible
disallowed affected verdict); Kopp v. C.C. Caldwell Optical Co., 547 S.W.2d 872
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (jury requested copy of document improperly referred to); Shaw
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1961) (improperly admitted testimony
prejudicially erroneous).
359. E.g., State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1977) (prosecutor creating new
evidence held not error); State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981) (reference
to supreme court's power to review death sentence held not error); Sanchez v. State,
622 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 628 S.W.2d 780
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (suggesting that defendant might harm jurors' children if
released held not error).
360. E.g., People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1967) (no possibility of a not guilty verdict).
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are handled differently. 6' Half the courts seem to reach decisions intui-
tively,3 62 their opinions being devoid of any allusion to the kinds of factors
that supposedly influence the outcome of harmless error balancing, such as
the strength of the winner's case,3 63 the seriousness of the error,364 whether
similar arguments, explanations or instructions had been made,3 65 the im-
portance or materiality of the issue,366 or the size of the resulting verdict . 67
361. Compare Peot v. Ferraro, 83 Wis. 2d 727, 266 N.W.2d 586 (1978) (defendant
argued for damages in excess of statutory limits, knowing they would have to be
lowered by court; reversed) with Austin v. Ford Motor Company, 86 Wis. 2d 628,
273 N.W.2d 233 (1979) (identical argument; cites Peot but affirms because practice
is widespread); compare State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976)
(argument inviting jurors to disregard defendant's constitutional rights, commonly
made by prosecutors despite previous cases condemning it will constitute reversible
error) with United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d
96 (1983) (argument inviting jurors to penalize defendant's exercise of constitutional
right, commonly made by prosecutors despite cases condemning it affirmed because
harmless error test cannot be ignored in order to discipline unethical prosecutors);
Austin v. Ford Motor Company, 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979) (argument
seeking to circumvent law is harmless error because practice is widespread); compare
Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (improper argument not
harmless because absent reasonable doubt) with State v. Kroll, 87 Wash. 2d 829, 558
P.2d 173 (1977) (improper argument harmless because hotly contested battle); compare
Hines v. State, 425 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prosecutor asked jurors
to tell community they would not tolerate violence; reversed) with State v. Sugar, 408
So. 2d 1329 (La. 1982) (prosecutor told jurors they should not let this happen in
community, must make streets safe; "flirted with reversible error" (408 So. 2d at
1331)); People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 430 N.E.2d 885, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1981)
(prosecutor told jurors they represented community, should make streets safe; affirmed).
362. See, e.g., United States v. Ziak, 360 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1966) ("Only
because of our abiding confidence that the intelligence of the jurors in fact rejected
this performance, do we refrain from reversing . . . ."); State v. Mayes, 286 N.W.2d
387, 392 (Iowa 1979) (error, some prejudice, but "not sufficient prejudice to reverse");
State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982) (remarks improper but did not result
in "injustice"). In the sample, seventy-four of 147 opinions (fifty percent) articulated
some reason why an error was or was not harmless; seventy-three did not.
363. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314
(1935); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983),
overruled on other grounds, Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (1985) (en banc); Bauwens
v. State, 657 P.2d 176 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
364. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980).
365. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973
(1978) (similar argument by appellant); Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (jury already aware of it); State v. Smith, 140 Vt. 247, 437 A.2d
1093 (1981) (careful instructions).
366. See, e.g., People v. Graham, 41 Colo. App. 390, 590 P.2d 511 (1978), aff'd,
610 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980) (irrelevant issue); Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 Ill. App. 3d
855, 414 N.E.2d 1266 (1980) (issue conceded); Cowles v. State, 636 P.2d 342 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1981) (issue essentially conceded by appellant).
367. See, e.g., Missouri-K.-T.R. Co. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951)
(verdict excessive; reversed); Polkey v. Phillips, 86 Ill. App. 3d 677, 408 N.E.2d 348
(1980) (jury returned small verdict, so no prejudice).
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One pattern does emerge clearly from the harmless error cases: the doc-
trine is invoked far more often to affirm criminal convictions than civil
judgments. Of the potential harmless error cases in the sample, sixty-four
percent of the criminal cases were affirmed, but only forty-two percent of
the civil cases were affirmed.3 6 This pattern is similar to the other already
discussed reversal avoidance doctrines. Once again, no significant differ-
ence exists between civil and criminal cases in the nature of the errors being
committed,3 69 or in the strength of the winners' cases that would account
for the discrepancy in outcome.
3. Limits on Reversal Avoidance Procedures: Getting to the Merits
The two preceding sections have examined procedural rules used by appel-
late courts to avoid reversing trial court judgments. These doctrines may
have seemed unfair because they permit verdicts to stand despite being
tainted by relatively serious errors or because they permit the attorneys to
get away with rule violations. Courts recognize that overly strict adherence
to these rules can cause injustices in individual cases, and use two rules to
limit the scope of the reversal avoidance doctrines: plain error and cumu-
lative error.
a. Plain Error
The plain error doctrine is not unique to closing argument cases. It re-
lieves a party of the burden of procedural default and permits appellate re-
view of serious errors of all kinds despite lack of objection at trial. Attaching
the label "plain error" or "fundamental error" permits an appellate court
to review an allegation that a serious error has been committed-one that
significantly reduces the likelihood that the jury will return an accurate ver-
dict. The court need not affirm on procedural grounds a judgment based
on a questionable verdict, but may invoke plain error to reach the merits
and reverse on substantive grounds.
The concept of plain error is firmly imbedded in the rules of appellate
procedure and appears to be regularly applied to the more serious closing
argument errors. Appellate courts employed it to reverse twenty-three cases
from two federal circuits and thirteen states in the sample of cases, but al-
368. The numbers become even more dramatic when one looks only at intermediate
errors: seventy percent (60/86) of criminal but only thirty-eight percent (23/61) of
civil cases are affirmed.
369. E.g., State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 1982).
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luded to it in almost every case in which the court discussed procedural de-
fault. One can get a good overall sense of how procedural default and plain
error relate by looking at the numbers of cases in the sample. In 137 cases,
it was clear that the appellant had not properly preserved the issue for ap-
peal: fifty-seven cases cited procedural default as a reason for affirming,
while only twenty-three cases cited the plain error doctrine as a reason for
reversing.
United States v. Young contains the most recent statement of the plain
error doctrine as applied to closing argument errors:
[Tihe dispositive issue under the holdings of this Court is not whether
the prosecutor's remarks amounted to error, but whether they rose to
the level of "plain error .... "
The plain error doctrine of Federal Rule [of] Criminal Procedure 52(b)
tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous objec-
tion requirement. The Rule authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct
only "particularly egregious errors," those errors that "seriously affect
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." In
other words, the plain error exception to the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which
a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." Any unwarranted ex-
tension of this exacting definition of plain error would skew the Rule's
[careful balance]. Reviewing courts are not to use the plain error doc-
trine to consider trial court errors not meriting appellate review absent
timely objection ....
Especially when addressing plain error, a reviewing court cannot prop-
erly evaluate a case except by viewing such a claim against the entire
record.370
To Chief Justice Burger's description, this author would append three com-
ments: the plain error doctrine is ubiquitous. It does not stem solely from
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; its definition is hardly "exact-
ing" nor is it even particularly well understood by the courts that use it. It
is applied considerably more sparingly in criminal than civil cases.
To understand the rule, one first. must distinguish between procedural
default and waiver. A party's failure to object and to preserve an issue for
appeal may merely be an act of neglect, ignorance, or incompetence, or it
may be a deliberate, intentional decision to forgo the point. The former is
370. 470 U.S. 1, 14-16, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12-13 (1985)
(citations omitted). FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b) provides that "plain errors . . . affecting
substantial "rights" may be taken up on appeal "although they were not brought to
the attention of the court."
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procedural default, which may be excused by the plain error doctrine; the
latter is a waiver and precludes the use of plain error.3 71
Despite the simplicity with which the plain error doctrine is stated, it is
not easily applied. While courts agree on its definition, they do not always
agree on whether it should be invoked for particular closing argument er-
rors. One would expect most cases involving failure to object to egregious
errors would be reviewed anyway under the plain error doctrine, and that
does appear to be the result. Of the nine such cases in the sample in which
courts explicitly considered the question, the doctrine was invoked and the
judgment reversed in seven. 372 Likewise, one would not expect to find any
cases involving only trivial errors that were reversed for plain error, and no
such cases appeared in the sample.
Once again, the interesting cases are those involving intermediate errors.
Despite Burger's implicit claim that the definition of plain error is exact and
relatively clear, no discernible patterns exist in these cases. Several exam-
ples should suffice. A Massachusetts case in which a prosecutor com-
mented on the defendant's failure to testify was reversed as plain error; a
similar Texas case was not.173 In two cases where attorneys made pleas for
sympathy for the victim, appellate courts considered such remarks seri-
ously prejudicial and plain error; in two others, similar remarks were not
considered inflammatory enough for plain error. 74 Several state courts
found plain error when an attorney aroused the jurors' prejudices concern-
371. Courts seldom draw this distinction clearly. See Johnson v. United States, 318
U.S. 189, 63 S. Ct. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943) (prosecutor committed serious error,
defense objected but later withdrew the objection; cannot be reviewed as plain error
because it was an express waiver, not just inadvertence); United States v. Spears, 671
F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982) (defense was denied opportunity to argue, normally per se
error; cannot be reversed for plain error because counsel implicitly waived right to
argue).
Indeed, most courts use the two concepts imprecisely; e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1977) (failure to object is a waiver);
Clary Ins. Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980) (objection waived for failure
to object); Brown v. State, 639 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (failure to object
waived error).
372. E.g., Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977) (reference to appellate
review of death sentence); State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981) (appealing to
racial prejudice). But see Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1976) (remarks raising religious and ethnic prejudice not plain error).
373. Compare Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 444 N.E.2d 374 (1983)
with Brown v. State, 639 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
374. Compare Paulsen v. Gateway Transp. Co., 114 I11. App. 2d 241, 252 N.E.2d
406 (1969); Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 444 N.E.2d 374 (1983) with
People v. Handy, 657 P.2d 963 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Eckles, 83 Ill. App. 3d
292, 404 N.E.2d 358 (1980).
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ing the wealth and power of corporations; the Supreme Court did not.375
Relatively less serious errors, such as attorneys stating their personal opin-
ions concerning the proper outcome, making nasty remarks about the op-
posing attorney, and asking rhetorical questions of individual jurors, have
been held to be so serious that plain error is invoked 3 76 While the relatively
more serious errors of appealing to religious and ethnic prejudices, telling
jurors that the defendant had been found guilty by two other juries and sug-
gesting that a defendant had committed similar crimes in the past, have ex-
plicitly been found not to be serious enough for plain error.177
One can see the pattern of differential application of plain error between
civil and criminal cases. Not surprisingly, appellate courts dispense plain
errors more frugally in criminal cases than in civil. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in United States v. Young, warning that the rule is to be used "spar-
ingly," cautioning against any "unwarranted extension" of it, and criti-
cizing courts that give defendants "extravagant protection," is a classic
example of judicial attitudes.171 Since the sample contained more criminal
cases than civil, and more opinions in criminal cases discussed plain error,
if the courts applied the doctrine neutrally, one would also expect to see
more reversals in criminal cases. That is not the case. Plain error is invoked
to reverse fewer criminal cases than civil.379 It is increasingly evident that
375. Compare Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 341, 133
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1976); Manninger v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 65 Ill. App.
3d 719, 381 N.E.2d 383 (1978) with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940).
376. E.g., Ryan v. Blakey, 71 I11. App. 3d 339, 389 N.E.2d 604 (1979) (attorney
told jury he had cried and been convinced since the start); Paulsen v. Gateway Transp.
Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 241, 252 N.E.2d 406 (1969) (attacked opponent's lack of integrity
and his youth); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 1982) (prosecutor
told jury that the case was one of his strongest in years); Orchin v. Fort Worth
Poultry & Egg Co., 43 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (responded to argument
that witness had personal interest because employed by party by asking jurors if they
would fire an employee for telling truth).
377. E.g., People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1982) (prosecutor suggested that defendant may have committed similar crimes in the
past, no evidence of it); People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal.
Rptr. (1967) (prosecutor said that two other juries had found defendant guilty); Higgins
v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (remarks raising
religious, ethnic, and geographic prejudice).
378. 470 U.S. 1, 16, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1047, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13 (1985) (citations
omitted).
379. The sample contained more criminal cases than civil cases that went to verdict
(396 to 296), and opinions in more criminal than civil cases explicitly discussed plain
error (fifteen to twelve), yet fewer criminal than civil judgments were reversed (six to
nine).
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whatever the doctrine, criminal convictions are more likely to be affirmed
than civil judgments.
b. Multiple Errors
Closely related to plain error are the doctrines of cumulative error and
repeated error.3 80 Just as plain error permits a court to temper the blow of
an overly strict application of procedural default rules, cumulative and re-
peated error concepts permit a court to reverse judgments containing ex-
cessive invited, cured, and harmless errors.
The concept behind these two closely related doctrines is the same. While
one or two isolated errors may be harmless, cured, or excused because they
were invited,' 81 one can not so easily ignore a larger number of errors. The
difference is that the cumulative error doctrine applies when an argument
contains several different errors, and the repeated error doctrine refers to
the same improper argument being made several times. This author con-
siders these doctrines together because they are conceptually similar and be-
cause only six cases of "repeated error" reversals appeared in the sample.
The subsample for this section consisted of all opinions that alluded to
multiple errors as a reason for reversing and all cases which were affirmed
despite the presence of multiple errors,382 whether or not the court explicitly
considered one of the multiple error doctrines. In all, there were thirty-nine
380. Some opinions, in fact, treat all three doctrines as if they were one. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (errors taken together
were serious enough to warrant review despite absence of objection); Simmons v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 341, 133 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1976) (referring
to flagrant and repeated misconduct).
381. See, e.g., People v. Cart, 102 Ill. App. 3d 173, 429 N.E.2d 553 (1981) (one
reference to state's evidence as uncontradicted is permitted; six would be error); see
also United States v. Flemino, 691 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1982) (isolated error cured1 by
instruction); State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 365 A.2d 1135, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
845 (1976) (a single deviation from scope of rebuttal not reversible); Funk v. Venture
Stores, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 3d 115, 418 N.E.2d 498 (1981) (one incident not enough to
reverse); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960) (isolated
improper remark harmless); Suarez v. Dosky, 171 N.J. Super. 1, 407 A.2d 1237 (1979)
(a single brief remark is harmless); Roberts v. State, 571 P.2d 129 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) (lone improper remark harmless); Lopez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982) (single improper remark curable).
382. Based on having read hundreds of closing argument cases, this author has
intuitively (but not arbitrarily) defined "multiple error" cases as those in which the
court finds three or more argument errors but calls all of them harmless, waived,
cured, or invited. This is a little misleading, since the courts do not define "multiple
errors" numerically. However, it is the only way this author can include cases in the
subsample where courts had opportunities to invoke multiple error concepts but
declined them.
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such cases. Appellate courts affirmed seventeen, but reversed twenty.3 8 3
Among the cases reversed were those containing errors that, if committed
singly, would have been harmless 3 4 or cured." 5 No case appeared in the
sample in which multiple invited errors wanted reversal. This is not sur-
prising, since the invited error doctrine is the strongest reversal avoidance
device. While multiple error concepts theoretically apply to invited errors
as well as to other kinds, it may be that in practice the invited error doctrine
is simply too strong to be overcome. In the small subsample of multiple er-
ror cases, courts affirmed or reversed on other grounds all four of the cases
containing invited error, 386 but the number is too small to draw any reliable
conclusions about whether multiple invited errors can ever be reversible.
Little else can be said about the multiple error doctrine. No appellate
opinion discusses anything beyond what has already been mentioned. Fol-
lowing the most detailed statement concerning the multiple error doctrine
is:
Each of the ... errors was, in all likelihood, harmless, especially in light
of the overwhelming evidence against appellant and would not nor-
mally warrant this Court's intervention .... However, the harmless
error analysis is not unlimited. We cannot ignore the numerous errors
that occurred ... and still label them "harmless." Ultimately, suffi-
cient harmless errors must be deemed "harmful. '387
This is hardly an in depth discussion of the doctrine's parameters and how
to apply it! However, it is possible to draw a few inferences from the ways
in which courts use multiple error concepts. If the errors are minor, the case
is not likely to be reversed even if several are present; but if the case involves
several intermediate errors, the likelihood of reversal is high. All six cases
383. The remaining two opinions were decided on other grounds and did not reach
the reversible error question.
384. E.g., People v. Dowdell, 88 A.D.2d 239, 453 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1982) (each error
harmless, especially in light of overwhelming evidence, but we cannot ignore the
numerous errors that occurred and still label them harmless).
385. E.g., Basden v. Kiefner Bros., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 218, 414 N.E.2d 951
(1980) (corrective instruction did not cure error because improper argument was
repeated); People v. Davis, 58 Mich. App. 159, 227 N.W.2d 269 (1975) (if remarks
repeated, instruction does not cure error).
386. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d
1 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 431 N.E.2d 880 (1982). In
People v. Blackman, 88 A.D.2d 620, 450 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1982), the court reversed a
conviction because of the cumulative effect of four errors that otherwise would have
been harmless; but it separately holds a fifth error to have been invited and not one
of the multiple errors warranting reversal.
387. People v. Dowdell, 88 A.D.2d 239, , 453 N.Y.S.2d 174, 180 (1982).
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in the sample that involved multiple minor errors were affirmed,388 while
over eighty percent of the cases involving multiple intermediate errors were
reversed.38 9 The other conclusion that can be drawn is that, once again, the
law is applied differently in civil and criminal cases. While all seven civil
cases involving multiple intermediate errors were reversed; only ten out of
fourteen criminal cases were reversed.
c. Excessive Verdicts
In eight opinions from different courts, appellate judges looked at the
excessiveness of the verdict in deciding whether to reverse for closing ar-
gument errors. In each case where the verdict was found excessive, the court
reversed the judgment. Remittitur is not considered an adequate substitute
remedy. Not a single opiiion appeared in the sample of 700 cases in which
courts approved the use of remittitur as a substitute remedy.39° However, it
is not clear whether reversing for the excessiveness of the verdict is an in-
dependent doctrine or is merely a variation of several already discussed. If
a verdict is excessive, then the error obviously has affected the jury, and it
cannot be considered harmless.39' An excessive verdict affects a party's sub-
388. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d
1 (1985) (prosecutor stated his personal opinion on the issues three different times;
conviction affirmed); People v. Constant, 645 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1982) (repeated reference
to defendant laughing during trial).
389. Seventeen were reversed, four affirmed. Compare Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d
940 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983), overruled on other grounds,
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (1985) (en banc) (prosecutor stated personal opinion
on the merits, discussed consequences of conviction, and made two "safe streets"
arguments; death sentence reversed) with DeBolt v. State, 604 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (prosecutor stated personal opinion, discussed consequences of conviction,
and made a "safe streets" argument; death sentence affirmed); compare People v.
Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 122, 429 N.E.2d 905 (1981) (prosecutor misstated law,
indirectly commented on defendant's failure to testify, and attempted to weaken the
burden of proof; conviction reversed) with State v. Jensen, 308 Minn. 377, 242
N.W.2d 109 (1976) (prosecutor alluded to unintroduced evidence, misstated law,
commented indirectly on defendant's failure to testify, attempted to weaken the state's
burden of proof, and suggested that defendant's not guilty plea was not a denial of
guilt; conviction affirmed).
390. See, e.g., Minneapolis, S.P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 51 S.
Ct. 501, 75 L. Ed. 1243 (1931) (striking down lower court's use of remittitur). In
one criminal case, the appellate court reduced an excessive sentence but did not reverse
the conviction. Cowles v. State, 636 P.2d 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
391. Compare Gordon v. Nail, 379 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1980) (error not harmless
because verdict very large) with Halpin v. Pekin Thrifty Drug Co., 79 I11. App. 2d
153, 223 N.E.2d 708 (1967) (error not reversible because verdict not excessive).
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stantial rights and thus warrants application of the plain error doctrine.3 92
An excessive verdict shows that any attempt to cure the effect of the error
has failed.3 93 It could be argued that an excessive verdict shows that the ar-
gument went beyond the level of invited retaliation necessary to "right the
scale." This author concludes, therefore, that this is merely part of those
other doctrines, although no opinion explicitly addresses the question.
F. "It Isn't Error But Don't do it Again"
One final characteristic of appellate review of closing argument errors
deserves brief mention. Sometimes, two contradictory messages concern-
ing whether a particular argument is error appear in the same opinion. Such
an opinion typically uses reasoning which concludes that although the ar-
gument is not condoned, it was within the court's discretion to overrule
the objection.39
There are enough such opinions to warrant taking the issue seriously.
Twenty-three cases from two federal circuits and seventeen different states
contain such contradictions. They cannot all be dismissed as distorted
harmless error cases. Rather, they are cases where the courts appear hold
that the arguments are improper but are reluctant to label them as error.
While courts could have affirmed many of these cases under the traditional
harmless error test, they have for some reason chosen this strange alternate
route. It is as if they wish attorneys would stop making a particular argu-
ment, but deliberately refuse to label it error so that no one will be able to
appeal on it in the future.
The likely explanation for this phenomenon is two-fold. First, it is clear
that some judges are uncomfortable invoking reversal avoidance doctrines,
especially harmless error. Their inherent senses of fairness probably are
392. See School Bd. of Palm Beach County v. Taylor, 365 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (no objection made, verdicts would not be overturned were they not
excessive).
393. See Cox v. Valley Fair Corp., 83 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980) (reversed for
excessive award despite judge's cautionary instruction).
394. See, e.g., Helton v. State, 424 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (argument
"not proper" but does not require new trial); People v. Upshaw, 103 II1. App. 3d
690, , 431 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (1981) (argument "better left unsaid", but no error);
State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1977) (argument disapproved but no abuse
of discretion in permitting it); Bonner v. State, 43 Md. App. 518, 406 A.2d 646
(1979) (comments not condoned but judge within discretion to allow); Frank Realty
Inc. v. Heuvel, 284 Or. 301, 586 P.2d 1123 (1978) (argument "not condoned" but
not abuse of discretion to permit it); Harmon v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 21 Utah 2d 361,
445 P.2d 773 (1968) (ordinarily, argument "should be permitted", but within discretion
for judge to forbid it).
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bothered by admitting that an error occurred but affirming the verdict any-
way. If the improper argument could be characterized as something other
than and slightly less serious than an actual error, it is easier to affirm. Thus
courts point out the "better practices," 3 95 "disapprove" of some argu-
ments, 396 and "do not condone" others,3 97 label arguments as "ill-ad-
vised", 9s "better left unsaid," 3 99 and even "condemn" arguments, 4°° while
stopping short of calling them error. One court even explicitly states that,
while an argument came close to being improper, it was not improper. 40
The second part of the explanation lies in the fact that judges and attor-
neys are largely unaware of the existence of a law of closing argument. They
are faced on appeal with what appears to them to be a sui generis issue con-
cerning attorney misconduct. They focus their attention on whether the
conduct is proper or improper, with little appreciation for the fact that the
issue probably has been decided previously. 4°2 Because they may never have
thought of closing argument in terms of legal rules, they assume that mis-
conduct in argument, while not to be condoned, amounts to something less
than "legal error." They reserve that concept for violations of the legal rules
of more familiar bodies of law.
III. Conclusion
The picture of closing argument procedure that emerges is a more com-
plex, more rule-bound, and less discretionary one than previously had been
395. See, e.g., United States v. Dawson, 467 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1972); Roberts v.
State, 571 P.2d 129 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Jewell v. Wisconsin-Minn. Light &
Power Co., 181 Wis. 56, 194 N.W. 31 (1923).
396. See, e.g., United States v. Ziak, 360 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1966); McCullough v.
Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 73 P.2d 649 (1937); State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390
(Iowa 1977).
397. See, e.g., Bonner v. State, 43 Md. App. 518, 406 A.2d 646 (1979); State v.
Sanderson, 22 N.C. App. 669, 207 S.E.2d 341 (1974); Frank Realty, Inc. v. Heuvel,
284 Or. 301, 586 P.2d 1123 (1978).
398. Helton v. State, 424 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
399. People v. Upshaw, 103 Ill. App. 3d 690, 431 N.E.2d 1138 (1981).
400. State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976); People v. Higgins,
88 A.D.2d 921, 450 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982).
401. Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982).
402. Indeed, thirteen of the fourteen cases that are not just poorly articulated,
harmless, invited, cured, or waived error cases, contain no citation of authority to
support the court. Three opinions contain inapplicable citations but none on the point
being discussed, e.g., State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1977); two cite cases
that reach different results and distinguish them, but cite no cases in support, e.g.,
Biegler v. Kirby, 281 Or. 423, 574 P.2d 1127 (1978); and seven cite no cases at all,
e.g., United States v. Ziak, 360 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1966); Hines v. State, 249 Ga.
257, 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982); In re Maier's Estate, 236 Iowa 960, 20 N.W.2d 425
(1945); Harmon v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 21 Utah 2d 361, 445 P.2d 773 (1968).
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described. Most writers who have generalized about this body of law have
downplayed the role of procedural rules and emphasized the importance of
trial court discretion? °0 To the extent that those writers make empirical as-
sertions about how they think trial courts work in practice, they may be
correct; this author has not tried to explore that issue. However, to the ex-
tent that they make assertions about the structure of closing argument law,
their statements are either misleading or wrong. Although discretion cer-
tainly is an important component of closing argument procedure, it is the
ordinary sort of delimited discretion found in most well-developed systems
of legal rules .404 This author found no evidence of any sweeping legal prin-
ciple that the predominant tool for controlling closing arguments should be
the trial judge's exercise of discretion. This author also found no evidence
to support the related claim by some writers that appellate courts take vi-
olations of the rules of closing argument less seriously than other kinds of
legal errors. 4°5 To the contrary, appeals based on closing argument law er-
rors proved just as likely to result in reversal as appeals based on other
claims./
The author did find a generally shared ideology of trials. At its heart seems
to be the notion that partisan adversarial presentations facilitate the search
for truth. 40 7 According to this principle, giving lawyers relatively unre-
403. Much of the existing literature contains sweeping generalizations concerning
the scope of judicial discretion, such as: "The argument of counsel is subject to the
supervisory direction and control of the trial court, which has a wide discretion in
such regard. [Tihere exist no hard and fast rules to which counsel must adhere
J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 13. Such statements obviously are overbroad.
404. See, e.g., R. BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS (1931).
405. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 1, at 537. "One of the most striking features
of the law governing arguments is the infrequency with which appellate courts reverse
a conviction on the ground of argument error." Crump's statement was not supported
by any evidence.
406. In the primary sample, 2407o of the cases were reversed on appeal for violations
of the rules of closing argument. That compares favorably to the general reversal rate
for all kinds of cases, which the author calculated to be 22-27o. The lower figure
comes from the National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics
Annual Report (1980), derived by adding up the appropriate reports from the twenty-
two states that reported the figure. It represents 32,385 cases of all kinds. The higher
figure is based on the author's random sample of 469 appellate opinions in all kinds
of cases from state and federal courts, drawn in the same way as the closing argument
sample. In civil cases, the reversal rate is higher: 30% for closing argument errors,
31-39% for cases generally. In criminal cases, the reversal rates were 19o for closing
argument errors, and 14-17% for errors generally.
407. The author believes the merits of the adversary system are overrated. However,
most appellate judges who write opinions seem to share the views of those who tout
the adversarial system as the best vehicle for producing accurate results. See S.
LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1984). The debate over whether this really is the
best procedure overall for finding the truth is beyond the scope of this article.
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stricted freedom in closing argument promotes just results. However, ap-
pellate courts seem also, though less explicitly, to recognize that the
appearance of justice is important. A party's opportunity to participate in
closing argument is important for its own sake as a legitimating ritual. These
complementary notions are bounded by one other important principle of
the judicial system: efficiency. Thus there exists a rule structure that tends
to limit but not eliminate partisan argument.
Within this more or less shared ideology, individual rules of closing ar-
gument procedure seem to be trying to accommodate the competing, often
incompatible, values that flow from our complex views of what purposes a
trial is supposed to serve. Certainly one expects closing arguments to facil-
itate the truth-seeking function of the trial. This principle is well illustrated
by the rules requiring the trial judge to promptly correct misstatements of
law and fact, and to try to minimize the deleterious impact of arguments
appealing to emotions or urging the jurors to disregard the evidence. At the
same time, one wishes to preserve the participatory aspect of the process,
so that no one can say fair hearing was not given. Closing argument pro-
cedure accommodates this need well. For example, the law gives great pro-
tection to a party's right to participate in closing argument, even elevating
it to a consti -. onal right in criminal cases. This protection is given equally
to those wh.- juld aid the truth-seeking process and those who would use
the opportunity to obstruct truth-finding and thwart justice. The need for
efficiency in the court system is also recognized. Closing argument proce-
dure, like other bodies of law, emphasizes values associated with that prin-
ciple. Trial judges have discretion to impose time limits on arguments, and
appellate judges are encouraged to dispose of appeals on merit-avoiding
grounds like procedural default, cured error, and invited error. 408 The rules
of closing argument procedure reflect an uneasy balance among these prin-
ciples, apparently willing to tolerate some degree of risk of inaccurate or
unfair verdicts in order to operate the system efficiently and preserve its
adversarial nature.
One can make another generalization about appellate opinions concern-
ing the law of closing argument procedure: criminal defendants do not fare
as well as civil litigants.4 9 In the instances where courts created different
408. More than twice as many cases containing violations of closing argument rules
are affirmed under these doctrines than are reversed. In the sample, of all cases in
which the court admitted errors had occurred, 6801 were affirmed anyway, 320o
reversed.
409. That criminal defendants do not fare well in the appeals courts may or may
not be significant. The possibility that this is symptomatic of a pervasive bias against
defendants has been suggested. See Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals
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rules for civil and criminal cases, civil litigants invariably benefitted from
the more favorable variation. For example, a civil defendant who admits
the case against him and relies on an affirmative defense earns the right to
open a close; a similarly situated criminal defendant does not. A civil
defendant in many states may waive argument to deprive the plaintiff of
rebuttal; a criminal defendant may not. Overall, for violations of rules that
are supposed to operate similarly in civil and criminal cases, criminal
defendants are significantly less likely to win reversal for rule violations than
civil litigants. In the sample of appellate decisions, only nineteen percent of
defendants won new trials, whereas a full thirty percent of civil litigants were
successful. 40
The legal structure within which closing arguments take place is a com-
plex one. It has been the subject of scholarly analysis too infrequently. This
analysis attempts to bring some order to the rules of closing argument pro-
cedure, more as a preliminary step toward understanding the trial process
than as an end in itself. Many individual legal issues touched upon in this
article beg for more detailed research and analysis. The author trusts that
this article will aid those who pursue these issues in the law reviews and in
the courts, so that we may develop a more sophisticated jurisprudence of
trials.
and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal, A.B.F. REs. J. 543
(1982). It remains to be seen whether defendants also fare poorly when judges have
to make decisions under these rules at the trial court level.
410. One argument is that the difference in appeals rates is attributable to the fact
that the state bears such a heavy burden of proof in criminal cases. Marginal cases
where the evidence is not strong will result -in an appealable verdict in a civil case,
and if error were present, it would more likely be reversible because of weak evidence.
In a criminal case, such marginal cases supposedly result in unappealable verdicts of
acquittal, as jurors give defendants the benefit of the doubt. Thus, the argument runs,
errors in cases that get to the court of appeals are more likely to be found harmless
in criminal cases because the evidence will be stronger. Some of the basis for this
argument is undercut by R. SiMoN, THiE JURY: ITs ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 55-57
(1980), who discovered that when asked to quantify the different burdens of proof,
jurors in civil cases had a mean of 77%, and in criminal cases the mean was 7907o.
The argument also is undercut when one eliminates harmless error cases from the two
samples. When the excess harmless error cases in civil appeals were eliminated in the
sample, the remaining cases were reversed at a slightly greater disproportionate rate:
32% in civil cases, 14076 in criminal.
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TABLE 3
Frequency of Appellate Reversals
of Trial Court Results
[10:47
Percent of case reversed:
All cases Civil cases Criminal cases
Closing argument cases 2407o 3000 19070
(n = 692) 392
Cases that resulted in verdict
in trial court 27076 390a 17%
(n = 469)
All cases appealed 310o 390 180
(n = 1313)
All cases, sporadic data on
state courts 22076 3107o 1400
(n = 32,385)
Table 4
Success Rate for Criminal Appeals
Compared to Civil Appeals in Cases of Intermediate
Closing Argument Errors
Percentage of successful crim- Percentage of successful civil
inal appeals appeals
All closing argument cases
containing intermediate 2207o 46%
errors'
Procedural default cases' 1407o 360o
Invited error cases' 2307o 3307o
Cured error cases' 18070 3307o
Harmless error cases' 3007o 62%
Plain error cases' 40076 75076
Multiple error cases7  7107o 10000
1. In criminal cases, 38 of 72 were reversed, in civil cases 61 of 134 were reversed
2. Subsample described supra at text following note 280.
3. Subsample described supra at text accompanying note 297.
4. Subsample described supra at text accompanying note 315.
5.. Subsample described supra at text following note 318 and at footnote 337.
6. Subsample described supra at footnote 347.
7. Subsample described supra at text accompanying notes 350-51, and 357.
